| Evaluation of sci-tech achievements is the "baton" of scientific and technological workers in Colleges and universities,which plays a guiding role for research activities.In recent years,along with Our country colleges and universities pay more and more attention to scientific research activity,no matter on the quantity and quality of sci-tech achievements have made remarkable achievements.However,according to the country's scientific research investment and the expectation,the quality and level of sci-tech achievements in colleges and universities still exist many unsatisfactory places,there are many problems,which are Low conversion rate,disconnected with the actual needs of the social economy,the good and bad are intermingled,low-level repeating,and so on.It means something must have gone wrong in evaluation of sci-tech achievements.This paper tries to use the theory of asymmetric information to analyze the problems that exist in the evaluation of sci-tech achievements in order to provide a new solution.Information asymmetry is the root of all kinds of problems in the current evaluation of sci-tech achievements in Universities,if we consider evaluation of sci-tech achievements in universities as a process of signal transmission and information screening between valuator and those being evaluated.then we can apply the theory of information asymmetry to the analysis of the evaluation of sci-tech achievements.In this paper,we start with the principal-agent relationship in the evaluation of sci-tech achievements in universities,and describe the performance.causes and adverse selection,moral hazard problems caused by information asymmetry.Evaluation itself is accompanied by information asymmetry,is a process of overcoming the problem of information asymmetry between the subject and object.This kind of information asymmetry is root in the inner structure of the evaluation of sci-tech achievements,such as characteristics of sci-tech achievements and agency relations.This paper also analyzed information asymmetry caused by government-oriental evaluation system in two aspects:using subjective index instead of objective index and evaluating low-order information by high-order information.Government-oriental evaluation system is not successful but on the contrary,it aggravates information asymmetry,because it is not evaluated by the actual user.The quality and value of sci-tech achievements can only be evaluated by simple quantitative or higher order indexes,for instance,number of articles and books and administrative level of research projects.The classical information asymmetry theory holds that information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard.Scientific and technical personnel should be rational,who will put much more time and effort in significant index.In order to pursue the maximization of personal interests,they do not hesitate to take academic misconduct,such as crude making,academic fraud,rent-seeking,and those honest man will be adverse selected.The most concentrated and outstanding performance of moral hazard is the academic fraud and rent-seeking.The information gap caused by the administrative noise is the source power of the academic fraud.In this paper,administrative noise how to lead to academic fraud and adverse selection is analyzed by using principal agent theory and cost-benefit analysis method.Then,the corresponding suggestions and countermeasures for the problem of information asymmetry are put forward:Aim at information asymmetry caused by structural factors,replacing unreasonable partition mode of horizontal and vertical project with science project and technical projects.Just keep science projects in the administrative evaluation system,let market take technical projects over.This paper puts forward the solution of making information objective,including optimize and improve the evaluation index system of sci-tech achievements in colleges and universities,in order to achieve the purpose of objectification of the subjective information,using analytic hierarchy process and entropy analysis method to determine the weight of evaluation index,according to the individual and the overall sci-tech achievements in different situations.This paper follows the principle of "order reduction",puts forward some suggestions,including stripping away evaluation function of core journals,playing down resource allocation function of title.According to cost benefit analysis of the academic fraud,we can have a conclusion that in order to curb academic fraud,it is necessary to reduce the interference of administrative noise,on the other hand,we should strengthen the punishment for academic fraud.By establishing the mixed-strategy game model of academic fraud in sci-tech achievement evaluation,the mixed Nash equilibrium solution was calculated,and the equilibrium solution was analyzed thoroughly.The results indicated that improving the severity and certainty of punishment,increasing evaluation experts' reward.and reducing evaluation experts,information screening cost could effectively inhibit academic fraud in sci-tech evaluation.Take steps along the path strengthening the punishment for academic fraud.could effectively inhibit academic fraud,this paper also puts forward the suggestions for the establishment of academic reputation mechanism.Based on the analysis of the principal-agent relationship in the evaluation of university sci-tech achievements,the three party mixed strategy rent-seeking game model is built up and solved.Then the paper gave the policy implications of the parameters and variables through the Nash equilibrium solution and provided the governance approach of rent-seeking activities.These measures include increasing the punishment to the people who create rent and seek rent and the probability of successful supervision will be beneficial to reducing the optimal supervision probability of the supervisory organ;increasing the normal income of the people who create rent,can reduce the rent-setting behavior;reducing the supervision cost,it can effectively reduce the rent-seeking behavior.Finally,this paper presents the ultimate solution to the problem of information asymmetry in evaluation of sci-tech achievements in Universities.That is to build market-oriented evaluation system of sci-tech achievements.because it is the appraisal way to minimize the problem of information asymmetry. |
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