The Motivation And Path Selection Of SOE Reform In China

The reform of SOE is a global problem,especially in China.As the important economic foundation and cornerstone of socialism with Chinese characteristics,state-owned enterprises are the important pillar of our party in governing and rejuvenating the country.As an important part of China's economic reform,the reform of state-owned enterprises has the most far-reaching significance.There are a large number of research findings on the pattern,the path and the efficiency of SOEs reform in both academic and practical fields.Generally,the previous researches on state-owned enterprise reform can be summarized into three categories.Ones are analyses focusing on the property structure or the principal-agent relationship changes before and after the reform,preferred proving the rationality and necessity of the reform.Another type of research is the analysis of the reform motive.These papers liked to discover and verify that the external motive of SOEs reform was the change of domestic economic system,while the internal motive was the enterprise requirements for improving performance.And there are also studies combed evolutionary path of the reform from different angles,mainly including enterprise efficiency improvement,financial system reform,property rights Institutional changes,principal-agent relationship evolutions,and so on.The first two general categories focused on the implementation effects of specific stages or some certain reform measures,while the latter one was mostly a theoretical description of the reform process.During the process of SOEs property rights reform in past 40 years,as an important driving factor,it was not fully researched that the government had the motive to maximize of its own interests.Among the previous researches,there're few ones sorting out the entire process to refine a same causes which triggered the reform and acted on all stages,for relatively longer,more complete and macroscopic ones in particular.Therefore,this thesis was placed on the hope of sharing more theoretical knowledge.The possible innovations in this thesis are mainly reflected in the following aspectsFirstly,the dual role of government is used as the theoretical basis to explore the motive and inevitability of SOEs reform.In most previous studies government was regarded as a simple business manager to examine the results of reforms.And in some other papers,it was just considered as custodians of society.In other words,both of them had ignored the dual attributes of government,and gave little directly help to recognize the role of the government in the reform processes.While in some studies,the dual role did being considered,but did not being used to analyze the causes of reforms.So,although the dual role of government is not firstly presented in this thesis,it has not been found in any research as a motive for the reform.This can be considered as a theoretical innovation here.In my research,the government is not only considered as the owner of SOEs,assuming that it would raise economic interest in business practices;at the same time,it is also considered to chase political interests through government function.The chase,confusion and clarification of these two types of interests existed in the entire process of reform and directly affected the path choices.This setup does not only conform to the dual role of government,but also helps to understand the external causes of SOEs reform from a new perspective.And it also accords with logic and fact in explaining the effectiveness and difficulties in the whole reform process.Secondly,this thesis puts forward the real motive of SOEs reform:government motive.When analyzing the reasons for the reform,most of the previous studies were based on the comparison of the SOEs' business efficiency.However,this kind of research seemed to have found the real reason for the reform.In fact,it had demonstrated the rationality and necessity of the reform,rather than the inevitability of those choices.And the others basing on the theory of political asylum just focused on some certain stage rather than the whole process of reform.Therefore,for the first time,this thesis assumes the profitability of government behavior,regards the relationship of these three entities in the reform as interest relationship,combs their behaviors at different stages systematically,and finally gives the judgment that government's pursuit of its function returns is the basis of China's SOEs reform.Based on the analysis of institutional economics,Thirdly,This analysis is a longer-term reconsideration of SOE reform.The study period for China's SOEs reform is from 1979 to 2016,not from 1979 to 2007 as the previous ones which considered the reform after 2007 as consolidating and deepening moves.However,in the decade since 2008,SOEs' boundaries have changed more than once in different directions.According to the relevant theories of institutional economics,these changes are also important and valuable parts of SOEs' reform of property rights system.And they also provides very important impetus for the study.Therefore,the reform after 2008 is also included in the analysis in order to review the issue more comprehensively.Fourthly,there is a possible method innovation.In order to analyze the interest relationships among different entities more effectively,it is different from other literatures which used enterprise samples that macro-economic indicators are used for positive analysis.These indicators are the growth rates of SOEs' profits,central and local financial income.This design shows the role that reform played to the returns changes of each entity basing on their mutual influences.It provides a new way to study on the SOEs reform efficiency,and also lays a realistic foundation for the thesis of the institutional changes in the subsequent reform.There are seven chapters to this thesis.As the first part of this dissertation,Part ? is an introduction that expounds the research idea,lists the main content and possible innovation points,as well as theories and methods will be used in following parts.Part ? a review of prime theories.Sorting out various views from researchers in and aboard,it shows an evolutionary map of studies on SOE reform.That's why I could arrive at a more rational survey.Part ? is the beginning of main body.It shows the whole process of China's SOEs reform,marks the start and end points of each stage,reason why the reform is divided into six stages,and iconic events during each stage.Based on it,Part IV gives the main thread and extending paths of the reform first,following with the conclusion that China's SOEs reform is a property right system change triggered by the government's pursuit to both political and economic interests.There are also difficulties had to be faced and ways to solve them in the whole process,thereby preparing for analyses in Part ? The following two parts are core of this dissertation.Part V prove the reform effects to every entity of each stage with a VAR model.And sixth part analyzes the forecast and evaluation for government returns,especially for the central government.It verifies the judgment of the trigger of China's SOEs reform,and explains the causes of difficulties met in the reform.Finally,the last part presents some conclusions.First and foremost,China's SOEs reform is a passive property right system change triggered and pulled by government motive.Property right structure,as the basis of distribution,is the core of reform in all stages.It is the government's motive for all the measures in the reform process that to increase the amount of revenue and profitability,and this motive comes from the gap between the actual benefit and the expectation,bringing reconstruction of property right profit distribution and interest relationship.Secondly,among these three entities,the central government is the leader and the other two are followers.The former one guides and even enforce the reform to go forward along the path which benefits itself when necessary.Although the local government could not go against,its profit-seeking has different effects on the reform.As a matter of fact,reform can be carried out smoothly only when these three form a comprehensive relationship.It is the basis of China's SOEs property right reform.The third point is that,when the reform is carried out around the distribution of existing interests within the property right system,the property right structure will change along with the direction of improving the revenue and profitability of the central government.When the reform extends beyond the SOEs' property right system,the boundary of it will change along with the increase of property right returns of the central government.Fourthly,there is a clear causal relationship among the profitability of these three entities.The SOEs,central and local governments form a interdependency relationship.The former contributes positively to the latter two,but the latter do not have a real impact on the former.And the latter two form a competing relationship.The central government contributes positively to local government,but local government has no effect on central government.At last,The duality of government has played different roles in the reform process.The implementation of the normal reform completed by the entity exercising property right.Once got into trouble,the government liked to solve the contradiction by performing government function.When reform was deviated,the government's duality generated contradictions.The government did not correct deviations which wouldn't reduce its benefits,while did thecorrection when the returns declined.Throughout the reform process,the measures that provided long-last benefits are all what follows the law of productivity development,and the "easy" revenue could not sustainable.This judgment can be used as a standard for the continuous reform to make it go forward smoothly with fewer twists and turns.