| Since the reform and opening-up,with the rapid development of Chinese economy,environmental pollution has become increasingly prominent.In 2005,The State Council issued on the Implementation of Scientific Development Concept and Strengthening Environmental Protection Decision,changed the guiding ideology from "harmonize environmental protection with economic and social development" to "harmonize economic and social development with environmental protection",which is a strategic transformation from "economic priority" to "environmental priority".The fifth Plenary Session of the 18 th Party Central Committee in 2015 put forward five major development ideas,in which green development promoted the main direction of Chinese social and economic transformation.In 2017,the report of the nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward the socialism with Chinese characteristics into the new era,put the green development in a prominent position,and opens the prelude of the new era of green development and means the transformation from traditional economy to green economy.In the new era,the government has increased the scale of environmental protection investment.However,relying solely on government environmental investment and ignoring market mechanism is not only conducive to improving the efficiency of environmental investment,but also not conducive to the formation of endogenous growth mechanism of environmental investment.As the basic economic unit of social production,enterprises bear the important responsibility of environmental protection.Under the market oriented mechanism,corporate environmental investment is the only way to achieve green development and internalize environmental costs.It is also the internal need for enterprises to enhance green competitiveness and achieve win-win environmental performance and economic performance.Consequently,this paper is based on institutional theory,resource-based view,stakeholders and other multiple theories,and comprehensively used the research methods of combining quantitative analysis with qualitative analysis,normative analysis with empirical analysis,empirically studied the impact of government supervision,public participation and public attention on corporate environmental investment from three aspects of system,morality and economy,focusing on the three-field model of corporate social responsibility proposed by Schwartz and Carroll(2003).In addition,based on the perspective of enterprise heterogeneity,this paper studies the moderating effects of CEO duality,property rights and green image on the relationship between external supervision and corporate environmental investment from three aspects: resource acquisition behavior,resource acquisition capability and resource acquisition intention.Corporate environmental investment is further subdivided into corporate prospective environmental investment and corporate governance environmental investment,and the impact of internal and external factors on different types of corporate environmental investment and its realization path are examined.The contents of this paper are as follows:Firstly,on the basis of redefining the concept of corporate environmental investment,this paper further divides corporate environmental investment into corporate prospective environmental investment and corporate governance environmental investment according to institutional strategy and content characteristics.Besides,this paper tested the classification and distribution characteristics of corporate environmental investment by using the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2017 and using the methods of Median test,Kruskal-Wallis H test,Mann-Whitney U test,T test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test of the non-parametric test and parameter test,it is found that different types of corporate environmental investment has industry heterogeneity,spatial heterogeneity,and individual heterogeneity.Secondly,it discusses the relationship of government supervision,CEO duality and corporate environmental investment.As a public product,environmental resources have the characteristics of non-exclusiveness and non-competitiveness of consumption,which makes the common phenomenon of "free-rider" in the use of environmental resources,leads to the overuse of environmental resources,highlights environmental pollution problems,and needs to make up for market failure through government supervision to safeguard public interests.In practice,information asymmetry inevitably arises in the process of government supervision and enterprise investment decision-making,which leads to the game between government and enterprise.Governments will safeguard public interests and make up for market failures by strengthening supervision,this undoubtedly increases the uncertainty risk of enterprises.When the information of government supervision is transmitted to enterprises,it needs to be judged by the CEO to upload and take action.Whether the CEO is duality leadership structure represents to a large extent how much power a business manager can have to judge the information of government supervision and take resource acquisition behavior.Based on this,this paper attempts to explore the impact of the intensity of government supervision on corporate environmental investment,and the moderating effect of CEO duality on the relationship between the intensity of government supervision and corporate environmental investment.Using the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in China,and using OLS model and tool variable method,this literature has some results:(1)If corporate environmental investment is considered as a single dimension,the relationship between the intensity of government supervision and the scale of corporate environmental investment is non-linear,and the relationship between them is U-shaped.CEO duality has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the intensity of government supervision and the scale of corporate environmental investment.That is,when the intensity of government supervision is lower than the threshold value,CEO duality enlarges the absolute value of the negative correlation coefficient between the intensity of government supervision and the scale of corporate environmental investment.When the intensity of government supervision is higher than the threshold value,CEO duality enlarges the absolute value of the positive correlation coefficient between the intensity of government supervision and the scale of corporate environmental investment.