Study On The Game Analysis And Collaborative Problem Of Enterprise Cooperative R & D Under Spillovers

To enhance the capacity of independent innovation is the demand of national development strategies, Enterprises are the main body of the national innovation activities, cooperative R&D is an important organization of enterprise innovation, the theory and methods of inter-firm R&D cooperation are the scientific basis for R&D management. In this paper, the conflict and synergy of inter-firm R&D cooperation under spillovers is studied. We construct a more realistic theoretical R&D cooperation model under the perspective of technology spillovers, and we depicts the(horizontal, vertical)competing firms' conflict feature of decisions analysis for research and development. Also, we analysied the the main points of management for the decisions of cooperative R&D. Furthermore, the mechanism to insure cooperation, the main points of synergy and the policy recommendations for the collaboration of R&D cooperation are also given.Specifically, except for Chapter 1 Introduction, Chapter 2 the Define of Study, and Chapter 8 Summary and Outlook, the contents of this paper are divided into three logical parts, which include horizontal R&D cooperation under non-controled technology spillover, horizontal R&D cooperation under controlled technology spillover, and vertical supply chain R&D cooperation, a total of five chapters are as bellows:Chapter3, The game of asymmetric duopoly technology innovation under spillover. We construct a non-controled two-stage model under spillover, and also study the conflicts of R&D cooperation which result from asymmetries(initial cost asymmetry, innovation rate asymmetry, spillover asymmetry). Research shows that in the semi-cooperative R&D mode, the firm with lower initial cost has higer R&D expenditures, output and profit; the higher the difference of the two agents'initial cost is, the lower welfare is. The agent with higher innovation rate also has higer R&D expenditure and output; The higher spillover is more beneficial to the firm with lower innovation rate; The higher the difference of the two agents'innovation rate is, the lower welfare is; the agent with higher spillover always has higher R&D expenditure; the higher the difference of the spillover is, the lower welfare is. The government also prefers to promote the firms with similar level of cost, innovation rate, technology spillovers to cooperate. While the more advantageous enterprise will seek to invest more R&D expenditures, the less advantageous enterprise will choose firm with higher spillover as partner.Chapter 4, The model of cooperation and non-cooperative R&D performed in parallel under technology spillover. Based on the points of the view that core technology always be performed independently while non-core technology cooperatively R&D, we take the simultaneity of R&D cooperation and competition of heterogeneous products under non-controled horizontal technology spillover into account. The study shows that in the simultaneity of R&D cooperation and competition model, the firms will invest R&D expenditures to both cooperation and non-cooperation, and the lower the product substitution is, the more R&D resources will be invested; information-sharing will increase both R&D cooperative and non-cooperative investment; in the simultaneity mode, R&D investment is larger than that in standard model; The gvernment should subsidy both the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D, and the subsidization of the latter should be more than that of the former. Meanwhile, the higher the rate of innovation or the more similar of the products is, the less subsidization will be.Chapter 5, The analysis of opportunism in cooperative R&D under the unilateral-controled technology spillover. Opportunism means the defeation in cooperation. We construct a three-stage model to depict the opportunistic behavior in cooperative R&D under the unilateral-controled technology spillover. The study shows that opportunism badly affects cooperation R&D. However, cooperating on multiple dimensions of R&D contriubute to the stability of R&D cooperation; The incentives for opportunism increases with the size of the market and innovation level, and decreases with the cost of product. Even though there is opportunism under the multiple dimensions of cooperation, the welfare is higher than that in non-cooperative R&D. To collaborate the R&D process, the firms need to defense the opportunism in key decision-making; the government should concern the opportunism in larger size of firms and promote the strategic multiple dimensions of R&D cooperation.Chapter 6, The analysis and collaboration of R&D cooperation game under the bilateral-controled technology spillover. Based on the points of view that the spillover is decided by the similarity of technical path, we construct R&D cooperation game under the bilateral-controled technology spillover, and contrast the game features of non-cooperative R&D and cooperative R&D. The study shows that in non-cooperative R&D, the closer the technology is, the less the firms are willing to invest; The firm with higher R&D cost prefer higher spillover; the socially optimal distance between technologies is higher than the profitably optimal distance. Governmentn may use potential spillover as a policy instrument, and encourage cooperation on the basis of the similar technology; For the industry of higher spillover, welfare may be very low in non-cooperative R&D; While for industry with higher technology difference, government may prefer noncooperative R&D.Chapter 7, The conflict and collaboration of the retaile's process innovation decision under spillover. We construct R&D cooperation of supply chain enterprises under vertical non-controled spillover. On the assumption that supply chain adopt buy back contract design, and the retaile's process innovation can not be observed and unmeasured by the supplier, a two-stage stochastic model is built. Through the game analysis, we find under the buy back contract, the retaile's process innovation decision has a negative externality (spillover), the very reason is that such contract mechanism may stimulate regregiously and over-expectedly the retailer's process innovation behavior so that the profit of upstream supplier is affected by the interaction of logistics and spillover. We recommend suppliers adopt the combination of quantity discount and buy-back contract to collaboration the retaile's process innovation decision and strengthen the collaboration of logistics and technology spillover.This study complements the theory and methods of cooperative R&D, which will have a positive value to the collaboration of innovation activitie of government and enterprises.