Study On Rent And The Rent-seeking Game In The Provision Of Public Goods

As the reform of the economy system of China has come to a critical period, the rent-seeking issue in the provision of public goods has gained more and more attention. Whereas, a series of problems deriving from rent-seeking such as wasting of resources, low administrative efficiency, official corruption etc, have hampered the sound and steady development of the the country's reform. How to keep down rent-seeking game, decrease the rent-seeking activities and optimize the provision of our country's public goods is an important issue of much concern. The current study tries to analyze the rent-seeking issue in the process of the public goods provision, utilizing the rent-seeking theory, game theory, and public goods provision theory, etc, and then come up with some nichetargeting solutions.Firstly, the treatise gives a detailed overview of the public goods provision theory and rent-seeking theory, then it has a general analysis of the provision of public goods and the generation of rent seeking. In doing so, the treatise gives the definition and classification of public goods from both respectives. On the one hand, it summarizes the definition and classification of public goods home and aboard, and on the other hand, gives an economic definition and classification to "public goods". As the provision of public goods must have the government and the interrelated economic subjects, among whom the rent-seeking game will happen, it introduces all the subjects afterwards, that is, the government provision, the market provision and the third sector provision. Because both the generation of the rent and the rent-seeking games are different, we classify and compare the public goods of different kinds.One important point of the general analysis of the public goods is the general equilibrium analysis of the optimal provision, which has a guiding role in the equilibrium analysis of the rent-seeking game for either the pure public goods or the quasi-public goods. The analysis of the generation of the rent and the rent-seeking game makes clear the logic relationship of public goods provision and rent-seeking activities. Based on this analysis, the generation of rent-seeking in pure public goods provision and quasi-public goods provision is discussed respectively, which makes the base for the later exposition.Secondly, based on the division of pure public goods and quasi-public goods according to the exclusiveness and competitive level of the consumption, the present study deeply discusses the rent seeking game among different interest subjects in the provision of pure public goods. As rent-seeking game concerns the provision of public goods as well as the demand, we first discuss both consumption and provision of public goods. Then we discuss rent-seeking game from the theoretical pesperctive based on the classification of the rent-creating and rent-seeking in the provision of pure public goods,from both static and dynamic state.Thirdly, the game between the rent-creating and rent-seeking of quasi-public goods provision is discussed, statically and dynamically. In doing so, the game activities and the process are first mentioned.The analysis of the rent-seeking game of the interest group is from a static perspective, which is an emphasis of the chapter, and the game process and result are dealt with after giving the political and economic conditions. The analysis of the private provision of the quasi-public goods is from a dynamic perspective, taking the passenger transport system of China's countryside as an example.Forthly, in order to compare the rent-seeking game between different models of public goods provision, we choose planned model and market model, which are foundamentally different, and discuss their respective traits and efficiency of provision. Here the experience evidences of the microscopic level both home and abroad are introduced. Then an empirical study is applied in the analysis of the economic increase effect of the rent-seeking game on our country.Finally, based on the above analysis, we present some proposals to suppress and decrease rent-seeking game activities in both the provision of pure public goods and the provision of quasi-public goods. As to the pure public goods provision, the main point is to speed up the political transformation, adjust the role of the government and compress the range of the pure public goods provision. As to the quasi-public goods provision, the key lies in the intensification of the market competition in provisioning quasi-public goods and speed up the transformation of our economic system.