| Process of economy integration and globalization has strengthened the relationships among nations since the Second World War with increasing trade liberalization. Especially the foundation of GATT and WTO provides an opportunity for harmony international trade environment. Some effective negotiation which focus on high tariff and other important issues had went smoothly in the endeavor of WTO. These conferences largely reduced world tariff level and make enormous contribution on trade liberalization. Today, the world tariff level has fallen from26%of two decades ago to8.8%of2007, and more restrictions also has been imposed on the traditional non-tariff barrier such as quota. Though trade protection has weakened in perspective of not only the tariff drop but the non-tariff barrier restriction, governments still provide abundant protection in name of sheltering so-called infant industry. Therefore, new non-tariff barrier including antidumping, subsidy, safeguard, TBT and SPS emerges and welcomed by more and more governments.In all kinds of new non-tariff barriers, antidumping, subsidy and safeguard are the three legal trade remedy allowed by WTO in case the industry was hurt by imports. Because of plausible mask, these trade remedy measures are widely used today by increasing countries. Antidumping is the most popular one of the three resulting from its easy operation and moderate imposing requirement. The number of antidumping case is as many as3683compared with198and245for countervailing and safeguard measures. Therefore, antidumping would be the main measures of trade protection in the late years. World economy still mired in the finance crisis at this moment, and expectedly trade liberalization is facing challenge from trade protection again. The situation of world antidumping is still tough. As known to us that agriculture always gains importance in all nations because it is the base of the whole economy and society. China’s agriculture has deeply opened to the international market and developed fairly fast since1978. Till now, China has become one of the main agriculture production and trade countries in the world with the average growth rate of9.16%of agriculture trade in the year of1978-2009. USA is the traditional import country of Chinese agriculture product. After1978, the trade between two nations went well. Trade value is only$2.06billion in1989and increased toS18.03billion in2009. However, as such enjoyable performance, the USA continuously impose higher and higher antidumping duty on China agriculture product. The antidumping measures clearly produced adverse effect on our export agriculture product and weaken the welfare of two countries.Thus from the perspective of US-to-China antidumping case, both economic and polictic incentives exists in the will of plaintiff. However our question here is that are the US plaintiff can gain adequate trade protection as expected even if it gains political benefit? That is equal to say what is the trade remedy effect of the plaintiff? Further more, expect domestic market, does the welfare in the foreign market of the plaintiff lose by its antidumping appeal? This paper will discuss in detail and answer these questions in order to compliment related research, normalize the use of antidumping, create more harmony trade environment. Our analysis begins at the third market view and mainly focus on the commodity flow of5products suffered from US-to-China antidumping. In detail, the structure of our analysis goes as following:On the one hand, we describe the history and situation of US-to-China agriculture trade after the research and theory review, and then we briefly introduce the procedure of US antidumping, the US-to-China antidumping situation including agriculture product case. We find that China’s agriculture trade status does not match with its trade environment. Despite China has become big agriculture trade country in the world with rising US-to-China trade, US never stop using antidumping to restrict our product. Expectedly we think China will still be top one victim in the US antidumping in the future.On the other hand, we start from US domestic market, and concentrate on the substitute effect after US antidumping in which China restricted product was substituted by the same product coming from the third market. That is trade diversion effect. We hope to verify that the antidumping measures in fact produce less protection for the plaintiff than expectation. Furthermore, we test our hypothesis again through dynamic panel econometric model, and get the same result. Antidumping truly do not satisfy plaintiffs anticipation in domestic market.At last, we start from US foreign market, and focus on China’s restricted agriculture product export deflection strategy. We think such deflection strategy may most likely squeeze out the plaintiff product in the third market which is the China’s new market. That is trade deflection effect and third-market restriction effect. Similar to trade diversion, we find proof not only in the description and comparison between nations but also in the latter econometric model. Our result proves again that antidumping truly can not supply enough trade protection for the US antidumping plaintiff outside US continent.Through discussion above, we confidently think that antidumping trade remedy function is not as strong as plaintiffs expectation because of trade diversion, trade deflection and third-market restriction effect. Thus, as a rational person or enterprise, the appealing party may less likely initiate antidumping case considering those effects. We believe the result of this paper not only rectify the expectation of plaintiff but also provide better proof for normally using antidumping and better complimentary for antidumping research. |
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