More And More Division Of Labor,Common Agency And Their Influence On The Collusion

In the financial market,due to the division of labor is more and more refined,lead to more and more of the principal-agent relationship,such as securities and the stock broker system,the emergence of the large institutional investors,the investment manager.However,due to the asymmetry of information,financial markets may inevitably a lot of adverse selection and moral hazard problems,such as professional agent irregularities in order to obtain higher earnings,institutional investors and investment managers in order to achieve their own interests and to make irrational investment and so on.While lots of principal-agent relationship,mutual agency relationship also presents a kind of "spring",this is because the number of agents in the financial market is always far less than the number of the principal,an agent entrusted the quantity is huge,this leads to a lot of agents in fact is essentially a number of the principal agent together.Due to the development of network technology.investors can find the same agent extensively to replace his operating the buying and selling of securities or stock,it leads to a result:the same agent of the client probably don't know other client's private information.In common agency relationship,this kind of information asymmetry may cause common agent with one(or some)client "conspiracy" to damage the interests of other clients.So,the question is.when there is identity information asymmetry under the agency relationship of collusion happened,the occurrence of conspiracy to the stability and efficiency of financial markets has what kind of impact?Fruitful results of Common agency theory have been achieved for more than 30 years of development since its inception by B.Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston.Their papers(1985,1986(a))groundbreaking gave the definition of the"common agent":when a person's(the agent)behavior affectes not one participal.but many participals(the client),and the clients' preference for all possible behaviors of the agent are conflicting.However,the existing common agency theory didn't consider the "double spy" or this kind of situations.The "double spy" is an old,a typical example of the common agency.In "double spy" activities,the identity information of the "double spy" is vital,and the identity information is not known at first.But common agency theory has not studied the importance of this identity information.In reality,however,it is very common that the common agent's identity information is hidden,such as professional agents of business,private detective,etc.,and the existing common agency theory is not used to analyze this kind of problem.Here is the problem,how to build a research framework that can be used to analyze this kind of problem like "double spy"?There is another important questiong that is why the common agent appers.The explanation of the existing common agency theory is nothing more than economies of scale of the common agent.However,this paper proposed that,there is a division of the cause of common agency's generalization is the division of labor.In this paper,it is not difficult to understand that the division of labor can produce the common agency relationship in fact.When the division of labor is more and more refined,principals can not finish all the work by themselves,they are bound to find agents,when a growing number of principal-agent relationships appear,the common agent also appear,the identity information hidden common agent mentioned above can appear more easily.So.the question is:under the division of labor,identity information hidden common ageeney relationship may arise,is there any difference between the market of refinement of division of labor and the market of no refinement of division of labor?The above two questions are the main content of this paper to study:in short,this paper studies the relationship between the division of labor,common agency,and collusion under a widespread framework of significant characteristics,and the effects on the equilibrium of them.It is studied in the framework that the vertical division of labor produces the comnmon agency relationship,and the identity information's concealment of the common agent may lead to the collusion between the pricipals and agentclients.and the motivation is the vertical division of labor,the action result is collusion.Our research purpose is to analyze a series of effects on equilibrium of the causal relationship.The content of our research contains two parts:one is the effects of collusion on the result of equilibrium in a framework within the identity asymmetry information of the common agent;Two is the changes of market efficiency from the introduction of division of labor into competition model.In this paper,the fourth chapter builds theory model to study the first question.Firstly,built a game interactive model of identity information asymmetry,the purpose is to study the optimal action selection of the common agent or principals,and the conditions and of the collusion,and the model also has studied the influence of the asymmetry degree of the initial identity information on the final result,because it is meaningful for building this kind of model in the asymmetry degree of initial identity information hypothesis;Then,based on the "cournot model ",extending the model's hypothesis,making it to be a common agent analysis framework with a hidden identity information common agent,studing the conditions of the collusion,the influence of collusion on the result of equilibrium,and comparing the equilibrium results of extension model and traditional cournot model.The conclusion is:collusion can appear under certain conditions;Collusion is effective for participation agents,whose income can be increased,but collusion for market efficiency is not necessarily effective,under certain conditions,collusion can increase the whole benefits of industry:Under certain conditions,collusion may also reduce the whole benefits of industry.In this paper,the fifth chapter extends the classic case of "prisoner's dilemma" and cases with market failure to study the second question.Firstly,it expand the "eagle and dove game" and "the cournot model",introducing the division of labor to the classical models,and compared the equilibrium results of the model,and very meaningful conclusions are obtained;Then,this paper built a generalization model to solue the "prisoner's dilemma",and studied the conditions for the division of labor making markets more efficient;Finally,this paper extended two classic case of"lemon market" and "corporate governance model" with the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard,respectively,and put forward some effective suggestions to solve the two kinds of market failure.The conclusion of this chapter is that "the common agent" participates in the non-cooperative game in the form of collusion with the clients,and collusion with synergy effect,namely alliance benefits is greater than the union benefits of agent and the principal with no collusion,and collusion may cause damage with client outside the alliance,the client's income is lower than no alliance benefits.When under certain conditions,common agent in non-cooperative game can achieve a certain degree of cooperation and overall benefits and individual income will increase.Finally,in this paper,the sixth chapter will theory research on the financial markets is used to analyze the collusion influence on the stability and efficiency of financial markets,and enhances the stability of financial markets,increase market efficiency measures.Through the research conclusion of this paper,we can find:First,in the common agency framework,researches of the asymmetric indentity information is of great significance,because the identity information asymmetry can lead to collusion of common agent and the principal,and collusion will change the balanced income structure.Second,the competition model with the division of labor,using the mechanism of action of collusion,can analyze the market forces---wherther division of labor effect on market efficiency or not.It has important theoretical significance.According to the conclusion,under certain conditions,there is a good division of labor to make the market efficiency higher of competition model,and it is proved that reasonable division of labor can improve the efficiency of the market.