Present Situation, Problems And Reform Ideas Of State-Owned Financial Managing System

In March, 2003, The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission had been established by State Council as its subordinate entity to specially manages the non-financial state-owned assets, while how to manage the state-owned financial assets had not been determined. After December of 2003 when China SAFE Investments Limited was established, it has carried on a series of motion of funding the state-owned key financial organ, which arouses the analysis and guess of the state-owned financial assets management reform's direction. Under such background, this thesis analyzed the problems in the present managing system based on the Property-rights Theory, and found that the problem lies in that nobody performs the role of owner, as well as the referred roles don't have enough motivity to carry out the property-rights. Therefore, we can establish a 'state-owned financial assets managing structure', according to the corporate governance structure;The 'state-owned financial assets' is exactly 'the state-owned financial capital', which comprise the shareholder capital when the state invest to the financial enterprises directly, and the state-owned corporation's capital through indirect invest. The present state-owned financial assets managing is under the principle of owned uniformly and managed classified, moreover, the national state-owned financial assets are concretely under several government departments' intervention. There exist many problems in such state-owned financial assets managing system. First due to the particularity of state-owned property-right, the government has become the exerciser of the property-right, and the government hasn't differentiate the public managing function and the assets' owner function in property-rights' exercises, which causes that many public departments share investor's rights but actually nobody is responsible for the assets. The vacancy of the role of property-rights' owner has become the core problem. The solution to this problem is to clear that the objective of state-owned assets' management is make their value rise, and impersonate the owner of the assets. Next, the referred roles don't have enough motivity to carry out the property-rights is the essential link of the problems. Therefore we must establish a power mechanism to guarantee the 'state-owned financial assets' value rise, which transforming the administrative method into the economical method, accomplishing one group who obtain their profit through managing the state-owned financial assets, and strengthening public's right to know the fact of the assets' operation, etc. Further, about the reform of state-owned financial assets managing system, we should follow four principles. We can establish a 'state-owned financial assets managing structure', according to the corporate governance structure: the National People's Congress is the exerciser of the property-rights; the state-owned financial assets managing institution is the deputy of the investor; the financial holding companies are the agencies to operate the assets; the audit office to do the independent auditing to the related institutions. Among the administrative levels the trust-agent relationship has been confirmed and responsibilities of various roles have been clearly defined.The main achievement of this thesis lay in that it analyzed and concluded the problems in the present state-owned financial assets managing system based on the Property-rights Theory, and discovered some solutions. Moreover, it assumed to establish a 'state-owned financial assets managing structure' according to the Corporate Governance Theory and the corporate governance structure, made some explorations for the state-owned financial assets managing system's reform. The insufficiency is that it only proposed a rough plan and frame on the state-owned financial assets managing system's reform, and hasn't involve the concrete design to the system, which lacks to be combined with the practice.