The Study On Conflict Management Of Marketing Channel

With the evolution of marketing channel theory, scholars have shifted focus channel structure to channel conflict and channel behavior. Conflict management of channel has been increasingly important, an how to resolve channel conflict and realize a win-win goal has become interest and need of stakeholders. Channel power is the most important part of channel behavior, and their research is mainly concentrated on the developed market economies. As for channel power, related theory especially industry-specific empirical research is still inadequate and more theoretical research-based.With the development of industrialization and information technology, as an important industry of the national economy, telecommunications industry has been playing more and more evitable role. After the third restructuring of telecommunications,3G license issuance as well as incoming4G issuance, the telecommunications industry structure is expected to be optimized and the market competition among operators will be more intense. Each operator tends to place distribution of marketing channels as well as governance channel relationships in a critical position, where channel satisfaction is an important goal of channel relationship management. Operators should establish awareness that channel satisfaction is able to promote channel performance and further customer’s satisfaction, focusing on building long-term stability, mutual benefit and ecological channel relationships.In this paper, based on research paradigm of conflict game of telecom operators and agents in telecommunications industry, the relation between the use of power of operator channel and a sense of credibility of agents is studied, which is used to compensate for the lack of studies in this field, creating theoretical and practical significance. Meanwhile, this study bases on channel power transfer, which features the characteristics of times. This article first summarizes domestic and foreign scholars’research on theory of channel conflict and channel power, channel member satisfaction, the relationship between power strategies and satisfaction. Combined with the background of telecommunications industry, appropriate research model and research hypotheses are proposed. Then, through simulation of conflict game between operators and agents, we are able to conclude that the use of channel power is a double-edged sword, on one side, it would help operators to enhance their profit in a short term, however, on the other side, and it will reduce the credibility of both sides, causing "Prisoner’s Dilemma" and a lose-lose result. If the agents in the market can freely change their favored carriers, operators that use less channel power will eventually win in the market, despite there is some short-term losses on revenue growth. Apart from that, illegal behaviors like hidden transactions of agents will ultimately impact the market, resulting in the "public land" tragedy and further deteriorating the market environment. To be able to form a good reputation among operators and agents, operators should take caution to consider using channel power; Otherwise the weapon will hurt the other as well as yourself.This paper addresses the credibility of the game between operators and agents and builds credibility system based on the game between operators and agents, finding that (1) the market which agents enable freely to choose is ideal market;(2) Forced channel power exerts devastating effects on sense of credibility between the agents for the operators;(3) parameters such as credibility in one cycle, sales volume, the number of fraud agents, frequency of inspections from carriers as well as the cumulative number of products of the entire market are being studied.Based on that, by consideration of practice, the influence of inner agent on channel operation is further studied. From the prospective of long-term motivation, profitability of inner agent mechanism is constructed. Through adding long-term motivation constraints, discount rate, earnings rate, long-term motivation model is developed.