Study Of Incentive-constraint Mechanism Of State-owned Financial Assets Management

The state-owned financial assets are owned by state, existing in financial enterprises. The state-owned financial assets play an impotent role in our national economic system, in terms of total quantities, scale, or the impact of national economy. With the development of economy, the detachment of operating and ownership rights incurs principal-agent relations in the state-owned financial assets, in which a series of deep contradictions and problems are exposed. In order to solve these conflicts, the agents of the state-owned financial assets should design appropriate incentives and restraints to improve the state-owned financial assets’operation efficiency and complete the delegated tasks. Accordingly, in current management system of the state-owned financial assets, that how to design a scientific and reasonable incentive-constraint mechanism has become one of the critical issues.This dissertation carries out deep and systematic researches on the Incentive-constraint mechanism under the background of the management system of state-owned financial assets. These researches mainly include drawing a clear conclusion on tasks entrusted by the principal of the state-owned financial assets, analyzing the characteristics of incentive-constrain mechanism of the state-owned financial assets, and choosing reasonable incentive and restraint measures. Finally, recommendations to improve our country’s incentive-constraint mechanism of the state-owned financial assets have been proposed in details.The dissertation has eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction part. This chapter introduces (1) the aim of this dissertation,(2) the theory and practical significance of this dissertation, and (3) the research range, measures, and contents. The second chapter is the theoretical part. In this chapter, the theories related to this study are systematically summarized, and the research framework of the thesis is put forward. The third chapter is about the history of incentive-constraint mechanism in the state-owned financial assets. This chapter analyzes the existing problems and gives its reasons. The fourth chapter draws experiences and lessons from comparisons and analysis of the incentive-constraint mechanism in financial enterprises. In the fifth chapter, the tasks of State-owned financial assets are analyzed, with which the tasks, the targets of the incentive-constraint mechanism are mapped out. The sixth chapter constructs the state-owned financial assets principal-agent model based on our country’s situation. According to the analysis of the model, ways to improve the incentive-constraint mechanism have been obtained. On this basis, this chapter puts forward the research hypothesis, constructing a regression model and using panel data to do an empirical test. According to the above conclusions, the seventh chapter introduces several advises to perfect the incentive-constraint mechanism in the management of the state-owned financial assets. The eighth chapter is the conclusions and prospects, mainly explains the research conclusion, and further efforts in the future.Through these researches, this dissertation identifies that in line with requirements of government, state-owned financial assets have three tasks. They are financial efficiency, financial stability and social responsibility. To complete these tasks, the state-owned financial assets agents need to undertake works include improving financial state-owned enterprise’s profit ability, the risk control ability and assuming reasonable social responsibility. Therefore, goals of incenting and constraining state-owned financial assets agents are (1) the profit ability,(2) the control ability, and (3) the social responsibility. It is the unique characteristic of the state-owned financial assets. In addition, the status mentioned above, also produces deterministic soft budget constraint problems, of which the state-owned financial assets agents expect that the government will certainly offer financial aids when the state-owned enterprises fall in financial troubles. This is another unique characteristic of the state-owned financial assets. Based on the two characteristics, this paper establishes incentive-constraint model of the state-owned financial assets. Analysis of the model shows that, under the background of the management of the state-owned financial assets, the design of incentive-restraint mechanism is distinguished from other industries as well as other types of enterprises. Only the incentive-constraint mechanism which includes all these characteristics, can overcome the series of problems produced by the state-owned financial assets’ principal-agent relationship, can play sound incentives and constraint to the agent of the state-owned financial assets to improve the operation efficiency, and can promote the healthy development of the state-owned financial assets to assist to the national economy growth.