Study On Closed-loop Supply Chain Decisions Under Different Dominant Power Cosidering Information Sharing

The extensive mode of economic growth is the key to our economic and social development under the dual constraints of resources and environment.Developing circular economy is an important way to solve the environmental problems and achieve sustainable development of our economic society.Closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)has been playing an active role in promoting overall resource conservation,reducing energy consumption intensity and other ecological civilization construction,and has gradually become the focus of attention of businesses and scholars.Increasing instability and complexity in CLSC are according to much nodes and different market power.Information,especially demand forecast information,as a key element of CLSC,will affect the overall performance of CLSC and decision of nodes.Therefore,it is necessary to study the decisions of CLSC under the different dominant power considering information sharing.By using game theory,optimization theory and mathematical statistics,this paper first constructs a centralized decision model of CLSC under centralized strategy.Comparing the centralized strategy,this paper study the decentralized strategy under different market power with non-and information sharing.Furthermore,the selection of information sharing and collecting mode is influenced by different information prediction accuracy,effort recovery cost and recovery payment level.(1)Under the non-dominant power of Nash game,information sharing has little effect on the overall performance of the CLSC,especially under the manufacturer and the thirdpart collecting models,the value of information sharing is zero.From the choice of collecting strategy,retailers get the maximum profit in the manufacturing collecting model,and the retailer shall reclaim the most cost-effective,which showed the enthusiasm of some small and medium-sized retailers lack of collceting items,and collecting items belonging to a "pick-up" state.In the case of low collecting payment,the third-pary collecting model is the most profitable for the manufacturer.(2)Under the retailer dominant power,the manufacturer and the retailer comply with the Stackelberg game.By study,information sharing under the retailer collecting model will damage the overall profit of CLSC.Under the manufacturer's collecting model,information sharing can increase profits of CLSC and participants in a certain range,and retailers have the motivation to share the private information voluntarily.When the cost of collecting effort is lower,retailers and manufacturers can get the maximum profit.When the cost of collecting effort is higher,manufacturers can choose the third-part collecting to maximize their interests by appropriately raising the level of collecting payment.(3)Under the manufacturer dominant power,the manufacturer and the retailer comply with the Stackelberg game.The way of information sharing is transformed from the oneway dissemination,which retailer to the manufacturer,to two-way sharing between manufacturers and retailers,forming a combination forecasting information.Information sharing makes the closed loop supply chain and retailer's profits increase,but the manufacturer's profit is damaged.Therefore,it is necessary to promote the information sharing of the manufacturer through the incentive mechanism.However,no matter whether the information is shared or not,the manufacturer collecting model can maximize the profits of all parties in CLSC.(4)By introducing the retailer's horizontal competition,the information sharing is considered in the manufacturer collecting model under the different market power structure.Under the Nash equilibrium,the introduction of competition changes the profit of CLSC and the members before and after information sharing.Under the retailer dominated market power,information sharing benefits CLSC and other members,while the interests of the information sharing are impaired.Under manufacturer dominated structure,information sharing will reduce the interests of CLSC,and the information sharing is unfavorable.(5)Taking the collecting of old household appliances(TV),this part mainly discussed how to choose the implementation models of collecting under the prediction of demand and waste volume.