The Research Of Platform Goverance On Internet Finance

As a trusted third-party,the internet financial platform nominally and technically solves the information asymmetry problem between investors and financiers.However,the inspiring direct transaction between those two parties has a presumption that is information transferred through the platform is real and valid.From the reality,the information asymmetry problem between investors and financiers,between investors and platforms have not been fundamentally resolved.The dual opportunistic behaviors of participants and platform are continuously superimposed and interacted,resulting in negative externalities of transactions.Under the indirect network effects and positive feedback effects mechanisms,the platform has experienced all kinds of turmoil in concentrated form.Based on the mature SCP paradigm,this paper attempts to establish a theoretical logic of “trust structure—pricing behavior—governance performance” as the analysis framework of platform governance to deal with the opportunistic transaction behavior.Given the same opportunistic impulsion of internet financial platform,this paper proposes a risk early warning mechanism based on the governance capability of the platform to enhance the forward-looking nature of supervision.Firstly,according to the analysis of the typical model of Internet finance,the general operating mechanism of platform trading is summarized,and the logical starting point of platform governance transaction is proposed through trading game analysis.When the public information transmission is weak,the prisoner’s dilemma of the two parties cannot be solved autonomously.On the one hand,the platform acts as an information intermediary to provide trader credit information,can make up for the lack of public information,increase the probability of the bad behavior of opportunists being discovered,and promote the cooperation between the two parties by reducing the potential benefits of the non-cooperative strategy.On the other hand,the platform acts as an intermediary to punish bad traders to reduce the potential benefits of non-cooperation strategies,forcing opportunists to abandon bad behavior and promote cooperation.However,the private interest of the platform makes it have an opportunistic tendency in the governance process,which needs to be paid attention to by the regulatory authorities.Secondly,taking the P2 P online lending as an example to detect the inner connection between trust structure,pricing behavior and governance performance of the platform.The hypothesis of identity-based trust structure is proposed to examine the trust characteristics of the platform.The empirical results show that identity-based trust is the basic trust structure of China’s online lending platform.The specific manifestation is that the background of stateowned assets,venture capital,and commercial banks play a positive role in attracting popularity.Meanwhile,the platform’s information disclosure mechanism does not help to attract participants,indicating a lack of institution-based trust regarding internet financial platform.Moreover,the lower level trust is reflected as the collective punishment of reputation.The malicious behavior of particular platform is extremely damaging to the overall reputation of the industry,distorting the platform reputation signal.The key to reconstructing trust lies in the external institutional environment.After several months of special rectification,the reputation signal of the online lending platform has been re-recognized and played a positive role in attracting popularity.Exploring the pricing behavior of the platform from the perspective of transaction efficiency and resource allocation efficiency.There is a significant negative correlation between the transaction time-consuming and guide interest rate,indicating that the online lending platform has the motivation to set high-interest rates to pursue transaction efficiency and profit.Moreover,it is also found that the non-endorsement platform is more inclined to guide interest rates at a higher level.What the non-endorsement platform really cares are making more profits instead of improving allocation efficiency,and this is so-called “decoupling behavior”.With the help of factor analysis method,a comprehensive index of platform resource allocation efficiency is constructed to test the relationship with guidance interest rate.The result shows a lower interest rate leads to more efficiency in allocating the resource.As a fact of constant decrease of interest,the allocative capacity and efficiency of platforms are getting stronger and stronger.Based on the non-oriented SBM super-efficiency DEA model,the efficiency-based platform governance performance evaluation index is built.The results show that the online lending platforms’ efficiency behaves quite differently and has been adjusting dynamically,which can reflect the effect of platform governance.More importantly,it is also found that “endorsement” behavior has a negative effect on efficiency.Obtaining “endorsement” from banks,state-owned enterprises or venture capital institutions can enhance the credibility of online lending platforms and alleviate business pressure.However,the operation of the platform after that is likely to be slack,which is reflected in decline in platform efficiency.Last but not least,the lack of governance capacity leads to the concentrated outbreak of platform risk,thus constructing a platform risk early warning mechanism based on governance capability.The principal component analysis method is used to construct a comprehensive index to measure platform governance capabilities from five dimensions: scale control ability,matching efficiency,capacity reserve,product design capability,and risk control capability.The case analysis of the problem platform found that the governance capability index can track and reflect the dynamic governance of the online lending platform and capture the anomaly a few months in advance,providing an early warning of the concentrated outbreak of the platform problem.The last part of this paper concludes the findings of this paper to propose recommendations,and guide future research direction.