Research On Interest Conflict And Coordination For Preventing And Controlling Of Chinese Industrial Pollution

With the efforts in more than 30 years, series of policies and laws have been set up on protecting environment. However, the performance of environmental protection is still not satisfied and some hardly irreconcilable conflicts still exist between the prevention and control of industrial pollution and the economic development, which has been trapped into the vicious circle from sewage violation to bad accident, to environmental remediation and to more large-scale sewage violation. Recently, governments, enterprises and the public have even attached a great importance to the industrial pollution, it did little to resolve the conflict because some key factors of triggering conflict have been closely linked with some mistakes of development strategy. Therefore, it becomes a worthy subject for studying to explore the causation and coordination mechanisms of interest conflicts between different stakeholders in the industrial pollution based on the perspective of interest conflict and the management systems of environment. At the same time, this subject is what the author study on.The practical significance and target of this topic is to help some public administration to go beyond piecemeal approaches on the technical level and grasp the root causation why the policy cannot be smoothly implemented on the strategic level, to formulate more comprehensive and more appropriate policies to achieve sustainable development on economy and the environment.The current development strategy is GDP-oriented and growth-priority, so that the influencing factors to the performance of the industrial pollution prevention should be studied from two parts, one is institutional transition, another is expected performance. The strategy will cause and intensify the above-mentioned conflicts through two aspects as follows:As for marco-aspects, in pursuit of a rapid short term growth of GDP, the local governments with their benefits of an increasingly independent depend on the extensive mode of growth. This led to the deterioration of the environment on the process of distribution of benefits between the local governments and central government (or higher levels of government) and on the process of government's competition among local governments. Thus, it is obvious that institutional transition creates conflict of regional environmental interest.As for mirco-aspects: in order to attract more enterprises to create more GDP, local governments tilt toward enterprises on allocation of environmental resources. Because of the principal-agent relations between the public and governments at all levels and environmental regulatory authorities, agents will make rational choices under asymmetric information after they compare expected income with pollution prevention performance to result in environmental regulatory collusion become normal state and render conflict of local environmental interest. To all intents it is a consequence because the power lack of supervision and constraints, thus it belongs to the scope of governance structure.From above, we can see that the conflict between pollution prevention and economic development in China comes from the growth-prioritized development strategy. Therefore, it's necessary to resolve the conflict fundamentally by making institutional innovation.In order to coordinate the conflict of interest among the departments at all levels' government in industrial pollution prevention and control, assessment mechanism of local government selecting GDP as one of core indicators, horizontal and vertical integration of administrative system for pollution prevention and control with should be set up, environmental taxes should be introduced as soon as possible, Emissions Trading System(ETC) should be strengthened accelerating, compensation for environmental protection based on Kaldor-Hicks Improvement and transfer payments systems of pollution controlling should be built gradually.In order to coordinate conflict of interest among government departments, enterprises and the public, it's of great urgency that vertical management systems for environmental monitoring should be built to ensure the impartiality and authenticity of the environmental information and to guarantee the effective implementation of pollution prevention and control policy. At the same time the mechanism for public participation in environmental protection should be constantly improved, so that the public and NGO could play their full role in environmental protection.However, it must be clearly recognized that it be difficult to achieved results in the short-term for institutional innovation and after-effects eliminating of the old strategy. This determines that the above-mentioned conflict will last for a long time.In theory, the core of innovation in this paper is that the different types and formation mechanism of conflicts of interests, evolution's path of interest relations and the consequences of evolution have been analyzed for industrial pollution prevention and control in China separately in accordance with the various levels, including between central government and local governments, local government and local government, the government(environmental regulatory authorities) and enterprises and the public, and with application of the analytical framework of conflict of interest. Then it is proposed that only institutional innovation can resolve effectively the contradiction between development and pollution.Other main innovations include:(1)It is the relationship of Chinese pollution control system, policies and environmental performance that been analyzed systematicly by using econometric models from panel data over the years industrial pollution and economic development in China. The conclusions can be better explained that most industrial pollution in China should be the government pollution, including permitted and identified with and supported pollution by governments.(2) The trichotomy of Environmental Information Distortion (TEID) was brought forward in this paper. TEID can be trichotomized into Rule Distortion (RD), Rule-violating Distortion (RVD) and Behavioral Distortion (BD). With the perspectives of information asymmetry, bounded rational respectively etc., causes of RD, RVD and BD were analyzed. In the final, this paper analyzed the relationship among RD, RVD and BD briefly and put forward some measures to improve environmental information quality.In Practice, the analytical framework of conflict of interest was used to analyze the actual state of sulfur dioxide pollution of thermal power in China and the policy recommendations have been put forward to it.