Research On Co-opetition Mechanism Of The Units In The Telecommunications Industrial Value Chain

With the development of the telecommunications technology and the increasing of the market requirement for the qualities of the services, the data service becomes the important impetus which urges the telecommunications operators to increasing profits. At the same time, the development of the data service also results in the profound change of the mode of the traditional telecommunications industrial value chain: All kinds of new units appear in the industrial chain, such as Services providers(SP), virtual operators, application integrators and so on, which makes the division of telecommunications industry further detail. The new telecommunications industrial value chain comes about new fission and owns more value links and value content when it expends original telecommunications content.However, the increase of the units brings on the complexity of the telecommunications industrial value chain. The links of the industrial chain gradually exposes many questions. It mainly acts as followed: First, the units in the industrial chain develop in imbalance. Equipment manufacturers hold basic network standard and core technology and become the leaders of technology innovation and technology market jointly with terminal manufacturers. They develop fast. But the middle service market which engages in information processing and application is weak. It is the bottleneck of value increment. For example, the content which SP provide lack of innovation and pertinency and the development of SP is not mature, which leads to some social, economic and legal problem, such as cheat, nasty message, annoyed advertisement and so on. The industrial chain is a body which the units need to develop jointly. Any unit in the industrial chain which lack and lag will influence the value-added efficiency of the whole industrial chain. Secondly, there is some conflict about coordination among the units in the industrial chain. It mainly acts no smooth coordination and cooperation between telecommunications operators and other units in the industrial chain, which results in benefits conflict among the units. The balance conflict between telecommunications operators and SP is the focus problem all the time. Although adopting the strategy of terminal customization can solve the compatibility of the new services of the telecommunications operators and terminal product, it brings enormous cost subsidy and the pressure of the marketing for telecommunications operator and terminal manufacturers also bear the risk of weakening brand and decreasing profits. The attitude of the both is contradictory and complex, which needs to find an effective solution to correspond the both conflicts. Thirdly, the development of the units of the telecommunications industrial value chain cannot adapt to the environment. It behaves as the technology progress and the services cannot develop jointly, the development of the services cannot meet the desire of the customers, such as VOD, and the co-opetition of telecommunications operators and SP need the controlling. The above phenomena show the conflict between the development of the units and external environment, which can influence the harmonious development of the telecommunications industrial value chain. It is necessary to analyze the mechanism of action among the units of the telecommunications industrial value chain and propose the suitable strategy of the development of the telecommunications industrial value chain in order to solve above questions. At present, many references analyze the form of the telecommunications industrial value chain, the cooperative mode of the units, evolutionary trend of the telecommunications industrial value chain and so on, which lack of the research of the mechanism, especially the research of co-opetition mechanism of the telecommunications industrial value chain. It is the reason of choosing the theme.The telecommunications industrial value chain is telecommunications industry system which centers on telecommunications operators, is composed of various units which are dynamically correlative and unceasingly evolutionary, and aims at providing information product and creating service value for end customers. Aiming at the target of creating value for the customers, the telecommunications industrial value chain takes on the characteristics of dynamical correlation and synergetic evolutionary. The telecommunications product is different from manufacture product and behaves as the two dimension attribute of the telecommunications product, which needs to deal with the co-opetition relationships among telecommunications operators, SP and terminal manufacturers. The co-opetition mechanism of the telecommunications industrial value chain is defined as the interactional units in the telecommunications industrial value chain generate co-opetition action which result in the particular law aiming at value promotion of the whole industrial chain. The telecommunications industrial value chain is characteristics of self-organization, nonlinear, value symbiosis and dynamically correlation.The synergetic evolution of the units in the telecommunications industrial value chain is drove by some impetus. The telecommunications industrial value chain behaves as instability, which provides the dynamical premise for the evolution of the units of the telecommunications industrial value chain. It considers value as the order parameter of the evolution of the units in telecommunications industrial value chain. The value dominates the action of the units in the industrial chain and is improved with the optimization of mode of the telecommunications industrial value chain, which impel the evolution of the whole telecommunications industry system. Therefore, the drive of the evolution of units in the telecommunications industrial value chain is the value increment. At the same time, the controlling parameters, such as technology, desire and policies and so on, also play the important role during the evolution of the units in the telecommunications industrial value chain. After illuminating the drive of the evolution of the units in the telecommunications industrial value chain, it needs to further expound the interaction law of the units in the telecommunications industrial value chain. It reveals the mechanism of action among the units in the telecommunications industrial value chain from the view of hypercycle. This paper considers the telecommunications industrial value chain as an organic life system which all units form hypercyclic structure based on value