Defining World Structure And Identity And Sino-U.S. Relations—An Analysis Of The Constructivist Approach

The United States and China are both at a moment of transition and face great strategic opportunities and challenges. Based on the mainstream constructivism’s understanding of role identity, the constructivists’notion that the interests of states are shaped by their identities, while state identities (and therefore interests) themselves are subjected to change in the process of interaction, and the argument that the identity and underlying interests of states are never altered by the interaction unless the distribution of relative material capabilities changes, this study put forward three hypotheses on the pattern of dynamics of interactions between the United States and China during the past60-plus years:1) If the two parties both have a mistaken or partly mistaken assessment of the world situation and a mistaken understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity, it is inevitable that the two countries will have a head-on collision.2) If the two parties both have a correct assessment of the world situation and a correct understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity, it is very likely that the two countries will have a breakthrough in or a more smooth development of bilateral relations.3) If one party has a correct analysis of the world situation and a correct understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity while the other party has a short-term mistaken analysis of world situation and a wrong understanding of the other’s role(s) and state identity, Sino-U.S. relations will deteriorate, but if the mistaken’ party corrects the mistakes, the bilateral relations will not witness serious backslide.Three case studies vindicate the validity of these three hypotheses. During the period between1949and1969, the United States government viewed America’s struggle with the Soviet Union as a life-and-death struggle between Capitalism and Communism, between freedom and slavery and viewed the Communist bloc as a monolith which was under the tight control of the Soviet Union. After the outbreak of the Korean War and China’s involvement in the war, China was deemed as the enemy of the United States and this perception of China being an enemy of the United States was maintained by all American administrations from Truman to Johnson during this period. The Sino-Indian border conflicts in1962reaffirmed the threat of China on the part of key American policymakers. As a result of such a China identity, the United States largely pursued a China policy characterized by political isolation, economic and trade embargo and military encirclement which was aimed at the demise of the Beijing regime. On the part of the Chinese government, the Chinese leadership also viewed the United States as the biggest threat in this period. The perception of American threat prompted the Chinese leadership to make the decision to send volunteer troops to North Korea, thus making the United States and China real enemies in battle. Chinese leadership’s assessment of the world situation in the1950s marked the gradual left-turn of Chinese politics and the Chinese leadership refused to accept the Soviet notion of peaceful coexistence with the West, which further antagonized the American government. In the late1950s, Mao Zedong’s assessment that the East wind was prevailing over the West wind further exasperated China’s strategic situation which resulted in the mistaken assessment that China had become the center of world revolution. China’s American identity as the biggest threat to China was kept almost unchanged during this period.During the period between1969and1972, the changed world situation, particularly Soviet expansionism after1968, was taken notice by the American policymakers. The Soviet threat of nuclear attacks against China made the American policymakers conclude that the Soviets had become the greatest threat to America’s strategic position in the world, particular in Asia. As a result, China was not the biggest enemy of the United States anymore. As Sino-Soviet relations went from bad to worse in the late1960s, especially after the armed conflicts along the Sino-Soviet border in1969, Mao and other leaders realized that China’s biggest threat came from the north. At the height of the tension between China and the Soviet Union, China’s very survival was even threatened. The changed security situation made Mao adjust China’s foreign relations strategy. The "fighting with two fists" strategy was changed, and China tried to seek for allies to deter the Soviet Union. The best choice was the United States. China found it a high priority to improve Sino-U.S relations. As a result, the United States was not the biggest enemy of China. Instead, both countries defined the Soviet Union as the biggest enemy. This convergence of threat perception and the changed identity of one another paved the way for a possible rapprochement.During the period between1989and1992, the Bush Sr. administration, based on its assessment of the world situation which was transitioning to a post-Cold War era in which the United States was the only superpower, imposed sanctions on China and at the same time tried to maintain the channels of communication with Beijing open and fought vigorously with Congress to keep China’s MFN status because it thought it necessary to do so to shape the development of China and facilitate positive change in China. During the early Clinton years, the renewal of China’s MFN status was linked to China’s improvement in human rights by an executive order because key policy-makers in the Clinton administration and several influential Congressmen(women) held the view that the United States had a golden opportunity to export democracy and reshape the world in the American model, and more importantly, the Communist Party in China would collapse soon. They had a mistaken assessment of the world situation and overestimated the so-called golden opportunity and mistakenly thought that the Beijing regime would follow the steps of its counterparts in Eastern Europe. However, the Chinese leadership with Deng Xiaoping at the core had a correct assessment of world situation before the June4incident in1989, to be specific, during the period between1984and1989, and concluded that peace and development had replaced war and revolution as the two defining features of the world situation. During the most difficult years in the wake of the June4incident, Deng Xiaoping correctly assessed the world situation and did not change his basic judgment that peace and development was still the prevailing themes of the era and decided to maintain a non-confrontational stance toward the United States even though there were different voices in China and refused to claim the leadership of holding high the banner of anti-Americanism as expected by some developing countries, thus the Chinese leadership observed the situation coolly, held their ground and kept their patience. Deng Xiaoping, based on his correct assessment of the changed world situation, gave the16-character guiding principle in China’s policy toward the United States, which guided the foreign policy work of the Chinese government led by Jiang Zemin. The Clinton administration changed its mistaken assessment of the world situation and the future of China and the Chinese Communist Party when it was clear that the pressure had not worked and would not work. It delinked the improvement of China’s human rights record from the renewal of China’s MFN status in May1994, which paved the way for a summit between U.S. President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the APEC1994Summit. The meeting between Clinton and Jiang Zemin marked that Sino-U.S. relations had come back to the right track after the fluctuations since the June4incident in1989.Based on these three hypotheses, this study argues, on the one hand, that on the basis of the assessment that the global balance of power has not undergone fundamental changes and the United States is still the only superpower, the Chinese leadership concludes that China should not claim leadership and challenge the United States but make great efforts to build a new type of relationship between great powers; on the other hand, the Obama administration does not accept the argument that China has become a threat to America’s security and does not think that confrontation or war between China and the United States is likely. China has not been defined as a threat to American interests or an enemy of the United States, so the Obama administration still adheres to the hedging strategy. The United States will continue its rebalance to Asia and China will make efforts to build a new type of relationship between great powers. Although mutual strategic mistrust is the biggest problem in promoting. Sino-U.S relations, the Chinese leadership and their counterparts in the United States are very clear that the stakes are too high if the bilateral relationship goes sour. This author suggests that Beijing and Washington:1) show the bottom line to each other;2) stress equality between and respect to each other;3) build a crisis management and control mechanism.