Collection,Patent Licensing Strategies And Collaboration Contract Design Of Closed Loop Supply Chain Under Competitive Environment

Over recent years,the gradually emerging problems of the global enviromental pollution and deficiency of resources has ignited the extensive attention from enterprises,consumers and governments alike.From the perspective of enterprises,the active usage of wasted and used resources has become a major current trend.The closed loop supply chain management has organically integrated the forward product selling and the reverse collection procedures,unifying the economic development and environmental protection,and therefore the strategy has been gradually adopted by enterprises across all sectors.At present,the research on the closed loop supply chain has been mainly focused on the single supply chain realm.In reality,competition may also exist between members,between chains and between sales channels in the closed loop supply chain.Different competition styles will exert important influence on pricing and collection decision making of the closed loop supply chain,and will indirectly influence the profit of the decision making members and the system's environmental performance.Therefore,in the circumstances of competition,the analysis of marketing and operation decision making of the closed loop supply chain bears great theoretical and practical significance.On the basis of this,this dissertation discusses collection,patents licensing and cooperation contract design of the closed loop supply chain in the circustances of competition.Specifically,the innovation of the dissertation is embodied in the four aspects as follows:(1)The pricing,collection and coordination are studied against the background that competition exists in the sales and collection channels.Totally three collection models are considered: the manufacturer + the retailer collection model,the manufacturer + the third party collection model and the retailer + the third party collection model.The study has found that the MR collection model is the strategy where the manufacturer takes the predominance,and the system's profit and the environmental performance are the highest in this model.Hence,with the optimal decision making result in the centralized decision making as the benchmark,the dissertation studied the coordination of the decentralized closed loop supply chain in the collection model of MR,to find that the improvement on the conventional two-part pricing contract can realize the perfect coordination of the closed loop supply chain.(2)The selection of the optimal licensing model of OEM in the closed loop supply chain against the background of retailing competition has been studied and the influence from the retailer competition on the selection of the OEM licensing model.Totally tow licensing models have been considered: remanufacturing licensed to the retailer and remanufacturing licensed to the third party.The study has found it that the manufacturer's balanced license fee and balanced wholesale price are the same in the two licensing models.The selection of the optimal licensing model by the manufacturer is correlated to the acceptance of the remanufactured products by the consumers.Next,if the competition increases between retailers,the OEM tends more to choose the R licensing model.(3)The cooperation contract design of the closed loop supply chain has been studied with the incomplete information.The game model of the closed loop supply chain in the complete and incomplete information is established to compare the balanced decision making and profits of the closed loop supply chain in different channel power structures,with the discovery that the incomplete information will lead to the loss of the decision making efficiency of the closed loop supply chain.Therefore,with regard to the closed loop supply chain model led by the manufacturer,a cost-sharing contract is designed to realize the improvement on the decision making efficiency of the whole closed loop supply chain.(4)In the environment of incomplete information the cooperation contract design of the double channel closed loop supply chain has been studied.The double channel closed loop supply chain game models in the three models,namely,the centralized decision making,complete information and incomplete information,have been established and the comparison leads to the discovery that the incomplete information will lead to the loss of supply chain decision making efficiency.The profits of the manufacturer,the retailer and the closed loop supply chain have all decreased.Therefore,the manufacturer can provide a cooperation contract to the retailer to motivate the retailer to feed back the true collection cost information,in order to increase the system's decision making efficiency.