| The successful experience of foreign farmer cooperative practices shows that,compared with other types of economic organizations,cooperative advantage comes from its unique institutional arrangements,in which,the democratic decision-making system and the surplus return system serve as the hardcore.They embody the essential attributes of cooperatives.However,in the process of rapid development,China's farmer cooperatives have generally deviated from the "hard core" system of cooperatives and undergone serious organizational variation,which makes farmer cooperatives in China look like a misnomer,receiving strong criticism from the academic circle.Some scholars even admit that there are no real farmer cooperatives in China.At the same time,the government has issued relevant laws and regulations for many times in an attempt to guide and regulate the cooperatives onto the "correct" track.However,it is a pity that neither the criticism and questioning from the academic circle nor the guidance and intervention from the government seem to have "corrected" the track of China's farmer cooperatives,which is still developing rapidly along its own track.Cooperatives were born in the west and have a history of nearly 200 years.In this long historical process,in order to cope with the changes in the internal and external environment,the organization operation mode of western cooperatives has been constantly changing,but some changes are more inheritable.The organization operation mode of western cooperatives still maintains the institutional core of traditional cooperatives today.Chinese farmer cooperatives originated and were learned from the West.Why did such a common organizational variation occur in the process of their rapid development? Furthermore,the main functions of China's farmer cooperatives at the present stage is to provide pre-production,in-production and post-production services for scattered and weak farmers and help their members increase production and income.Then how will the organizational variation affect the realization of their functions? This paper will focus on these two issues.1.The fundamental purpose of this study is to reveal the formation mechanism and influence of the variation of farmer cooperative in China.The main research contents include the following aspects:(1)Comparison of variation of agricultural cooperatives at home and abroad.First,foreign agricultural cooperatives are divided into two major types from which their operation mode will be sorted out and the general characteristics of foreign agricultural cooperatives condensed.Then,according to the identity of the leaders,the farmer cooperatives in China are divided into four types,of which the organizational operation characteristics of different types are analyzed and summarized.Finally,through the comparative analys is of domestic and foreign agricultural cooperatives,this paper reveals the organizational var iation of China's farmer cooperatives from three aspects: property right structure,decision-making mode and surplus distribution mode.(2)Theoretical analysis of the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives.On the basis of literature review and theoretical reference,this paper makes a theoretical analysis of the organizational variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives.Based on the historical track and realistic constraints of the farmer cooperatives in China,this paper starts with the exclusive resources and organizational costs of the leaders,and reveals the formation mechanism of the variation of China's farmer cooperatives through the game theory.(3)Quantitative analysis of the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives.On the basis of theoretical analys is,using the micro-survey data at the level of cooperatives and the multinomial logistic regression model,the paper examines the factors' influence on the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives from the perspectives of the leader's exclusive resources and organizational costs.The specific work includes design of the survey,description and comparison of the sample cooperatives,and quantitative analysis of variation of farmer cooperatives.(4)Qualitative analysis of the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives.Focusing on government support and external pressure,the thesis investigates Chinese farmer cooperatives' variation dynamically with an attempt to answer in what conditions the initiator might have delivered the rights of residual control and residual claims.Findings can further reveal the mechanism of Chinese farmer cooperatives' naturalization.(5)The influence of Chinese farmer cooperatives' variation on their service.The main purpose of this part is to test the impact of organizational var iation on the service function by using the data of cooperatives at the micro level,focusing on the impact of cooperatives' capital structure,decision-making mode and surplus distribution mode.The specific contents inc lude the realization mechanism and influencing factors of the service function of farmer cooperatives,the measurement and comparison of the service function of farmer cooperatives,and the empirical test of the effect of organizational variation on the service function.(6)The impact of Chinese farmer cooperatives' variation on the income increasing function.The main task is to test the influence of farmer cooperatives' variation on member income increasing,with special focus on the impact of cooperative capital structure,cooperative decision-making mode and cooperative income distribution mode.The specific contents include the mechanism of farmer cooperatives income increasing,the overall description and comparison of farmer cooperatives increasing their members' income,and empirical test of the variation affecting farmers' income increase.