Study On Environmental Pollutions On The Basis Of Government Regulation And Public Participation

Now China is in the process of industrialization, economic growth is based on the extensive development patterns, environmental degradation and ecological imbalance. Although the economy is continuing developing and technology is progressing, the trend of environmental degradation is still rising. It is extremely unbalanced between economy development and environmental development. Consequently, more and more attention is paid to"change the growth pattern"and"govern the environmental pollution"by the government and the public. All these hostile environmental conditions should attribute to the emissions caused by enterprises. Considering government regulation and public participation are the most effective measures to prevent environmental pollution, this paper applies evolutionary game theory based on government regulation and public participation and enterprises to reveal how the three players choose their own strategy theoretically; this paper also examines the impacts of government environmental regulation, public participation and enterprise abatement costs on enterprise pollution abatement empirically. And then, this paper analyzes the situation of the abatement cost of enterprises, government regulation and the public participation in China based on the theoretical and the empirical study to provide effective advices to improve the environment conditions.The first part of this paper introduces the current serious environmental pollution in China and predicts the reasons: first, although the government has been regulating environmental pollution in various ways, there is room for enterprise to conduct a game with the government. The high cost of government regulation leads to a weak regulation. Second, we did not fully integrated the public into the system of environmental protection, the high cost of public participation in environmental protection leads to a low degree of public participation and the public cannot achieve their supervisory role. Third, generally, the production technology and the production facilities of enterprises in China will cause a lot of pollution. The costs of technological innovation and facilities upgrading of enterprises are too high, that is, the cost of pollution abatement is too high, which leads these enterprises would rather accept the punishment than to conduct the abatement. Then this paper introduced some domestic and foreign studies related to government environmental regulation and public participation in environmental protection issues. These studies show that government regulation has a significant negative impact on emissions, the impact of public participation depends on specific circumstances and the lagged enterprise environmental pollution variable has a great positive impact on emissions.The second part of this paper first introduces the evolutionary game theory. We can know the local stability of equilibrium point through the Jacobian determinant of the replicon dynamic equation. Then we establish game models between enterprise and the government, enterprise and the public, and analyze how the three players choose their strategies based on their costs, that is, find the ESS of the players. From the summary of the game models, we find that enterprises'environmental pollution is subjected to the cost of enterprise abatement, government regulation and public participation. In the case of the intensity of government regulation and the degree of public participation is settled, the impact of the cost of enterprise abatement on enterprises'environmental pollution is determined by the size of the cost. If the cost of abatement has great impact on enterprises'environmental pollution, we can conclude that the cost is high; otherwise we can conclude that the cost is low. In the case of cost of enterprise abatement and the degree of public participation is settled, the impact of government regulation on enterprises'environmental pollution is determined by the intensity of government regulation, if government regulation has a great impact on enterprises'environmental pollution, we can conclude that government regulation has a great impact, otherwise we can conclude that the government regulation is strong and the cost of it is low,otherwise the government regulation is weak and the cost of it is high. In the case of cost of enterprise abatement and the intensity of government regulation is settled, the impact of public participation on enterprises'environmental pollution is determined by the degree of public participation, if public participation has a great impact, we can know that the degree of public participation is high and the cost of it is low,otherwise the degree of public participation is low and the cost of it is high.The third part of this paper proposes an empirical model through domestic and foreign studies on government regulation and public participation in environmental problems, the model considers enterprises'environmental pollution and lagged enterprises'environmental pollution, government regulation and lagged government regulation, public participation and lagged public participation. This paper uses twelve major industrial pollutants to measure the abatement of enterprises, sewage charges to measure the intensity of government environmental regulation and letters related to environment to measure the degree of public participation. The estimates show that public participation variable and lagged public participation variable are not significant, the government regulation, lagged government regulation and lagged enterprise emissions are significant. In order to compare the importance of various factors that affect enterprise emissions, we calculates the standardized coefficients of the explanatory variables. The standardized coefficients show that the lagged enterprise emissions variable has the largest positive impact, the government regulation variable has negative impact but not obvious impact and the lagged government regulation variable have some positive impact. At the last of this part, this paper integrates the game models and the empirical analysis to analyze situation of the cost of enterprise abatement, government regulation and public participation in our country. The results show that he cost of enterprise abatement is high, government regulation is weak and the cost of it is high, the degree of public participation is low and the cost of it is high, as we predicted.The last part of this paper puts forward some proposals to reduce enterprise emissions, strengthen government regulation and promote the degree of public participation to improve environmental conditions according to the fact that the main reason for our country's severe environmental situation is that the costs of government regulation and public participation and enterprise abatement in our country are high.