Research On Models Of Supplier Selection And Contract Coordination For Green Supply Chain Management Of Large-scale Restaurants

The restaurant industry generates a great deal of revenues,and it is an important service industry in China.The rapid growth of large-scale restaurants(LRs)contributes significantly to sustainable development.However,in recent years,food hygiene and safety incidents have frequently been reported in LRs.Meanwhile,growing environmental awareness of consumers,increase the demand for green products.Due to the increasing pressures from stakeholders and potential opportunities for green marketing,LRs see the need to improve their green performance to achieve competitive advantage and sustainability goals.However,LRs5 environmental performance not only stems from their internal green practices,but also depends on the cooperation among supply chain(SC)members.Thus,it is critical for LRs to develop an effective coordination mechanism to integrate each chain member's green effort to improve both the economic and the environmental performance of the whole supply chain.To realize the purpose of effectively coordinating the supply chain,LRs face many challenges.First,in selecting green suppliers,it is important for LRs to consider suppliers'economic,environmental and social performance.Thus,how to develop a green supplier evaluation system to assess their suppliers to implement green cooperation is one of the major issues that need to be addressed.Secondly,LRs and their suppliers are independent decision makers in the supply chain.Under decentralized supply chain situation,both sides' behavior of pursuing the objective of maximizing their own profits will impede the objective of improving the SC environmental performance.Thus,establishing effective contract to coordinate the SC is imperative.Furthermore,in the real world,information asymmetry exists widely in the supply chain.Especially the upstream suppliers' concealing information behavior may have great influence on the decision of LRs and cause the lost of profit.Consequently,how to develop an effective contract coordination mechanism to motivate suppliers to share information and improve their green efforts under information asymmetry situation is also one of the major problems for LRs.In respect to the various challenges,LRs face to develop an effective coordination mechanism and integrate each chain member's green effort to improve both the economic and the environmental performance of the entire supply chain.This study applied Fuzzy-DEMATEL-ANP method and game theory as well as contract coordination theory to build model to address the various problems noted above.Firstly,Based on in-depth literature review and detailed investigation among experts,this study proposed a green supplier evaluation criteria system for LRs.Considering the economic,environmental and social performance of the supplier's,five first level dimensions including life cycle cost,quality,green management,service and green image are identified,and sixteen other indicators are also selected as the second level criteria.Meanwhile,with respect to the variety of the purchasing materials in LRs,we divided the purchasing objectives into different categories according to three dimensions,namely profit impact,environmental performance impact and the influencing power of LRs on suppliers.Subsequently,this study proposed a hybrid model combining fuzzy Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory(DEMATEL)and Analytical Network Process(ANP)methods for the green supplier evaluation.The DEMATEL method can be used to demonstrate the complicated interaction relations among various criteria and determine which criteria must be included in the evaluation system through setting a threshold for the extent to which criteria affect the evaluation objective.Based on the DEMATEL analysis results,the ANP method was applied to determine the weight of different criteria and select the right green supplier.The evaluation and selection results were tested by credibility and sensitivity analysis,and a real case study was used to illustrate the proposed model.Secondly,this study depicted the parameters in term of both the LRs' green processing effort and the suppliers' green material producing effort impact on the improvement of green degree of product as well as the LRs' green marketing effort impact on consumers' green sensitivity.Subsequently,the influencing relationships between these parameters and costs and profits were further investigated.Cost sharing contracts based game model for a two stages supply chain consisited of one dominated large restaurant and a supplier is proposed in this thesis.Regarding optimal profit and green performance,the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a real case.When green cost is only shared by one side,cost sharing contracts cannot optimally coordinate the supply chain,but they can improve profits for both the supplier and the large restaurant.When consumers'sensitivity to the green degree of food increases,a mutual cost sharing contract will bring more profits for both the supplier and the large restaurant than those under the non-coordination mode in a decentralized supply chain situation.A real case verifies the conclusions.Finally,In order to find out how the magnitude of asymmetry of information affect the profit and the decision of chain members as well as explore the mechanism of contract coordination to motivate the supplier to share its information,this thesis investigated a two stages supply chain which is consisited of one dominated LR and a supplier,where the supplier has private knowledge of its green material producing cost(GMPC),while the LR can only estimate the GMPC.The wholesale price contract was developed as the base model for examining the impact of the information value of GMPC(measured by the standard deviation of estimate value of unit GMPC by the large restaurant)on the profits and decision of chain members.The results show that information value of GMPC impacts the supplier's and the large restaurant's decision on green degree similarly.Under certain conditions,the supplier's green degree of material and the large restaurant's green degree of processing will both increase with the information value of GMPC,while the supplier's green degree of material under asymmetric information will never exceed that of under symmetric information.However,the information value of GMPC impacts profits of the supplier's and the large restaurant's differently.Under certain conditions,the supplier's profit will increase with the information value of GMPC,while that of the large restaurant is uncertain.This study then investigated how information sharing impacts on the supplier's profit.The research results show that the supplier is unwilling to share its own cost information when the information value of GMPC is very high or very low,because information sharing will decrease its profit under that situation.Thus,based on the whole sale contract,this study proposed a cost sharing contract for the asymmetric case to motivate the supplier to share its cost information and realize the aim of maximizing LR's profits and improving the supplier's green material producing effort.In the end,numerical experiments are conducted through a case analysis to illustrate and validate the proposed models and provide managerial insights.