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Information Asvmmetrv, Market Structure And Transplant Of Labor Standards

Posted on:2016-06-13Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X X LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1227330467995184Subject:Western economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Competition in the market has prompted more and more companies in developing countries to become a part of the labor certification of the supply chain. Since Labor standards which have been transplanted by means of trading platforms have had some impacts on the Chinese labor conditions and labor legal systems, the field investigation found that the impacts were still in primary stage. Based on literature review, this paper firstly analyses the micro mechanism of labor standards transplant in developing countries by means of modern economic theories and tools. Secondly, validates the conclusion in form of mathematical analysis by case studies.Lastly, draws the conclusions and revelation.Chapter2is a literature review. This part firstly defines the concept of information asymmetry and market structure, and then review Chinese and foreign literature about the legal transplant, the correlation between the labor standards and trade-investment, endogeneity of labor standard, labor standards transplant in China, micro mechanism of labor standard. Finally, the research question and basic thoughts are brought forward based on findings of field investigation.Chapter3is analysis overview about development status and connotation of labor standards based on political and civil platforms of internationalization of labor standards. Firstly, we briefly describe the generation and development history of labor standards and then not only give a comparative overview based on the requirements of the political platform of the International Labor Organization and World Trade Organization, but also bring about the development process and the content of folk platform based on voluntary labor standards. At the same time to compare Chinese labor law and international labor standards. Finally analyses the authentication mechanisms and related theories around the externally-dictated transplant of labor standard which can provide certain theoretical support and practical platform while later analyzing the transplant of labor standard in developing countries based on the specific market structure.Chapter4analyzes the characteristics and distribution of labor standards transplant in China based on sellers-led market by using signal model. At first we simply state the statement of labor standard certification and price mechanism based on the sellers-led market. After literature review of signal model we analyze some features about the transplant of labor standards. The results show that in China VE such as similar oligopolistic market, The level of suppliers’ labor standards tends to be minimum due to the results of Pareto improvement by the suppliers with their market forces; If the distribution function of the companies types is sufficiently concave, labor standards will converge to the lowest point of equilibrium, not higher than the lowest one. When the supplier is risk-neutral, and finally equilibrium labor standard is higher than the risk-averse.Chapter5analyzes the characteristics and distribution of labor standards transplant in China based on buyers-led market by using information rent model. At first we simply state the statement of labor standard certification and price mechanism based on the buyers-led market. After literature review of information rent model, we analyze some features about the transplant of labor standards. The results show that in China textile and apparel such as buyers-led market, the existence of high labor standard is the equilibrium on pursuit of rents between the seller and buyer. When the suppliers type of distribution does not meet the monotone hazard rate property, there will be a low standard pooling equilibrium which helps buyers maximize real remaining with buyers’ market forces. When the buyers are risk-averse, the final equilibrium labor standard is higher than that is risk-neutral. Meanwhile it will also improve the welfare of buyers and sellers. When considering the supplier moral hazard occurred after the adverse selection, the final equilibrium labor standard is distorted more than only adverse selection.Chapter6validates the conclusion reasoned under the transplant of labor standards based on different market structures through the analysis of two cases. Firstly, we conduct research related to aspects of style analysis about the large-scale restructuring of state-owned enterprise listed pharmaceutical companies and certain textile and garment enterprise (from OEM to ODM), mainly around the current situation and the development of enterprises certified for authentication which can validate the conclusion under the transplant of labor standards based on the seller and buyer-led market. Overall, the results of the investigation and analysis of cases are consistent with the conclusion of previous theoretical reasoning.In short, according to the background of labor standards transplant brought about under the developing countries suppliers obtaining buyers’ orders, this paper gives a systematic study on the microscopic mechanism of labor standard transplant in developing countries by means of the tools and methods of modern mainstream economics from the perspective of micro legal transplant. On the one hand is to expand micro system within the field of game evolution of endogenous institution; on the other hand it gives certain theoretical and practical significance for developing countries to learn how to use systems and rules for promotion of their economic development and better integration of the global systems.
Keywords/Search Tags:Sellers-led market, Buyers-led market, Micro legal transplant, Signal model, Information rent model
PDF Full Text Request
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