(2)If corporate environmental investment is considered as a multi-dimensional construct,there is only a significant "U" relationship between the intensity of government supervision and the scale of corporate prospective environmental investment,and CEO duality has a positive moderating effect only on the relationship between the intensity of government supervision and the scale of corporate prospective environmental investment.The above results show that there is a "threshold value" for the impact of government supervision intensity on the scale of corporate environmental investment.CEO duality has information advantage and fast decision advantage in dealing with uncertain risks of enterprisesThirdly,it discusses the relationship of public participation,property rights and corporate environmental investment.In order to prevent and control environmental pollution,the government is trying to take a series of measures to make up for market failure,which leads to the "government failure" phenomenon of insufficient government intervention or excessive government intervention.The public is the direct victim of environmental pollution,environmental protection can not be separated from public participation.Public participation and government supervision as complementary relations,in most parts of the world,public participation is widely used to make up for government failure and market failure in environmental management and decision-making.However,public participation is influenced by different cultural backgrounds,social,political and economic conditions,which made public participation has different effects in different countries and regions.In addition,in the face of extermal pressure,state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises bear different moral responsibilities,and have congenital differences in resource acquisition advantages.These differences may lead to differences in environmental practices of enterprises with different property rights.Based on the above,this paper attempts to explore the impact of public participation on corporate environmental investment,and the moderating effect of property rights on the relationship between public participation and corporate environmental investment.Using the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in China,and using fixed-effect model,this literature has some results:(1)If corporate environmental investment is considered as a single dimension,the degree of public participation is positively related to the scale of corporate environmental investment.Compared with non-state owned enterprises,the state-owned enterprises have weakened the positive impact of public participation on corporate environmental investment.(2)If corporate environmental investment is considered as a multi-dimensional construct,the degree of public participation is positively related to the scale of corporate prospective environmental investment,but it has no significant relationship with corporate governance environmental investment.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises weaken the positive correlation between public participation and corporate prospective environmental investment,but have no significant moderating effect on the relationship between public participation and corporate governance environmental investment.The results indicated that the public participation as a bottom-up external supervision power can influence corporate environmental investment decision,but the effectiveness of public participation is limited by the nature of property right and the content of corporate environmental investment.Fourthly,it discusses the relationship of public attention,green image and corporate environmental investment.The public's environmental awareness,green consumption concept and green lifestyle help promote the development of green economy.The ethics formed by the public on environmental issues affect not only public behavior,but also corporate behavior.As consumers and investors,the public can protest against ethical enterprises by "voting with feet" exit mechanism,or express environmental appeals to enterprises through political appeal mechanism.It shows that there is a close relationship between public environmental concern and environmental pressure and violation risk of enterprises.In addition,environmental information is an important basis for stakeholders to manage,evaluate and supervise corporate environmental pollution prevention and control.Under the condition of a certain degree of public environmental concern,can the market behavior of enterprises to establish a green image transmit good environmental information to the public and affect the public's tolerance of enterprises' environmental investment behavior? Based on this,this paper attempts to explore the impact of public concern on corporate environmental investment,and further explore the moderating effect of green image on the relationship between public concern and corporate environmental investment.Using the data of A-share manufacturing listed companies in China,and using Logit model,OLS model and reverse causality test,this literature has some results:(1)Corporate environmental investment decision-making is affected by both internal and external factors.From the perspective of corporate external factors,the degree of public concern and the intensity of environmental regulation are the increasing functions.From the perspective of corporate internal factors,resource acquisition ability,the proportion of the largest shareholders,growth ability and size are the increasing functions.However,the age is the subtractive functions.