Rearch On The Evolution Of Mixed Ownership In China

In the process of the transformation from "Asset management" to "capital management" for state-owned assets management system,the state-owned enterprises continue to optimize the strategic layout in the macro level,and improve the property right structure and the corporate governance structure at the macro level as well.At present,many kinds of economic ownerships have become more and more powerful,and it has become an irreversible economic trend for market space,operating mechanism,financial capital and production factors to interact with each other.The cross-shareholdings and integration of state-owned capital,collective capital and non public capital have also become a new economic trend which is difficult to avoid for microeconomic organizations.In spite of the deepening reform of the state-owned enterprises,mixed ownership has become an important breakthrough,but mixed ownership is not a natural basis for the generation of modern enterprise systems.In an economic organization that games continue to play between public ownership and private ownership,mixed ownership is actually reflected with complicated gambling process among the government,state-owned capital and non-public capital,for which the process is a balance of institutional structure.The formation and evolution of the mixed ownership enterprises is essentially "the process of the enterprise system gradually returning to its property logic and the continuous evolution of autonomy under the premise of the optimization of the institutional environment".History is important,the development of mixed ownership can not deviate from the planned economy to a market economy.From this point of view,this paper chooses the evolution of the mixed ownership system as the research object.On the one hand,the research results of this perspective are relatively rare in the academic circle.On the other hand,"history is a mirror for our guidance",recognizing the historical evolution of the mixed ownership system correctly can provide some reference for the current practice of mixed ownership reform in full swing.Based on the related theory of institutional evolution,this paper analyzes the evolution process of mixed ownership,and answers the fundamental reasons for the generation and development of mixed ownership.By incorporating the government and enterprise into the game analysis framework,the inherent laws of the generation and evolution of mixed ownership are explained.The property rights game behavior of different ownership enterprises is simulated and analyzed in order to describe the rules and characteristics of the system and some relevant policy recommendations were given.First,on the basis of comprehensive summary and analysis of the evolution process of the mixed ownership,three factors of driving the evolution of mixed ownership are put forward:the deepening reform of the state-owned economy,the maturity of the market mechanism and the improvement of the property rights protection.Three main kinds of developing mixed ownership were also concluded:the restructuring integration,the employee stock holding and the mixed reform fund.Secondly,on the basis of the analysis of the evolution of Chinese enterprises,the relationship between government intervention and the evolution of Chinese enterprise form is also answered.The motive power of the enterprise evolution is shifted from government's relaxation of administrative control to the subjective dynamic evolution.The evolutionary equilibrium of mixed ownership are analyzed by the construction of the evolutionary game model.Thirdly,the endogenous analysis framework of mixed ownership is constructed by combining the system evolution trajectory theory based on the individual group to the macro level from Dopfer and the subjective game perspective from Aoki.The determinants of influencing the evolutionary balance of mixed ownership are put forward in the subjective game analysis paradigm:the alternative strategy,Institutional legitimacy constraint,and expected utility.In addition,a panel data model is built to verify the relationship between the degree of ownership and the performance of the enterprise,in order to testify the view that the enterprise will affect the equilibrium of game strategy based on the change of expected utility.Finally,the game behavior of the main body of the mixed ownership is analyzed by MATLAB evolution,the selection and diffusion mechanism of the mixed ownership system in the whole economic system is depicted and explained by the construction of the replication dynamic equation.The innovations of the paper are mainly manifested in the following four aspects:first,we have constructed a complete analytical framework for endogenous evolution of systems.This paper combines the evolutionary trajectory theory of institutional evolution and the subjective game model,and analyzes the generation and evolution mechanism of mixed ownership by the dynamic evolution of the micro individual(enterprise)game strategy,and puts forward the decision factors to influence the equilibrium of the mixed ownership evolution based on the subjective game analysis paradigm:alternative strategy,institutional legitimacy constraint and expected utility.Second:a panel data model is built to verify the relationship between mixed ownership and firm performance.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the mixing degree of ownership and the performance of the enterprise in transportation,warehousing and postal industry.The development of mixed ownership is beneficial to the improvement of the performance level of the whole industry.There is a significant negative correlation between ownership dispersion and enterprise performance.In the process of mixed ownership,a certain degree of ownership concentration should be maintained.Third:the two level evolutionary game model of"government-enterprise" and "enterprise-enterprise" is constructed.The government and enterprises are regarded as the participants of the limited rationality in the specific environment.The strategy equilibrium of the government intervention in the enterprise evolution and the evolution stability of the property rights subject of different ownership enterprises are discussed.And the simulation is carried out through MATLAB.The evolution of the game of ownership of different ownership is depicted.Fourth:redefining the government's behavior in the framework of endogenous institutional evolution.In the process of institutional evolution,the government is not a constructor,but a game participant and strategy chooser with different utility functions.The government plays a game in the market environment with the enterprises,encourages the enterprise's spontaneous innovations and screens them,and give the policy approval,promotion,supervision and guidance to the behavior according with the socialist market economy,standardize the complementary rules(complementary system),and ensure the diachronic stability of the system.