Research On Water Pollution Abatement Mechanism Of Trans-district River Basin Based On Cooperative Games Theory

The construction of ecological civilization is a long-term plan which concerns people’s well-being and national future. The Communist Party’s 18 th National Congress has put forward that in order to build a beautiful China and realize the sustainable development of the Chinese nation, it is necessary to put ecological civilization construction in a prominent position, and integrate into the overall layout of the five in one of socialist modernization in conjunction with economic construction, political construction, cultural construction and social construction. Ecological civilization construction is a complicated and huge system engineering. In the face of the new situation and new tasks, we need to stand in a high degree to promote the modernization of national ecological environment governance system and management ability for ecological civilization construction and environmental protection. Water pollution prevention and control of river basin as an important content of ecological civilization construction must construct a complete, scientific and efficient system. By means of promoting construction, standardizing behavior, implementing objectives and strengthening accountability and punishment, system will become important conditions to protect the sustained and healthy development of river basin.The paper takes cooperative games as theoretical basis of research. Through systematic and in-depth analysis, paper focuses on how to solve water pollution abatement of trans-district river basin. By seeking to find theory basis of pollution abatement, verifing science and effectiveness through empirical analysis, paper aims to explore a set of water pollution abatement mechanism of trans-district river basin.The concrete contents are as follows:①With cooperative games, the problem of cost sharing is formulated as cost sharing games for pollution abatement. On the basis of Shapley value, it makes use of a new but universal algorithm—binominal semivalue, takes three adjacent regions in the Yangtze River as research objects and chemical oxygen demand(COD) as water quality index, and is solved through multilinear extension considering coalition structure. Research results satisfy binominal semivalue’s three condition, that is super-additivity, collective rationality and individual rationality, and validate the effectiveness of this method.②In order to solve expected profit allocation, propose dynamic Shapley value with fuzzy degree of participation. Put three areas in river basin as objects, establish water pollution abatement models in continuous time, and solve them by Shapley value. Finally a numerical example is analyzed.③Propose a two-player、finite-horizon stochastic differential game and analyze the influence of environment projects under three cases: autarky, individual investment and cooperation. Solving it by Bellman dynamic programming and comparing welfares at different time, the results show that allowing for investment cooperation between lower reaches and upper reaches could conform to the actuality and be beneficial to realize the objective of emission reduction.④ Propose a three-player, finite-horizon differential game and analyze the influence of environment projects under three cases: autarky, bilateral coalition and grand coalition. Solving it by Bellman dynamic programming and comparing welfares at different time, the results show that bilateral coalition could conform to the actuality and be beneficial to protect watershed ecological environment and promote sustainable development of society and economy.⑤Two technology incentive policies, that are subsidies and cooperation, are put to use in technology R&D of energy saving and emission reduction which includes production engineering R & D and pollution emission reduction R & D under the condition of exogenous emission tax. A game model of mutual action between government and firms is built to compare R&D, profit and social welfare. It can be found that: ①When spillover rate of production engineering R&D is low, the level of production engineering R&D under subsidies policy is higher than under cooperation policy; otherwise, just the opposite.②When discharge rate is less than critical rate, the level of pollution emission reduction R&D under subsidies policy is higher than under cooperation policy; otherwise, just the opposite. The research result will provide theory support for government to choose correct technology incentive policy and for firms to choose correct R&D behavior.⑥Enterprises which will carry out technology R&D of energy saving and emission reduction face the problem of choice of different coalition modes. It is explored using two-stage dynamic game method under the condition of exogenous emission tax. Through comprehensive comparison of equilibrium output, production engineering R&D level, pollution emission reduction R&D level, profit and social welfare under three coalition modes, that is non-coalition, half-coalition, whole-coalition, the results show that to form whole-coalition will be the best choice. The research result will provide strong theory support for the actual operation of enterprise.