(2)If corporate environmental investment is considered as a single dimension,public concern is positively related to the scale of corporate environmental investment.Green image has weakened the positive impact of public concern on corporate environmental investment.(3)If corporate environmental investment is considered as a multi-dimensional construct,the positive impact public concern is only positively correlated with the corporate prospective environmental investment,and green image only has weakened the positive correlation between the public concern and the corporate prospective environmental investment.The above results show that good green image can help to alleviate public attitudes and increase public's tolerance to corporate environmental investment behaviors,and the public can respond to different types of corporate environmental investment.There are four main contributions in this paper: Firstly,the paper expands the basic theory research of the corporate environmental investment.According to the main purpose principle and capitalization principle,this paper redefines corporate environmental investment,and makes statistics on corporate environmental investment according to the principle of certainty and consistency.And the corporate environmental investment is further divided into corporate prospective environmental investment and corporate governance environmental investment according to the view of strategic system and content characteristics.Based on China's national conditions,this paper explores the internal and external factors affecting corporate environmental investment,so that relevant theories can be combined and expanded on the green level of enterprise investment behavior.Comprehensive and systematic research makes up for the limitations of previous related research,and promotes the development of related disciplines while enriching existing literature.Secondly,the paper deepens the research on the influencing factors of corporate environmental investment.Starting from the three levels of system,morality and economy,combined with stakeholders,institutional theory,resource-based view and other multiple theories,this paper combines external factors with internal factors of organization,hard and soft constraints,and human and material factors to analyze the impact of each factor on corporate environmental investment and realization path.This paper identifies five important factors affecting corporate environmental investment: three of which are related to "people",namely,the public and the managers of enterprises.The public is embodied in the degree of public participation and public concern,the managers of enterprises are embodied in CEO duality.Two other important factors are related to "things",namely,the green image,and the property right.Under other conditions,this paper studied the relationship between different factors and different types of corporate environmental investment behavior,which enriches and deepens the research on the impact of corporate environmental investment.Thirdly,the paper advances the research on the moderating effect on the internal and external factors and corporate environmental investment.There are many studies on single influencing factors in the existing literature,but there are few studies on the moderating effect by combining the internal and external factors of the organization with corporate environmental investment.Therefore,based on China's special political and economic background and the perspective of enterprise heterogeneity,this paper examines the moderating effect of "CEO duality","property rights" and "green image" on the relationship between external supervision and environmental investment.Chapter 4 takes CEO duality as a moderating variable to reveal the moderating effect of enterprise resource acquisition behavior on the relationship between the intensity of government supervision and different types of corporate environmental investment.Chapter 5 takes property rights as a moderating variable to reveal the moderating effect of enterprise resource acquisition capability on the relationship between public participation and different types of corporate environmental investment.Chapter 6 takes green image as a moderating variable to reveal the moderating effect of resource acquisition intention on the relationship between public concern and different types of corporate environmental investment.Through the effect of regulation,it strengthens the interrelationship between internal and external factors of the organization and corporate environmental investment.Fourthly,the paper promotes the construction and innovation of environmental protection system.In order to make up for the market failure,the government used mandatory intervention measures in the past,such as environmental regulations,though having immediate results.Therefore,most of the existing studies are based on institutional theory to study the impact of environmental regulation on corporate environmental investment.But there are some phenomena of "government failure" in government intervention,such as insufficient intervention or excessive intervention.However,the existing literature lacks the research on the influence mechanism of public participation and public concern as an external supervisory force from the perspective of multi-governance,combining with the factors of organizational heterogeneity governance.Through theoretical and empirical research,this paper clarifies the role of the public and enterprises in environmental protection,breaks the previous concept of government-based environmental protection,and helps to promote environmental protection system innovation,"from top-down to bottom-up" and "from compulsion to induced" transformation.It will help to promote the construction of environmental protection system,form "primary action groups" and provide institutional guarantee for the construction of ecological civilization society in China. |
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