The Research On Intergovernmental Game Of Trans-district Water Pollution

Water shortage and water pollution are important environmental issues which China facing. Trans-district water pollution is a cross-border externalities, affecting by the natural integrity and fluidity, the pollution can often be transfer to one or more administrative regions.The cross-regional and transferability of Water pollution’s characteristic, making the system which mainly management by water administration department and segementation-based water resources management,can not meet the requirements of comprehensive prevention and control water pollution. Study how to design the player’s incentive compatibility and participation constraint collaborative governance mechanism, making basin on the road to sustainable development, is not only an important part of building resource-saving and environment-friendly society, but also an important protection construction ecological civilization.This paper describes the regulation difficulties of water pollution in China:on the one hand, with the increasing laws and regulations on the water pollution control, the state and community are more and more aware of the tremendous harm caused by water pollution in recent years; on the other hand, the water environment is deteriorating, the rules are show growing void. Based on the sort of domestic and foreign literature and observation of basin water pollution control plight, this paper find that the keys which led to continued deterioration of water pollution and control invalidity are not only related to irrational industrial structure, enterprise’s selfish emission behavior, environmental supervision structure, but also related to the non-rational balanced of intergovernmental game which under the existing system.This paper analyzed institution as the rules of gam. According to "Environmental Protection Law","Water Law" and "Water Pollution Control Act" and other relevant laws, our country’s basin management system combined district management and watershed management,but mainly based on district management’s basin management system.This system requires local governments responsible for local water environment, but unconcerned about trans-district water pollution.The unadaptability between existing basin management laws and nature of basin is the main causes of intergovernmental game. In the game, local government win the promotion through economic performance.Thus, irrational industrial structure is only a surface reason of trans-district water pollution, and the deeper reason is the vicious competition among local governments.We build intergovernmental game model for trans-district water pollution.The action, payoff, strategy and equilibrium in the water pollution control were analyzed in the game. The results show that the upstream local governments have free-riding behavior in pollution regulation, Nash equilibrium supply of voluntary provision on river public goods is less than Pareto optimal.And when the downstream government take "tooth for tooth" commitment action, the game’s balance would be changed. In the policy game of central and local government, the implementation probability of local government is inversely to central government’s supervision costs, but is proportional to the punishment of central government.The signaling game model between central and local governments shows that in order to obtain rewards from central government, different types of local governments tend to send same signal.The empirical analysis of tans-district water polltion on the intergovernmental game shows that local government have a major impact on environmental law enforcement.In the face of protectionism by local government, central government’s river limits policy is successfully against local government.It made local governments have to pay more attention to pollution control. But the differences in dynamic mechanism of environmental management between central government and local governments,and the fuzzy of financial authority and powers on water pollution control which lead to insufficient investment of water pollution control.Xiangjiang River Basin also demonstrated the presence of intergovrnmental game on trans-district water pollution,the attention from central government and provincial government made local governments which along the Xiangjiang River signed the goal of governance responsibility book and environmental agreement,so the governance go into the track of co-operative.Changing the rules is benefit to water pollution control. River pollution contral liability system, watershed property rights system, ecological compensation system, performance evaluation system, environmental community litigation system and social coordination system, these institutions’s establishment are important to constraint and incentive the behavior of players. From these aspects, this paper further summarized the argument of the text, proposing through improve institution design to improve the quality of water environment.