Study On Rural Land Conflicts In The Transitional Period

Now our country is entering a transitional period of values and benefit demonstration. In this transitional period, more and more rural land conflicts happen frequently, bringing about the negative effect for harmonious society.What is the tactics of stakeholders in rural land conflicts? What causes induce rural land conflicts? What is the meamure of reducing rural land conflicts? Domestic scholars's research about rural land conflicts locates in the starting phase, this paper defines the concept, characteristics and types of rural land conflicts firstly, then analyses the tactics of stakeholders in rural land conflicts with the game method, and then analyses the reason of rural land conflicts from the angle of society, economy, system, law and administration, and conducts the qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis of rural land conflicts's inducement with the measurement method, lastly proposes some measures. The main results of this study are as follows:(1) Putting forward the concept of rural land conflicts. The concept of rural land conflicts is a disharmonious state caused by different subjects, such as peasants, rural collective economic organization, government and relevant departments, enterprises, developers, cadres and so on, have discorded and interacted mutually among rural land's cognition, acquisition, possession, use, income, disposition, circulation and so on. The performance of rural land conflicts is verbal abuse, quarrel, fighting, affray, demonstrations, blocking up traffic,violence assaulting and so on.(2) Revealing the transition period of the characteristics of China's rural land conflicts. The characteristics of rural land conflicts are that conflict's content is surrounding the protection of land rights, conflict's scale and intensity is shocking, conflict's main body is diversification, conflict's inducement is complex and conflicts show political nature.(3) Analysing the tactics of stakeholders in rural land conflicts with the game method. Stakeholders in rural land conflicts are peasants, the local government, village cadres, construction unit and the central government. In this game, everyone takes different tactics according to other's tactics for defending respective peculiar benefit. This paper analyzes emphatically the game between peasants and local government. According to the analysis of nash equilibrium, we can get the conclusion that decreasing the cost of peasants protecting rights, intensifying the punishment for local government expropriating land illegally and increasing the income of peasants in the course of expropriating land can make the game equilibrium between local government and peasants more reasonable, reduce land- expropriation conflicts effectively.(4) Analysing the causes of rural land conflicts from the angle of society, economy, system, law and administration. The reason of rural land conflicts is complicated and is interacted by various causes. These causes have included that peasants's social position is in the weak station, land value and land- expropriation compensation have been rised gradually, the system of land- expropriation and villagers self-governance are incomplete, law exists hysteresis and executors have administrated illegally.(5) Conducting the qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis of rural land conflicts's inducement with the questionnaire survey, interviews, and logistic regression model method. The conclusion is that the following four factors have the significant influence for the possibilities of conflict occurrence:the degree of responsibility of village cadres, the desire of peasants whether willing to expropriate land, it is whether holding the villagers meeting and the distribution of land-expropriation compensation is whether equitable. Among the influence degree of this four facors, the factor that whether equitable of the distribution of land-expropriation compensation is first, if the degree of unfair is rised one unite, then the possibilities of conflict occurrence is 70.94 times of former comparison group. The factor that the responsibility degree of village cadres is second, if the degree of irresponsible is rised one unite, then the possibilities of conflict occurrence is 34.10 times of former comparison group. The factor that land-expropriation desire is third, if the degree of willing land-expropriation is rised one unite, then the possibilities of conflict occurrence is 0.098 times of former comparison group. The factor that whether holding the villagers meeting is fourth, if the possibilities of holding the villagers meeting is rised one unite, then the possibilities of conflict occurrence is 0.056 times of former comparison group.(6) Proposing the measure for reducing rural land conflicts from the angle of society, economic, system, law and administration. In the society aspect, we should improve peasant's social position and educational level, establish peasant's organization, increase law advocacy and law assistance for peasants. In the economy aspect, we should adjust the distribution pattern of land income, reinforce the administration of land-expropriation compensation by economic lever. In the system aspect, we should perfect villagers self-governance system, land inspector system and rural social security system. In the law aspect, we should improve related laws and regulations of land-expropriation, speed up the step of entering to market of rural collective land and the construction of rural law. In the administration aspect, we should implement the mechanism of chief executive accountability, perfect leading cadres check mechanism, improve the quality of village cadres and build the diverse mechanism of sovling conflicts.