| Farmland conversion is inevitable during the course of economy development. From the perspective of spatial and industrial allocation of land resource, the expansion of industrialization and urbanization are manifested as farmland conversion. With a great deal of agricultural lands transform into non-agricultural use in China, farmers' land property rights have been suffering extensive and serious damages. Until now, researchers have made abundant discussions related to expropriation standard, expropriation procedure, compensation mechanism, settlement approach, social security and so forth. But few studies have connected expropriation reform with farmland property-right innovation. Therefore, it becomes significant and urgent to make research from property-right perspective.From the property-right perspective, this study mainly focuses on the land-lost fanners' rights impairment and land expropriation system reform in China. On the basis of reviewing evolvement of China's land expropriation system, firstly, the author analyzes the characteristics and limitations of current expropriation system. Then measures the extent of interest impairment using spatial analysis model for the land increment income, and discusses the inner reason and mechanism for impairment. Finally, combining with farmers' cognition and some helpful experiences from other countries and areas, the author put forward useful measures for land expropriation system reform mainly from the property-right perspective.This researching item consists of nigh parts as follows.Chapter 1: Exordium. In the first part of this paper, the author introduces why he makes this study from the property-right perspective. As for farmers' interest impairment and land expropriation system reform, the literature summary and comment are expounded. Following, the author shows us the researching purpose, researching contents and technique route.Chapter 2: Theoretical foundation: Trade cost, property-right and institution. On the basis of explaining famous theories on trade cost, property-right and institution, the author designs an analyzing framework through seeking the relationship between institution environments, trade cost and institution innovation. i.e. External profits will accumulate gradually with institution environment changes, which can not get from the original institution. Therewith, farmers will bring forward their impulse to obtain more right demands. However, trade cost is inescapable during right definition. The optimal property-right will appear when marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue, and then institution innovation will be accomplished. Finally, a new institutional equilibrium and its corresponding public domain will be created.Chapter 3: Institution evolvement of China's land expropriation system. In the following study, the author looks back the institution evolvement of land expropriation system since 1494, analyzes the characteristics and defects of current expropriation system, and also makes an institution analysis about the reasons that caused these defects. It is pointed that China's expropriation system was produced following a special era and policy background, which not only mitigated the huge financial pressure especially for local governments, but also provided effective guarantee of land resource for social-economy growth. The state constitutes the exclusive subject and rural collective land is the sole object; both compensate and allocation mechanisms are endowed with characteristics of planned economy; farmland expropriation was monopolized by governments, all these above can be considered as the typical features of such expropriation system. However, as institution innovation is lagged behind the institution environment change, current expropriation system presents some defects, such as the over extensive target, low compensation standard, irregular allocation measure and unreasonable procedure.Chapter 4: Analysis of the extent to which farmers' interest lost during farmland expropriation. In order to find out the extent to which farmer's rights have been bereaved, in the fourth part of this paper, the researcher designs a spatial analysis model for the land increment income. Besides, using the data of Jiangsu province, the author makes a detailed analysis about the influence of "scissors" price, governmental monopoly, market failure on land increment income got by farmers. It's found that, under current expropriation system, farmers' right lost is consisted of three parts: the first part is the lower price caused by governmental monopoly, the second part is the unfair price derived from the discrimination between agricultural and industrial products, the third part is the value lost of farmland's social security function because of the market failure. However, all kinds of farmers' lost above were taken away by governments finally. The proportion that framers can share is very low. It is clear that farmers' rights were bereaved severely in the course of land expropriation.Chapter 5: Analysis of the reason why farmers' interest lost during farmland expropriation. On the basis of usual factors that lead to right impairment, the author explores causes in term of expropriation system, farmland property-right and farmers' own ability, and then searches out the real reason from the perspective of property right. It is not difficult to understand that farmers' lost is caused by the irregular governmental behavior and also the incompetence in protecting their own rights. The irregular expropriation system leads to impotent restriction to governmental behavior. Farmers' right-safeguard ability has been bereaved by the absence of property-right base, exclusiveness of land property-right and unfair limitation together. And what's more, the low organization ability also leads to the inability in protecting rights. Therefore, for the sake of protecting farmers' rights and interests, it is indispensable to impel innovation both of current expropriation system and farmland property-right institution.Chapter 6: Inner mechanism of farmers' interest impairment from the perspective of property-right. The researcher set up a model of public domain of property right, in order to analyze the cost and benefit that farmers get during the course of distinguishing land rights and study how public domain occurs and changes. Finally, the inner mechanism in which farmer's right is deprived is found out. It is found that certain rights are kept in public domain I finally, because it is difficult to make an absolute definition to land value and public interest, and it is incapable for the ordinary rules to explain farmland property-right clearly. When institution environment changes and external profits impel more right demand, farmers bring forward their impulse to define right further. However, deferred system makes cost too high for farmers to create a new right definition. As a result, farmers have to give up their certain rights, and meanwhile, public domain II appears. However, because of the low organization ability and the difficulty of right-safeguard, it is impossible for farmers to get the property rights kept in public domain I and II equality. That is why their rights have to be bereaved to certain extent.Chapter 7: The relationship among property-right cognition, farmer's will and expropriation reform. Taking Nanjing city in Jiangsu province and Yingtan city in Jiangxi province as examples, the author explores the influence of property-right cognition on farmers' appraisal towards expropriation system. It is found that most farmers are unsatisfied to current institution, which can be described as follows: most of them refuse expropriation; compensation is not enough to support farmers' long term livelihood; both farmers' participation right and information right are absent; besides, the mechanism of social security is imperfect in practical implementation, although it has been considered in the compensation distribution. Farmers' evaluation is greatly depended on their property-right cognition, so the diversity of cognition in land ownership, land increment right and expropriation negotiation right lead to differences of expropriation will. If farmer can hold more rights, their unwilling emotion will be more obvious. If expropriation condition can be transferred to suit farmers' property-right cognition, their unwillingness will be reduced remarkably. That is to say, it is necessary to promote reform according to farmers' land property-right cognition. Meanwhile, policy makers should care more about the social security function of farmland and then bear out the corresponding value in expropriation compensation, which is attached much importance by farmers.According to the researching standpoints concluded above, useful policy suggestions are put forward towards improving China's expropriation system and safeguarding farmers' land interest. i.e. Under the guiding principle that fanners' rights and interests should be protected, China's expropriation system reform should come true through the following ways. On the one hand, we should standardize government's behavior in virtue of emphasizing farmer's rights. On the other hand, we should facilitate reform and dwindle the public domain of property right to safeguard fanner's right effectively, combining with fanners' cognition right.
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