The Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Cooperation Mechanism And Supervision Mechanism For Internet Crowdfunding

With the rapid development of Internet finance,mass entrepreneurship and innovation has formed a new situation.By adopting the new mode of crowdfunding to bring together the new driving force,to promote the matching of production and demand,and the integration of traditional industries and emerging industries have become a new direction of reform.Crowdfunding has broadened the new channels for investment and financing of entrepreneurship and innovation,effectively solved the financing problems of small and micro enterprises,especially start-ups,and promoted the capital matching and flowing between capital needs and providers.Global crowdfunding amount have been taken a spurt of momentum,by the end of 2016,it had reached $200 billion.The annual financing amount of china reached 217.43 billion yuan in 2016 and the number of crowdfunding platform has reached 511.However,at the same time,the risks of illegal fund-raising,running away and closing are also frequently occurring with the development of crowdfunding.There is a continuous moral hazard in the crowdfunding platform,which has a serious problem of self-financing and poor self-regulation generally.This article combines this background to consider the psychological factors of consumers' participation in crowdfunding.We studied the influence of various factors on financing success and the cooperation mechanism about how to better promote the public participation financing.How does the crowdfunding platform play the role of intermediary platform to audit and supervise the sponsors under the missing of crowdfunding legislation?How does supervision department regulate the illegal behavior of crowdfunding platforms?Based on the problems existing in Internet crowdfunding and combined the research results in theory and practice of existing scholars,adopt the research method of management science and a clue to consumers' different decision-making mechanisms,this paper presented the specific problems to be solved.First,in the two mechanisms of consumer fair contribution and voluntary altruistic behavior,how the financing target and shares,product preference and quality,group honor affect consumer decisions.How can the sponsors design the parameters of the projects to better promote the participation of consumers and improve the success rate of financing?Second,on the crowdfunding platform,information asymmetry exists between project sponsors and consumers,the project creative ideas and returns might be greatly exaggerated in order to attract consumer investment to meet the finacing needs.Consumers can not identify the merits of the project,which will make sponsors break the contracts and even escape with money.For the reputation and long-term interests,how do crowdfunding platform examine the sponsor project as an intermediary.How to adopt the punishment mechanism and guarantee mechanism effectively avoid the issue of moral hazard of the sponsors is the key to the long-term development of crowdfunding financing.Third,in the case of lower entry threshold and smaller registered capital for the crowdfunding platform,coupled with the absence of regulatory laws leads to the emergence of fraudulent' platforms,which have weak self-discipline and pose the crown of a higher yield or returns,conceal real financial information and release various crowdfunding projects,bring huge risks to consumers at last.How should the supervision department supervise the crowdfunding platform under the higher supervision costs?How to suppress the opportunistic violation of crowdfunding platform and solve the regulatory dilemma is also the cornerstone of long-term stable development and expansion of crowdfunding.This paper introduces the theories about crowdfunding and research method according to the research object and content.According to the research content,the literature on crowdfunding is classified.On the basis of literature review,this paper focuses on product crowdfunding as the research subject and solves the above proposed problem with different methods as supplement to existing literature.Details are as follows:Firstly,we character the supply of consumer money in Internet crowdfunding as multiplayer game.It is a dynamic adjustment process for consumers to decide whether to participate in crowdfunding or not.Consumers will constantly optimize their strategies based on dynamic information,such as the number of supporters and reviews,the number of social networks shared and remaining days,already financing amount and item classification et al.Use large group repeated game—replicator dynamics equation research on consumer groups who are bounded rationality got through imitating and learning to update their strategies for supporting or non-supporting crowdfunding.Under two scenarios for fairness and altruism contribution,we established two strategy and multiplayer evolutionary game model.Through analyzing the change of different parameters how to influence on the evolutionary stable equilibrium and the basin of attraction of the system,considering the failure of crowdfunding bringing regrets,this paper discussed the effects of crowdfunding success from various factors.The researches show that,under the fair contribution mechanism and without regard to regrets,supporting is the dominant strategy.The failure of crowdfunding brings regrets and generates negative benefit to consumer.If the target is smaller,the higher of the product quality level,the bigger of consumer's preferences and group benefits,they are more beneficial to the crowdfunding evolutionary success.However,the increasing of issued shares bring consumer's free-riding behaviors,thus,it restrains the success of crowdfunding.Under the altruism behavior,the bigger of consumer's preferences and group benefits,the higher of product quality level,the more beneficial to the crowdfunding