Research On The Prevention And Control Of Corruption Risk In Bidding And Bid

The Party Central Committee begins to pay more attention to the anti-corruption issues since the Sixteenth CPC National Congress. Corruption is regarded as the greatest threat to the regime in peacetime, and anti-corruption work is upgraded to anti-corruption battle. In January2005,"the Implementation Outline of Establishing the Sound System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption Paying Equal Attention to Education, Institution and Supervision" has been promulgated, which indicates the foundation of strategic policy to fight corruption and to promote honesty and cleanness by "Curing both Symptoms and Root Cause, Comprehensive Treatment, Consideration both Punishment and Prevention, Focusing on Prevention". It marks that the construction of fighting corruption and promoting honesty and cleanness comes to the new stage which is scientific, legal and systematic innovation and development. In May2008,"the Work Plan of Establishing the Sound System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption in2008-2012" has been promulgated by the Party Central Committee again, in which the key works are confirmed: improving bidding and bid institution of construction projects, consummating administrative supervision mechanism of bidding and bid of construction projects, deepening the reform of government procurement system, strengthening the supervision of each link of government procurement, standardizing the bidding and bid in state-owned enterprises procurement. The establishment of risk prevention and control mechanism for honesty and cleanness is an important part of the construction of the punishing and preventing corruption system. So it is practically significant to actively carry out the research on the risk prevention and control mechanism for honesty and cleanness in bidding and bid.Around the research ideas of "Emerging of Problems-> Analysis of Problems-> Mechanism Analysis of Key Problems-> Countermeasures to Problems-> Conclusions", the thesis is divided into seven chapters, and the main content of each chapter is as follows:The first chapter is the introduction, and focus on the emerging of problems. It mainly explains the overall overview of the following contents:the background and significance of the selected topic of the thesis, the related research status quo at home and abroad, the basic concepts related to the topic, the research ideas and methods, the structure logic and main content of the full text. Based on the research purpose of the selected topic, the "mechanism" is defined as the management rules, legal norms, procedures and methods, technical support, all of which are related to the supervision and risk prevention of bidding and bid activities. Based on briefly explaining the basic concepts and process of bidding and bid, it is especially pointed out that the economic theory of bidding and auction is exactly the same, but just their directions of trading reverse. So the auction theory can be entirely used to analyze the economic mechanism of bidding and bid. Based on the study of a large number of literatures, overseas and domestic research status quo is summarized from three levels:management mechanism, technical method and information support system.The second chapter briefly introduces the related theoretical basis to guide to analyze the problems. In this chapter, the theoretical basis related to the research topic of the thesis is intensively and briefly introduced. These theories include auction theory, game theory, mechanism design and principal-agent theory, the theory of corruption and anti-corruption, and the theory of risk management. Each theoretical basis will be used to guide the research of one or several chapters. The auction theory and game theory are applied to the analysis of economic mechanism of transverse and vertical collusion bid. The mechanism design and principal-agent theory are applied to the analysis of mechanism design and analysis related to vertical collusion bid. The theory of corruption and anti-corruption are applied to guide for the designs of this thesis framework and the supervision mechanism of bidding and bid. The basic concept and thought of risk management run throughout the analysis of each chapter and it is the starting and foothold point of the full text.The third chapter analyzes the risk of honesty and cleanness in bidding and bid practice in our country, the main content of this chapter includes the comprehensive analysis of forms, qualities, classifications, causes of the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid. According to the participants in bidding and bid activities who are likely to cause problems and risks, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is approximately classified into four categories:unreasonable administrative interventions of supervision departments, non-standard or black-box operations of the tenderee or its agency, limit competition behaviours of bidders, malfeasance behaviours of bid evaluation experts. In addition, according to the interaction features of collusion participants, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is also classified into the following four categories:transverse collusion bid, vertical collusion bid, mixed collusion bid and non-collusion mal-behaviors. Based on the above problem analysis, the main deep reasons behind representations of the dishonesty risk problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market.The fourth chapter analyzes in detail the economic mechanism of transverse collusion bid which is one of the key research problems of this thesis. Based on the analysis of the basic concepts and key features of transverse collusion bid, a typical one-dimensional (price) standard bidding model is established. The equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid are analyzed in detail by auction theory. The influence of external factors, which mainly include the number of bidder, reserve price, implementation cost of collusion, on the equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid as well as the risk game of collusion, are analyzed emphatically. In addition, the recognition and detection methods of transverse collusion bid are analyzed preliminarily.The fifth chapter analyzes in detail the economic mechanism of vertical collusion bid which is another one of the key research problems of this thesis. On the basis of pointing out that the essential characteristic of vertical collusion bid problems is ascribed to the abuse of bid evaluation discretion, a two-dimensional attributes (quality and price) standard bidding model is established. By auction theory, the following contents related the model are analyzed in detail:the auction equilibrium characteristics, the influence of bid evaluation discretion on the auction equilibrium solution and the optimal bidding mechanism as well as the relationship between corruption decision-making, corruption rate