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Research On Ordering And Transshipment Decision And Supply Chain Coordination Under Fairness Concerns

Posted on:2020-01-10Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:X H WeiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1369330578972954Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Demand uncertainty often leads to the risk of shortage or overstock of retailers.This phenomenon of mismatch between supply and demand always gives rise to a serious loss of supply chain profits.In order to meet uncertain market demands,retailers use inventory transshipment strategies to pool inventory risk,improving customer service levels and supply chain efficiency.From the perspective of sustainable operation of the entire supply chain,it is hoped that dealers or retailers can use the inventory transshipment strategy as a normalization mechanism,so that enterprises in the same echelon can spontaneously transship,and maintain long-term stable cooperative relations with the upstream enterprises in supply chain,which give full play to the advantages of the inventory transshipment strategy.This will not only enhance the company's own profit,but also improve supply chain resilience,so that enterprises can respond to supply chain risks or uncertainties better,and resist supply chain disruption as much as possible or quickly resume operations after the interruption.Under demand uncertainty,in order to achieve long-term stable cooperation between enterprises and give full play to the advantages of the inventory transshipment strategy,economic agents adopting the inventory transshipment strategy concern fairness when making decisions,that is,they consider not only direct profits,but also their status in economic groups and how the enterprise in the same echelon and the upstream enterprise in supply chain to respond to their decision.Therefore,in the case that retailers adopt the inventory transshipment strategy,the author introduces fairness concerns to study the ordering and transshipment decision and supply chain coordination.The main research results are as follows:First,when retailers in the same echelon mutually transship,we investigate the impact of fairness concerns on retailers' ordering and transshipment decisions.And we model the system consisting of two independent retailers with transshipment,and study the optimal ordering decision in the two scenarios of asymmetric and symmetric fairness concerns.The conditions for the retailer to spontaneously adopt the inventory transshipment strategy are given.It is found that the Nash equilibrium solutions exist for the order quantities of retailers in both scenarios.Retailers tend to transship and gain more initiative by controlling the volume of transshipment when making order decisions under demand uncertainty.Combined with theoretical analysis and numerical examples,the conditions for retailers to spontaneously adopt the inventory transshipment strategy are given: under asymmetric fairness,the fairness-neutral retailer always benefits from inventory transshipment and is willing to spontaneously adopt inventory transshipment strategies;the fairness-concerned retailer is also willing to adopt inventory transshipment strategy by increasing his own transshipment price.Under the premise that the retailer is willing to cooperate each other by inventory transshipment,if the retailer's fairness concern damages the performance of the cooperative team,the damage may be compensated by reducing the transshipment price of the fairness-neutral retailer.Under symmetric fairness,only two completely symmetrical retailers are willing to adopt inventory transshipment strategy spontaneously.If the fairness concerns of two retailers damage the overall performance of the cooperative team,the damage may be compensated by lowering the transshipment price of both parties.Compared with the performances under completely rationality,that of cooperative teams under asymmetric and symmetric fairness concerns declines.The cooperative team has the lowest performance under symmetric fairness concerns.Second,when retailers adopt inventory transshipment strategy,the impact of fairness concerns on supply chain ordering decisions and coordination is studied in supply chain.We models a supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and two independent and symmetric retailers,and study retailers' optimal ordering decisions,as well as the impacts of fairness concerns and transshipment prices on the profits of supply chain members and supply chain coordination,in the two scenarios that the manufacturer is a price acceptor and a price setter,when two retailers adopt inventory transshipment strategy and have vertical fairness concerns.It is found that the profits of manufacturers decline due to retailers' fairness concerns,when retailers adopt inventory transshipment strategy,regardless of whether they are in completely competitive or monopolistic competitive market.In the completely competitive market,manufacturers' market share of sales declines due to retailers' fairness concerns.In the monopolistic competitive market,retailers with fairness concerns will lower wholesale prices by negotiation and extract more profits from manufacturers.And due to the inventory transshipment strategy between retailers,the retailer's fairness concerns do not affect the manufacturer's market share.Through theoretical analysis and numerical examples,it reveals the inherent mechanism that