| As a policy to ease the economic development for uncoordinated and unfair in the river basin, ecological compensation is becoming one of the key areas of economic research. As our country has many rivers and big areas, and it related to many stakeholders and huge interests, ecological compensation, especially cross-regional, is becoming more and more important. So the article do a research on the theory for "Why ecological compensation in river basin (ECRB)" and "How to ECRB". The study identified as stakeholders in ecological compensation across river basin for administrative regions characterized by theoretical analysis and model analysis, we conclude that the key of the across-regional ecological compensation system.We do a research on the ecological compensation of trans-regional river basin, we find that the ECB will relates to the relevant departments of the central government (Short for central government), the upstream of local government and downstream of local governments, the related industries of upstream and downstream. In this paper, we study the multi-level inter-government relationship between the stakeholders, through each level of the tools by game theory, we analysis government and industry at all levels in the use of water resources and environmental protection process based maximize their own interests, we can conclude that:(1) First we use Karldor-Hicks improvement to study ecological compensation of river basin, we could broken it into two aspects:the ecological protection compensation and pollution for compensation. This is the result of the analysis from an economic perspective; Then we have verified that ecological protection is a Pareto improvement of uncooperative with stakeholders by model analysis from cooperative game. So we answer " Why ecological compensation in river basin (ECRB)", and it is the theoretical basis of the law.(2) We analyze the stakeholders government interpersonal level by model study. First, from the point of view of non-fully rational analysis of the correlation between the upstream local government and the downstream local government with the evolution of the game, and we find the two players cannot reconcile their own contradictions; Then, we introduce the central government, it use mutual restrictions and policy analysis of the relationship between the tripartite game, we come to the formation of stable cooperation between the three players;Finally, this paper verifies the superiority of the trans-boundary river basin ecological compensation through the cooperative game solution, combining with the cooperative game solution applications and digital case analysis on the trans-regional watershed ecological compensation cooperation stability analysis, In this way, we deduce from the model point of view "River Basin Ecological compensation".In this paper, we use theoretical research, model studies and numerical example explain why the implementation of river basin ecological compensation, how effective river basin ecological compensation and the stability of the cooperative compensation. We can get the policy implications from the research:The interest groups of inter-regional river basin ecological compensation is very complex, but from the point of view of economics and game analysis, we found that the river basin ecological compensation is an improvement compared to the non-cooperation; Second, under China’s political backdrop, the central government plays an important role in the implementation of the policy process, and it must be involved in the implementation of the ecological compensation process. With development of economic, the paper argues that the government will continue to weaken, and the direct cooperation of the related industries will reduce intermediate costs. It will form a wider range of alliance and cooperation. If the cooperation once formed, the parties will be a stable and cooperative relations by adjusting according to their form. |
PDF Full Text Request