and bid evaluation discretion. By rent-seeking theory and game theory, a three-party dynamic game mode is built that consists of the tenderee or supervisor which is the principle, the bidding delegate or agency which is the rent-creating middle agent, and the bidder which is the rent-seeking terminal agent. The relationships between the punishment rate of corruption and punishment intensity as well as collusion benefit are analyzed. The relationships of the corruption rate between bidding delegate and bidder is discussed. In addition, the static comparative relationships between the corruption rates of bidding delegate and bidder and supervision cost, punishment intensity (fine), bidding agency fee (emolument), and bribery magnitude, are demonstrated.The sixth chapter focus on the countermeasures of the above mentioned problems and the mechanism design of prevention and control of dishonesty risk in bidding and bid. Based on the comprehensive comparison of bidding supervision system in our country and foreign countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan, aiming at the main problems and shortages existing in the bidding supervision system in our country, drawing lessons from the advanced overseas experience, combining with the national anti-corruption policy, the improvement countermeasures to prevent and control the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid in our country are discussed from three aspects, which are the punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt, the prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt and the guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt.The seventh chapter is summary and outlook. The research content and related conclusions are summarized and reviewed, the innovations of the research work are refined, and the outlooks of related problems which need to be further researched are finished. The main innovation work of the thesis can be summarized as the following four aspects:(1) Based on a large number of literature research, all kinds of dishonesty problems in each link of the whole process of bidding and bid are summarized and classified comprehensively. Firstly, according to the participants in bidding and bid activities who are likely to cause problems and risks, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is approximately classified into four categories:unreasonable administrative interventions of supervision departments, non-standard or black-box operations of the tenderee or its agency, limit competition behaviors of bidders, malfeasance behaviors of bid evaluation experts. The above classification is convenient for the department of each participant belongs to strengthening the internal risk management and control by improving and perfecting the related systems, rules and processes. Secondly, according to the interaction features of collusion participants, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is also classified into the following four categories:transverse collusion bid, vertical collusion bid, mixed collusion bid and non-collusion bad behaviors. Based on the above problem analysis, the main deep reasons behind representations of the problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market. This classification is convenient for prevention mechanism design. Thirdly, the main deep reasons behind representations of the dishonesty risk problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market.(2) Based on the analysis of the basic concepts and key features of transverse collusion bid, a typical one-dimensional (price) standard bidding model is established. The equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid are analyzed in detail by auction theory. The influence of external factors, which mainly include the number of bidder, reserve price, implementation cost of collusion, on the equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid as well as the risk game of collusion, are analyzed emphatically. And so, six main conclusions with guidance significance related to transverse collusion bid are achieved. In addition, the recognition and detection methods of transverse collusion bid are analyzed preliminarily.(3) On the basis of pointing out that the essential characteristic of vertical collusion bid problems is ascribed to the abuse of bid evaluation discretion, a two-dimensional attributes (quality and price) standard bidding model is established. By auction theory, the following contents related the model are analyzed in detail:the influence of bid evaluation discretion on the auction equilibrium solution and the optimal bidding mechanism, the relationship between corruption decision-making, corruption rate and bid evaluation discretion. By rent-seeking theory and game theory, a three-party dynamic game mode is built that consists of the tenderee or supervisor which is the principle, the bidding delegate or agency which is the rent-creating middle agent, and the bidder which is the rent-seeking terminal agent. The relationships between the punishing corruption rate and punishment intensity as well as collusion income are analyzed. The relationships of the corruption rate between bidding delegate and bidder is discussed. In addition, the static comparative relationships between the corruption rates of bidding delegate and bidder and supervision cost, punishment intensity, bidding agency fee, and bribery magnitude, are demonstrated. The related research conclusions are summarized into seven theorems.(4) Based on the comprehensive comparison of bidding supervision system in our country and foreign countries, by the reference of the advanced overseas experience, from the perspective of the prevention and control of honesty and cleanness, guided by the concepts of system engineering, combining with the national anti-corruption policy, the improvement countermeasures to prevent and control the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid in our country are discussed from three aspects, which are the punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt, the prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt and the guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt. The punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt is embodied in two aspects:improving the legal system of bidding and bid, and speeding up the construction of honesty and credit system of bidding and bid. The prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt is embodied in the following two aspects:reforming the supervision system of bidding and bid, and for a tenderee to strengthen the internal management and control in bidding process. The guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt is also embodied in two aspects:reasonably selecting bid evaluation method and upgrading the information level of management and supervision in bidding and bid process. Further more, some corresponding concrete measures and suggestions are put forward respectively in the above six aspects.