creation. It analyzes self-replicative capabilities of each unit, mutual coupled capabilities among the units and aberrance and selective capabilities which the stable development of system structure depends on, reflects evolutionary mechanism which the telecommunications industrial value chain increase the efficiency of value creation. Forming the hypercyclic structure in the interior of the telecommunications industry through aberrance and natural selection can guarantee co-opetition and co-evolution among the units and is beneficial to improving the efficiency of creating value and the harmonious development of the telecommunications industry. Therefore, it is an effective pathway choice for the harmonious development of the telecommunications industry to establish the hypercyclic structure. AT the same time, the paper analyzes the aberrance trend of the units of the telecommunications using the hypercyclic evolutionary law. It is described that there will appear more and more mutants and services, which make the structure of the telecommunications industrial value chain trend to be complication and optimization. However, several units in the industrial chain develop badly, such as SP, and the coordination conflict among telecommunications operators, SP and terminal manufacturers influence the synergetic evolution of the whole industrial chain. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the game relationships of the three units. The paper introduces the concept of the key species and defines telecommunications operators as key species. The business mode of the telecommunications industrial value chain is the symbiosis relationships between key species and satellitic species and centered on the key species—telecommunications operators. Therefore, it chooses the research of the relationships between telecommunications operators and SP, between telecommunications operators and terminal manufacturers centered on telecommunications operators.The paper discusses the reason and trend of transformation of telecommunications operators from the own need of telecommunications operators and the development scale of the value-added services market. Telecommunications operators transform and enter the value-added services market. They will confront SP who are the cooperative peer and competitor. The relationships are subtle and uncertainty. It describes the evolutionary track of long co-opetition between telecommunications operators and SP based on evolutionary game. Therefore, it establishes the competitive and cooperative model between telecommunications operators and SP. In competitive model, the paper points out that if telecommunications operators go into the value-added services market with substitute service, operators can only partly distribute the profits of SP and the quantities of the customers and profits of telecommunications operators is smaller than SP'when it reaches equilibrium in order to keep SP continuing to exist and develop and keep the stability of the telecommunications industrial value chain, which need the government constitutes corresponding controlled policies to restrict the penetration of telecommunications operators for value-added services. In cooperative model, based on the analysis of the business mode which the both parties cooperate, it builds the revenue sharing contract to analyze the cooperative mechanism, computes it using the model of Stackelberg and asymmetry Nash negotiation. The paper proposes the following conclusions: the price, allocation coefficient and both profits are positive correlation to market desire and negative correlation to price flexibility coefficient. The cooperative mechanism based on asymmetry Nash negotiation model is more optimizing than Stackelberg model. In the cooperative mechanism based on asymmetry Nash negotiation model, allocation coefficient is positive correlation to the negotiation ability. The paper uses the cooperative and competitive case between China Mobile and Tencent as demonstration. It points out the strong power position of China Mobile is the root that fetion reorganize mobile QQ. According to theory analysis and practical case, it suggests that the government constitutes controlled strategy to protect SP for healthy development and SP should hold the chance of telecommunications reform and the application of 3G to improve the quality of the services and exploit the field of the services.The independent development mode between telecommunications operators and terminal manufacturers causes the incompatibility of terminal product and services, so telecommunications operators need to adopt terminal customization to solve the problem. At present terminal customization is divided into several modes of telecommunications recommendation, elementary customization, common customization, cooperative R&D and popularization, general customization and customer customization all over the world. The action of terminal customization exist principal-agent relationships. The success of terminal customization depends on the efforts which telecommunications operators and terminal manufacturers jointly put, so it is a problem of double moral hazard. The paper design principal-agent model and double incentive model under the conditions of double moral hazard based on the terminal customization mode of common customization and cooperative R&D and popularization. In principal-agent model, it establishes the optimized incentive intensity and its influencing factors which operators give terminal manufacturers. Therefore, telecommunications operators should give proper incentive intensity to terminal manufacturers combining own effort and the parameters of terminal manufacturers and design fixed pay contract and incentive contract which changes with performance according to stochastic factors of market, which diminishes the negative effect for the both profits because of uncertain factors in market. In double incentive model, it computes the conditions of ability and cost coefficient when the profits of telecommunications operators, terminal manufacturers and the both is biggest, discusses the optimized decision of distribution proportion of terminal manufacturers in the conditions of optimization of each expected utility, offers the dynamic influencing factors and changing interval of distribution proportion. It uses the case of terminal customization of China Mobile and Korea SKT as demonstration and points out that telecommunications operators should adopt terminal customization at suitable time and suitable quantities and terminal manufacturers should develop the industrial mode centered on services.