The Research On Behavior Mechanism And Government Regulation Of Social Power Participating In Affordable Housing

It is an important choice that guiding social power to participating in the construction and operation of affordable housing in order to promote the construction of housing guarantee system,improve the efficiency of resource allocation and optimize the public service supply mechanism.Since 2012,China has issued a series of policies that encourage social power to participate in affordable housing,which has achieved initial results.However,compared with social needs and government expectation,it still has a large room to improve.Recently,about the research on the participation of social power in affordable housing,the existent literature focuses on macro or micro level,which lacks in-depth investigation and data analysis.Furthermore,the existent literature still lacks the empirical research of micro level on the internal mechanisms,paths and dynamic equilibrium of the research on social power's participation on affordable housing.Therefore,based on the need of theoretical research and realistic work,this thesis focuses on the behavioral decision process of social power,uses multiply research methods to systematically study the behavior preference,decision-making factors,micro mechanism in the progress of the participation of social power in affordable housing,and analyzes the dynamic evolution path of public-private cooperation mechanism of affordable housing by evolutionary game,and puts forward some regulations suggestion as the reference for related policy mechanisms.Firstly,status analysis of the participation of social power in affordable housing.Based on Zhejiang province,this thesis carries out large sample research.Statistical analysis shows that the recognition and awareness of the social power on affordable housing is not in high level,and the proportion of investment is not large.The proportion of participation in research object is 5.22%and the proportion of investment intention is 21.87%.The core problem of the low participation of social power is low income and high risk.The research shows that the actual profit rate of affordable housing is not more than 3%.If added various subsidies,the actual profit rate is not more than 5%,which is lower than not only the average rate of profit of commercial real estate,but also the required return of the social power participating in affordable housing.Secondly,behavioral research on the participation of social power in affordable housing.Through model statistics,the result shows that the ideological factors,such as sense of responsibility and values play an important role in the participating behavior of the enterprises.It is a U-like relationship between enterprise scale and the participating behavior in affordable housing.The intention of participation is high in super real estate enterprises and small and medium real estate enterprises.The moderating effect of policy instrument is more obvious when the intention of participation is low and the abilities of participation is strong.Compared with administration policy instrument,the economic policy instrument has more strong moderating effect.Thirdly,evolutionary game analysis on cooperation between government and enterprise of affordable housing.The analysis based on evolutionary game and empirical data shows that it is difficult for the enterprises to evolve naturally towards the direction of active participation.It is possible to control the evolutionary track of behavioral strategy on both sides,promote the game to evolve to the target state by clarifying the initial status of game,improving the motivation and restraint system and adjusting the regulatory intervention parameters.Under different parameter conditions,there are four game states.The game is currently in the a section of I status,under this condition,the government lacks motivation of governance and the social power also lacks the initiative of participation,it needs government to enhance regulation and improve the measures of motivation and restraint.Fourthly,the construction of government regulation framework based on the theory of incentive compatibility.Guided by the theory of incentive compatibility,this thesis puts forward the following suggestions.1)Strengthening the propaganda guide and improving the corporate social responsibility;2)Perfecting the legal system construction,clearing the power of the enterprise and providing a clear institution environment;3)Improving the motivation and restraint system and further improving the economic incentives;4)Widening financing channel and perfecting the supporting system;5)Strengthening supervision and management,implementing the dynamic supervision evaluation on enterprise behavior and establishing the risk control mechanism of corporate default;6)Optimizing management and services,transforming part of the state-owned enterprises into NGO,implementing classified guide according to the size and internal needs of organization.