Long-term Game Of Cooperative R & D Between Enterprises And Scientific Research Institutions Based On Relational Contracts

With the fierce competition in high-tech industries and products'life cycles becoming shorter, the environment for most enterprises has changed dramatically.Therefore,it is badly important for enterprises to innovate in techniques and products in order to survive and develop in the new era. In face of scarce resources and capacity, enterprises hope to ensure their competitiveness in the market through research joint venture formed by strategic alliances,which can share the cost and risk in R&D.Under such circumstances,not only scholars but also industry participants are showing more and more interest in cooperative R&D.The direct cause that enterprises and research institutions cooperate in R&D is the increased efficiency brought about by division and cooperation. Partners pursue different goals, which is also the key factors of cooperation. The pursuit of scientific research institutions is to maximize the social effect and enhance the level of the scientific research.The enterprises are seeking to maximize the economic benefits. Although this pursuit often has short-term and local characteristics,the two parties can achieve a win-win situation.Because cooperative R&D can make technical cooperation develop in the direction of specialization,and the interests of both sides are materialized through different forms of cooperation and adjustment.Firstly, the article makes targeted comments on domestic and foreign research. On the basis of theoretical review of cooperative R&D, we do further study on cooperative R&D models of a variety of enterprises and research institutes.Then summing up their common characteristics, we divide cooperation models into technical trading mode and commercial collaboration mode, in order to prepare for the further study below.Secondly, from the sub-topics of the collaborative projects in Netherland and Asia(Asia Facility For China),which is responsible for writing business plan,we find that there is delicate contract relationship between enterprises and scientific research institutions in the reality. Appropriate contractual mechanism-selection is directly related to the success or failure of cooperative R&D between enterprises and research institutions.On the basis of analysing characteristics of cooperative R&D,we think the formal contracts are not complete in cooperative R&D.Because the performance of R&D can not be proven,the relational contracts can make up for the lack of formal contracts.Then the article proposes the conceptual model of governance mechanisms based on relational contracts.Then, we explain the research and development issues between enterprises and scientific research institutions from game theory perspective. The article puts aside the formal co-operation contracts in R&D organization, but it focuses on the relational contracts.The research emphasis is about delicate contracts in R&D between enterprises and scientific research institutions,which are under established cooperation mode. The article sets up game models respectively about technical trading mode and commercial collaboration mode in case of one-time cooperation and repeated cooperation,and carries out mathematical analysis to explore the main factors that effect cooperation between the two parties in both short and long-term.In game analysis about technical trading mode,the article modifies game models builded by Wang Anyu,introducing uncertain variable to R&D,so that the theoretical model is closer to economic reality,and get different conclusions from existing study. In the long-term cooperative R&D between enterprises and research institutes, the bonus is influenced by not only the fluctuant value of technology,but also the relative efficiency of research institutions.At the same time the article uses P representing the high-value probability of scientific and technological achievements,which turns the value of the technology into a state of continuous function.Different probabilities map with different levels of bonus b, meeting the demand of reality and filling gaps in the study.In game analysis about commercial collaboration mode,we research the determinants of income distribution rate between the two sides under the principle of incentive compatibility.The finding is that partners in short and long-term cooperation should get reasonable amount of profit in proportion to their own investment in knowledge,which is called the principle of the relative efficiency. Similarly, the introduction of uncertainty variable in R&D,concludes that the uncertainties in R&D basically do not have much impact on the ratio of income distribution between enterprises and scientific research institutions in the short and long-term cooperation.From game analysis of the two cooperation modes, we find uncertain variable has a great impact on cooperative R&D under technical trading mode,but it basically has no effect on choice behaviour of enterprises and research institutions under commercial collaboration mode.Finally,the article has analysed the case of the research about tissue culture,which is cooperated by Agrom company in Holand and Horticulture Plant Laboratory of Huanzhong Agricultural University.In this part,the thesis analyses the cooperation process of the two parties using the game tool,proposes the issue which the two parties should pay attention to during the process of cooperation.At the same time, the two parties are planning to develop a professional R&D Center.The former research on theoretical model can not only improve the efficiency of cooperation under technical trading mode,but also provide necessary proposals for further cooperation between the two parties.It can make the two sides maintain a long-term relationship, which is the value of this article.