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Research On Interest Conflict And Coordination Among Business Subjects Of Leisure Agriculture

Posted on:2020-12-01Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q F LaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1529306125959399Subject:Agriculture-related business and management
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Leisure agriculture has become one of the most important ways to improve rural economy and rural industry and raise farmers’ income in the context of the Rural Revitalization Strategy,the speed of industrial convergence and the concept of "Internet + agriculture".In the process of cooperative operation,farmers,cooperatives,management and operation companies and other business entities have different income growth rates and growth amounts due to different degree of realization of interest demands,resulting in interest conflicts among business entities,directly affecting the sustainable development of leisure agriculture,and coordinating the interests of each business entity has become an urgent problem to be solved.Research content: Based on stakeholder theory,incomplete contract theory and game theory,this paper selects 297 leisure agriculture demonstration business units in Fujian Province as research objects,and uses grounded theory research method,regression analysis method,variance analysis method and game analysis method to systematically explore the main characteristics and interests of farmers,cooperatives and management and operation companies in leisure agriculture appeal,conflict of interest and interest game relationship among subjects.According to the conclusion of the game analysis,the paper puts forward the Interest Coordination Countermeasures for the interest conflicts between farmers and cooperatives,cooperatives and management and operation companies.Conclusion:(1)Summarize the characteristics and interests of farmers,cooperatives and management and operation companies by using grounded theoretical research methods.Farmers have the characteristics of dynamic participation,weak risk resistance and backward breeding technology.Cooperatives have strong learning and public welfare organization characteristics,as well as interest demands for serving farmers and management and operation companies.Management and operation companies have strong market profitability organization characteristics and interest demands for maintaining product sales.(2)The interest demands of the business subject are affected by various external and internal factors,among which the external factors have a stronger impact on the business subject.The interest demands of farmers are influenced by individual capital and external capital,the interest demands of cooperatives are influenced by organizational system and farmers’ cognition,and the interest demands of management and operation companies are influenced by markets and policies.With the increase of operation time,the satisfaction of business subjects with different interest demands fluctuates.The satisfaction of farmers in obtaining cooperative income decreases with the increase of operation time.The satisfaction of cooperatives in obtaining capital service decreases gradually.The satisfaction of management and operation companies in product quality presents a downward trend.There are many factors that affect the realization of interest demands and the decline of satisfaction,which lead to conflicts among business entities.(3)Using grounded theory and game analysis to study the interest conflict and game behavior in leisure agriculture.There are different conflict relations,default behaviors and game equilibrium among different business entities in different stages.In the early stage of operation,there are conflicts of land interests between farmers and cooperatives,asymmetric information conflicts between cooperatives and management and operation companies;in the middle stage of operation,there are conflicts of labor distribution between farmers and cooperatives,and management and operation companies;in the later stage,there are conflicts of competitive interests between farmers and cooperatives,and there are interests between cooperatives and management and operation companies allocation conflict.There are some similarities in the Games caused by conflicts in different stages,but they will be limited by different factors.The default behavior of farmers is affected by the expectation of income after the default,the default behavior of cooperatives is limited by market supervision and default cost,and the default behavior of management and operation companies is limited by default cost.The default behavior of the three major business entities leads to the reduction of the overall interests.The game does not reach Pareto optimality,and only full cooperation is a win-win situation.(4)According to conclusion of game analysis,the paper puts forward the Benefit Coordination Countermeasures between the two groups of business subjects.In terms of farmers and cooperatives,the paper puts forward coordinated countermeasures such as reasonable distribution of the interests of both sides,construction of effective interest expression channels,strengthening of external supervision and incentive mechanism,and improvement of financial support policies.In the aspect of cooperatives and management and operation companies,it puts forward the Coordination Countermeasures of standardizing cooperation behavior,establishing interest supervision mechanism,optimizing management mode and perfecting risk early warning system.Through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the relationship between the main operators in the development of leisure agriculture in Fujian Province,and the case study of Xiangrui grape planting cooperatives in Fengyang Town,this paper discusses the profit problems,default problems and default reasons in the development of leisure agriculture from the theoretical and practical perspectives,and further discusses the development of leisure agriculture and puts forward effective interest coordination countermeasures.
Keywords/Search Tags:leisure agriculture, business entities, interest conflict, game theory, interest coordination
PDF Full Text Request
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