manufacturers do not allow retailers to transship in a completely competitive market,and manufacturers encourage retailers to transship in a monopolistic competitive market.It is also pointed out that manufacturers' consideration to retailers' fairness concerns will directly affect the total profit of the supply chain.If the manufacturer does not consider retailers' fairness concerns,the largest profits will be gained in the supply chain when the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are equal on the basis of ensuring cooperation.If the manufacturer considers retailers' fairness concerns,the manufacturer can give the retailer a certain payment,which can improve the efficiency of the supply chain and ensure Pareto improvement on the basis of ensuring cooperation.When the wholesale price is exogenous,the required payment is less.When the wholesale price is endogenous,the required payment is more.Third,in the dual-channel supply chain,the author investigates the impacts of fairness concerns on the ordering decisions and coordination of dual-channel supply chains.The O2 O model requires the channel members to cooperate more closely.Channel members with competitive advantages often show the behavior tendency of fairness concern in the three scenarios: only the supplier is concerned with fairness,only the retailer is concerned with fairness,and both parties are concerned with fairness.And the author models a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer adopting online direct sales channels and a retailer that only conducts offline channels in the three scenarios,when the two channels transship to each other.In the three different scenarios,the optimal ordering decisions of direct sales channels and retail channels under the O2 O model are studied,and the conditions for achieving the coordination of dual-channel supply chains under the three scenarios are also studied.The results show that: Nash equilibrium solutions exist for order quantities in the direct sales and retail channels in all three scenarios,and the inventory transshipment strategy can be used to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain.Numerical examples are used to analyze the effectiveness and feasibility of coordination.The inventory transshipment strategy can be used to directly coordinate the dual-channel supply chain when only the manufacturer is concerned with fairness.The retailer feels unfair in the other two scenarios,which affects cooperation.To maintain cooperation with the retailer and achieve optimal supply chain efficiency and channel coordination,the manufacturer must compensate the retailer or choose one with fewer expectations regarding its channel status or a fewer fairness concerns.When only the retailer is concerned with fairness,retailers can gain more profit and fairness utilities while achieving supply chain coordination by increasing unit profit commissions.When both parties are concerned with fairness,the role of retailers to increase unit profit commissions is minimal.The main innovations of this paper are:(1)The research on impact of fairness concerns on enterprise decision-making behavior and supply chain coordination in supply chain has attracted extensive attention in the academic circle.Most of the literatures only consider the system composed of one manufacturer and one retailer.A few literatures focus on the situation that there are two retailers in a system,and few of them involve the situation that inventory transshipment strategy is adopted between retailers.When retailers adopt inventory transshipment strategy,the theory of organizational justice is introduced into the study of the interaction between retailers and supply chain members,which expands the research field and scope of organizational justice theory.(2)Most of the literatures on inventory transshipment assume that economic agents rationally make decisions.Under centralized system,cost minimization is the optimization goal,while under decentralized system;profit maximization is the optimization goal.It is rarely considered that economic agents concern fairness when adopting inventory transshipment strategy.The decision of retailers considering the inventory transshipment strategy when they concern fairness enriches the research on the transshipment newsboy in the behavior field and has more practical significance.(3)When retailers adopt inventory transshipment strategy,fairness concerns are introduced to systematically study theirs impacts on the interaction between retailers and supply chain members in horizontal and vertical cooperation,which fills the gap in existing studies.Firstly,we study the impacts of fairness concerns on horizontal cooperative relationships when retailers in the same echelon transship each other.Secondly,we study the impacts of fairness concerns on the vertical cooperation relationship in the interaction between transshipment retailers and upstream suppliers in supply chain.Finally,there are both horizontal channel competition and vertical double marginalization effect between retailers and suppliers in dual-channel supply chains.When inventory transshipment strategy can be adopted between dual channels,we study the impacts of fairness concerns on the interaction between retailers and suppliers.
Keywords/Search Tags:Inventory transshipment, Fairness concerns, Ordering decision, Transshipment decision, Supply chain coordination, Dual channel supply chain coordination
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