Research On Supply Chain Competition Pricing Decision Models Under Different Structures

As the global economic integration accelerates, the continuous development of productive forces and the deepening of the international division of labor, fundamental changes have taken place in the internal and external environments of enterprise management. People also pay more and more attention to the product quality, function, individuation and so on. It puts forward unprecedented challenges to traditional enterprise management. More and more enterprises realize that if you want to gain a foothold in the fierce market competition, you must rely on the strength of a supply chain. Upstream and downstream enterprise group combined together is a must to enhance the competitive advantage of supply chain, and they should stand in the height of the supply chain together to implement their decisions and actions. Supply chain competitive pricing decision models have been studied in this dissertation by integrated using of game theory, the pricing theory, coordination mechanism, the algebraic theory and so on. It starts with the internal competition of supply chain, considering the dual-channel pricing decision, coordination mechanism and channel mode selection, then considers external competition, supply chain from two supply chains competition game to complex n supply chains competitive pricing decisions, and proceed comparison analysis. The main research and innovation points of this dissertation are presented as follows:(1) In the research of the dual-channel supply chain competitive pricing decision model, this dissertation stands on the internet direct channel side to think, that is in keeping with the current vigorous development of e-commerce. First of all, in the dual-channel supply chain model with mixed demand, considering the retail channel facing determine demand and the internet direct channel facing stochastic demand, the pricing decision and coordination mechanism are studied. Respectively consider decentralized decision and centralized decision of the manufacturers and retailers, make comparison of the optimal decisions of the two modes, and further more put forward the simple coordination mechanism. The research results show that the price game's Nash equilibrium solutions are existence in the two modes and manufacturer's guidance pricing contract can make the perfect coordination of supply chain. The model has certain anti-interference to the form of demand function and the fluctuation of demand, customers'channel preference has influence on channel profit and selling price, it should pay attention to the cultivation of the customers' loyalty in channels selection. In centralized decision-making, the manufacturer can use pricing differences leading demand from the uncertainty market to the certainty market to realize win-win situation. Secondly, in the model of based on the perspective of the internet direct marketing manufacturers'dual-channel supply chain pricing decision and the choice of mode analysis, we assume that the manufacturer having an internet direct channel, combined with the different dominance of enterprises in supply chain, analyze the pricing decisions of I mode, IN mode, IS mode and RS mode, compare those profits and find out the channel mode selection criteria, so as to make channel mode selection. Meanwhile the model selection problems have been thought in terms of the entire supply chain. Then the model analyzes the influence of the channel mode selection which made by the manufacturers investment to channel. The results show that the manufacturer can develop the retail channel to sell products, but should give priority to one sale channel and another channel is complementary. The channel mode should be preferred choice IS mode. Manufacturers can use the brand effect, advertising, sales promotion, production methods, subjective distribution and so on to adjust the channel of investment, so as to adjust the channel market share to meet the needs of the current channel mode. In addition to adhere to the principle "one main and auxiliary" of two channels, the retail channel should be chosen IN mode in terms of the supply chain as a whole.(2) In the competitive pricing decision model of two unequal status supply chains, this dissertation emphatically analyzes the influence to pricing decisions when the chain members'power changes. It considers two supply chains and each supply chain is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. Stackelberg game is considered between chains, manufacturer Stackelberg game and retailer Stackelberg game are considered respectively in the chain. It focuses on DMDM, DMDR, DRDM and DRDR the four structures, then analyzes the optimal decisions of the enterprises within the chain which under different game strategies and the power change's influence on the product price, sales, profit of single chain and the influence of the industry's profits during the competing process for control of the supply chain. The research results show that the product price, sales, profit of single chain and the industry are not affected during the competing process for control of the supply chain. The change of power in chain can only decide the wholesale price. The wholesale price plays an integral role of supply chain profit. Any change in the internal control of supply chain has no effect on the competition between chain and chain. Want to gain a competitive power, to obtain higher profits, should aim at the point of view of the whole supply chain to consider, and is not lying in game between upstream and downstream enterprises, it is just a kind of internal friction. As two chain strength evenly matched, after entering the market of the supply chain advantage which called "the late-move advantage".(3) In the n supply chains competition pricing decision model, the article respectively studies that the n chains have the same structure or not. First, it studies competition pricing decisions in the same structure of n supply chains. The existence and uniqueness of optimal decisions in IS structure, AI structure and AD structure these three structures are proved and detailed analysis of optimal decisions are presented. Secondly, it studies competition pricing decisions in the mixed structure of n supply chains. The existence and uniqueness of optimal decisions in PIPD structure, PIPC structure and PDPC structure these three structures are proved and detailed analysis of optimal decisions are presented. The results show that the supply chain structure has a significant influence on optimal decision. No matter which kind of structure, market share is the most important factor that affect the optimal decision. Introducing the horizontal competition is good for the supply chain which has lower market share. With the increasing of the horizontal competition strength, the price variance and profit gap between different supply chains are shrinking. From the overall industry perspective, the industry's profit is maximized in the monopolistic market; when the supply chains share the market completely, industry has the lowest profit. In IS structure which is similar to monopolistic market, horizontal competition is driving the market in the direction of balanced development. The structure of the industry has a minimum guarantee, no matter how fierce competition, it won't appear that supply chain exit the market because of no money to earn. In the rest of the structures, the function of the horizontal competition is to encourage industry to maximize the benefits to customers. There is not the lowest guarantee for the whole industry.In conclusion, this dissertation makes the extending research on the different structures of supply chain competition pricing decision models. It enriches the supply chain competition decision-making theory and it also provides a theoretical basis and decision support for the supply chain practice.