evolutionary success.When financing target is fixed and the issued share is increased,free rider behaviors don't increase,instead,the success probability of crowdfunding is enhanced.Secondly,based on the problem of how to promote the emergence of consumer cooperation crowdfunding,considering the homogeneous mixed and finite consumer group,based on Moran process,this paper studied the crowdfunding strategy evolution dynamics for consumers whether choose to participate in the crowdfunding or not.Divide the consumer into two groups:participation and non-participation.In order to simplify the analysis,we calculated the fixation probability of the two strategies,compared the fixation probability of the two strategies and neutral drift probability,from the perspective of two group game and multiplayer game,respectively.We obtain the conditions of the dominant strategy under the strong selectivity and the weak selectivity.The researches show that,under the condition of strong selectivity,when consumer size is less than some numerical value,then nonparticipating strategy occupies the whole population,the crowdfunding is failure.Under the condition of weak selectivity,whether consumers choose the crowdfunding strategy depends on the net revenue and outlay cost.Evolutionary stablized in crowdfunding getting success,when the net revenue is greater than the outlay cost' certain multiple.Evolutionary stablized in crowdfunding getting failure,when the net revenue is less than the outlay cost' certain multiple.Then,the results are generalized to multiple consumers,the research shows that product preference,product quality level and group utility have positive incentive to financing success.The smaller the financing target is,the higher the financing success will be.The bigger the initial wealth,the less successful it will be.The more regretful the financing failure is,the less conducive to financing success.With other parameters determined,there is always an appropriate financing share to make the financing successful.Simultaneously,we got the condition of participate in crowdfunding turned into the evolutionary stable strategy.Bring some managerial implications to project sponsor for crowdfunding.Thirdly,in the online financing crowdfunding market,the ex ante asymmetry information between the project sponsors and consumers can easily lead to adverse selection problem during the process of consumers choosing investment projects.However,the crowdfunding platform as the intermediary implementing the punishment effects of supervision to sponsors can avoid such problems effectively.Considering the bounded rationality of players,using evolutionary game theory and method,we analyzed the interaction mechanism of the strategies'selection 'and built the evolutionary game model between the crowdfunding platform and project sponsors.We discussed the influence of different penalties on the sponsors' strategy choice and the influence of the guarantee mechanism,the degree of fraud and the supervising cost on the selectiop of the regulation strategy of crowdfunding platform.The researches show that,without regard to the platform and sponsor are encouraged by external reputation,the greater the supervision and punishment of crowdfunding platform,the greater the likelihood for the sponsor strategy will evolve to truthfully reveal.The more the project sponsors cheat,the more likely the crowdfunding platform will evolve in the regulatory strategy.The cost of supervision has a key impact on strategy selection of crowdfunding platform,higher regulatory costs encourage the platform have no supervise enthusiasm,eventually leading to good and bad projects mixed together.However,the punishment to the sponsors who illegally disclosure information can effectively balance the benefits between crowdfunding platforms and sponsors.The crowdfunding platform takes on the loss caused by the defaults of the sponsors,thus this can effectively restrict the platform's inaction.Proper punishment can effectively restrict the false disclosure of sponsors,and reduce the adverse selection caused by information asymmetry.At last,some suggestions are offered for both crowdfunding platform and project sponsors,which can provide a theoretical basis for solving supervision problem in crowdfunding market.At last,the Internet crowdfunding platforms fled away with fundraising money from investors frequently,and conspired with the sponsors to defraud consumers frequently.This brings huge risks to investors and affects the steady development of crowdfunding industry.We construct the game matrix between the supervisory and crowdfunding platforms.First,through static game analysis,we found that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.Through the discussion of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,we found that the higher the media exposure rate,the more effective for restraining the self-discipline of the platform it is.At the same time,it also encouraged regulators to strictly regulate.In this paper,based on the evolutionary game theory—replicator dynamics equation,we constructed the evolutionary game model between the supervisory department and crowdfunding platform.Through the analysis of the stability of the equilibrium point,the conditions of the evolution stabilization strategy of different strategies are obtained.Researches have shown that supervision cost gap between strict supervision and lax supervision,the penalties for illegal operation crowdfunding platform and the reputation loss of both sides,the excess returns of irregular operations and the complaints of third party medias or mass investors for illegal operations are the key factors to affect the strategic choice of the game and development of the crowdfunding industry.Through the discussion of the stability of the equilibrium,some policy suggestions are given about how to promote the crowdfunding platform compliance management and regulators tightly regulate.