The Political Economics Analysis On The Labor Dispatch Contract

The labor dispatch is a new form of employment in recent fifty years. There is an especial characteristic of the labor dispatch in employment relationship which differs from other employment forms that is the triangle employment with the representation of labor agency’s hiring-with-no-using and employing organization’s using-with-no-hiring. The labor dispatch not only satisfies the demand of numerical flexibility for employing organizations, but also plays an important role in absorbing the unemployed. Nevertheless, in the development of labor dispatch, there is also many problems constantly emerging such as the low employment quality and unfair treatment of dispatched labors, the "over crowd out" of labor dispatch to formal employment and so on, which all can be described as the issue of occupation of dispatched labor’s right.Since the labor dispatch only emerges for decades, the study on labor dispatch is still in the initial stage. Currently related researches pay more attention on providing explanation for the rationality of the labor dispatch and giving an analysis or evaluation on the legal regulation of it. Meanwhile, little attention is payed for the fact that the situation of dispatched labors is getting worse which results in an lack of adequate theoretical explanation for this issue. According to the realistic condition that the labor dispatch has been affect labors’employment quality and led to the tight labor relations in the labor market, based on the political economy analysis method, using mature theoretical system including modern contract theory and interests relations theory, regarding the labor dispatching contract as the research object, this paper clarifies and analyzes the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects, especially analyzes the endogenous defects both in the self-enforcing process and in the third-enforcing process and discusses the boundary between the labor dispatching contract and other employment contracts. Combined the conclusions of above analysis with our country’s social reality, paper focus on explaining the social issue of occupation of dispatched labors’right in China at last. In general, different interests subject are facing different objective interests function. Consequently, rational interests subjects will affect other ones through behavior selection so as to maximize their own interests. In this process, if there is no effective means to check and balance, the employing organization will get a better expression of their interests which will directly lead to an excessive occupation of the labors’ rights and interests.At the same time, this situation will also bring the labor dispatch industry deviating from the healthy path, disturbing the competition order of market economy, and bring negative influence to the inclusive growth of economy and society.This paper has7chapters. The chapters from3th to7th are the main parts.Chapter one mainly illustrates the background, significance, research framework, main content, research view, methods and theories, innovations and shortcomings. As to keep the consistency of subsequent research, this chapter also define the relevant concepts around labor dispatch including labor dispatch, contract, incomplete contract, labor relations, labor justice.Chapter two reviews the literatures about labor dispatch. According to this study, in recent years, the research of labor dispatch。at home and abroad just started as most researches focus on explaining the rapid development of labor dispatch with empirical method. And for the issue of occupation of labors’ right in labor dispatch, although several researches mentioned it, the theoretical analysis and explanation are still insufficient. The literatures pay much attention to the flaws of legal regulation, ignoring the affects from the limited rationality and opportunism behavior from related subjects including agency, employer, labor, government. And this study is trying filling the gaps in this aspect.Chapter three analyzes the employers’self-enforcing behavior in a labor dispatch contract. Based on the Self-enforcing theory, the Self-enforcing behavior will realize when the revenues from "hold-up" behavior are less than the loss result from the private punishment performing by counterparty. For the labor dispatch contract, the labors will give the private punishment to the labor user by the way of diminish its market reputation. In this operation mechanism, the position choice of agency will affect the punishment effect and the behavior of labor user. Honest agency will drive labor user choose the the self-enforcing behavior, and this will result in double honesty equilibrium. Otherwise, dishonest agency will match the labor user who breach the agreement with labors, and this will result in collusion equilibrium. From the comparison analysis of effects to the microcosmic subjects and macro economy from the two types of performance equilibrium of labor dispatch contract, the conclusion shows that double honesty equilibrium is superior to the collusion one. Therefore, it is necessary to take feasible measures to achieve the double honesty equilibrium.Chapter four analyze the performance from the third party’s strength. The third party includes the legal regulation and the government’s supervision. The legal regulation is an important measure in many countries. It is useful in providing specification to the development of labor dispatch, promoting the contract performance and protecting the right of labors(including dispatch labors). As social order specification, the legal regulation can affect the behavior of asocial participants. And at the same time, the above influence needs the guarantee of adequate execution from government. The government, being the rational economic man with its own preferences and interests, will make the cost-benefit analysis whether supervise strictly. Though analyzing the gaming process between government and the subjects of labor dispatch, the choice that government makes will depend on the comparison between the social benefits receiving from supervising loosely and the extra taxes and cost savings receiving from supervising strictly.Chapter five analyzes the "borders" between labor dispatch contract and other employment contracts. Based on the contract choice theory, the existence of different contracts means that their transaction costs are different, and the establishment of the borders between different contracts depends on the comparison of transaction cost. Because the labor dispatch contract and the atypical employment contracts has the similar trading nature, they can entirely replace each other. Comparatively, there are differences between the labor dispatch contract and the typical employment contracts in trading nature. While specific investment amount is higher, the transaction cost gap is larger. In this case, the labor dispatch contract will not substitute the typical employment contracts. Only when specific investment amount is small, the substitution will happen as the labor dispatch contract gets its advantages. Therefore, the labor dispatch will not threaten the development of typical employment. However, if there is occupation of labors’right resulting from the difficulty of making the labor users to fulfill their commitments, then there will be "excessive squeezing out" phenomenon from the labor dispatch to the typical employment. The underlying reason of this phenomenon is that the occupation of labors’right leads to a lower transaction costs of the labor dispatch. Chapter six analyzes the labor dispatch contract performance in China. First of all, this chapter analyzes the difficulty in both achieving the self-enforcing result and ensuring the performance guarantee with the third party’s strength in China. Secondly, based on the investigation results analysis to the labor dispatch status after "Labor Contract Law" promulgated, the conclusion demonstrates that in the labor dispatch practice in China, the problem of occupying labors’right from the agency and the labor user is serious. In addition, based on the inclusive growth theory, it is necessary to take measures to improve the performance status of labor dispatch in China. Chapter seven includes policy recommendations and future prospects of research. From the point of guaranteeing the labors’right and leading the labor dispatch industry to develop healthy and sustainable, this chapter puts forward the policy recommendations from the angle of adjusting the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects in labor dispatch. At last, the shortage of the research and future prospects of this topic is discussed. The main conclusion of this paper is that due to the endogenetic barriers and problems in the employers’self-enforcing behavior and the performance from the third party’s strength, it will lead to a result of occupying labors’ right, which is the primary cause of the "excessive squeezing out" phenomenon from the labor dispatch to the typical employment. The main innovation of this paper is to analyze the material interests relationships among the related interest subjects in labor dispatch with political economics’viewing angle so as to enrich the perspective and content of labor dispatch research, as well as to provides a new practical support for political economics research. The main shortage of this paper lies in the investigation of the labor dispatch status in China. As there are many problems of labor dispatch in practice which makes the investigating process very hard, the contents and the results of the investigation do not achieve the desired effect. The further improvement of this area is needed.