(7)Countermeasures and Suggestions for promoting farmer cooperatives in China.On the basis of the research conclusion,the article puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to promote the sustainable development of Chinese farmer cooperatives,including the general ideas,general principles and implementation paths to promote the development of farmer cooperatives.2.In accordance with the logical thinking of "scientific problem identification--theoretical analysis and deduction--empirical analysis and verification--normative analysis and induction".The research conclusion shows that:(1)Compared with foreign agricultural cooperatives,the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives is mainly reflected in three aspects: property right structure,decision-making mode and surplus distribution.In terms of property right structure,the initiator and a few core members of the sample cooperatives contribute more than 60% of the total investment.In terms of decision-making mode,"one share one vote" accounts for 48% of the total,while "one person one vote" only accounts for 27%."one share one vote" instead of "one person one vote" is the main decision-making mode adopted by farmer cooperatives.In terms of surplus distribution,67.9% of cooperatives adopt "dividend by share",while only 19.8% return surplus to members according to "transaction volume",and "distribution by share" has become the main surplus distribution of cooperatives.(2)In Chinese farmer cooperatives," one person,one vote" is replaced by "default majority consent" in decision-making.At the same time "second return of interest" is replaced by "transfer in advance" in the way of surplus distribution.The former comes into being firstly because relevant laws and regulations do not stipulate the operation procedure and operation mode of "one person,one vote",so that there is no rule to follow in actual operation.Second,under the influenc e of rural social culture,people are not accustomed to the "show of hands" or "secret ballot",which are relatively "hard" democratic expressions.Third,this decision-making mode is conducive to improving the decis ion-making efficiency,which is equivalent to "one person,one vote" in a sense.However,the disadvantages of this decision-making method are also obvious.Some members,in order not to offend others,may suppress their own demands,but from then on,they are indifferent to the development of cooperatives and even "vote with their feet" to quit cooperatives.Under the background of strong heterogeneity of the members,the surplus distribution method of one-time benefit has its rationality.However,the disadvantages of this distribution mode are also obvious.On the one hand,if this distribution mode is the active choice of smallholders,the result is that smallholders transfer the risks to the initiators and a few core members.On the other hand,if this distribution pattern is an institutional arrangement by the leader and a few core members,it may harm the interests of the weaker members of the cooperative;In a word,this way of distribution runs counter to the goals of fairness,justice and solidar ity of cooperatives,which will be detrimental to the sustainable development of professional farmer cooperatives in the long run.(3)The initiator seeking the return of exclusive resources and making up the organizational cost is the main mechanism of the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives.It is destined for cooperatives that,in the process of establishment and development,capital,technology,channels,etc.are much scarcer and more important than land and labor.In this context,cooperatives are usually set up by “big farmers” with rich exclusive resources.If they cannot control the cooperatives,the result will be that farmer cooperatives in China will either break up due to the absence of key elements or return to the primary state of product purchase and sales.Therefore,at present,the operation mode of cooperatives under the control of the initiators is a kind of selective incentive to the leaders.From the perspective of smallholders,in the highly differentiated situation of farmers,smallholders do not have the exclusive resourc es to set up cooperatives,nor can they afford the organizational costs of establishing cooperatives.Therefore,sharing the benefits of cooperation with big farmers has become the rational choice of smallholders.However,under the pattern that the big farmers launch and the small farmers follow,the small farmers must accept the institutional arrangement of the big farmers,otherwise the cooperation will be difficult to continue and fall into the dilemma of the zero-sum game.It seems that the initiators make the money of the small farmers,but the logic behind it is a profit-sharing mechanism,whose essence is the exchange of power and rights between the small farmers and the initiator.(4)There is a certain mechanism of "de-alienation" in farmer cooperatives if special conditions are satisfied.Through a comparative study of multiple cases,this paper finds that,if government support can reduce the organizational cost of the initiator and make up for the shortage of small farmers' exclusive resources,at the same time,external market pressure can change the relative importance of small farmers' labor and land elements.In this case,the initiator may give up the residual control right and residual claim right of the cooperative,and the democratic decision-making mode of "one person,one vote" and the income distribution mode of "surplus return according to the transaction amount" become possible.(5)Although the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives weakens its function,it still realizes the pareto improvement of its members.Through quantitative analysis,this paper shows that the leader's control does hinder the service function and income increasing function of the cooperative.However,on the whole,cooperatives have become an important provider of agricultural socialized services,and the participation of farmers in cooperatives can still increase the income of their products by 20-30%.Therefore,it can be considered that although the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives weakens its function,it still achieves pareto improvement for its members.(6)The variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives may continue for a long time.At present,the operation mode of Chinese farmer cooperatives seems to have entered a locked state.In fact,because the cooperative international and domestic environment will be more complex and changeable,capital,talent,technology,management and other factors will become more and more precious.Under this background,the cooperative organizational focus will pay closer attention to market,so that the small farmers under the interests and abilities,might have to give up their rights in return for market access and price.At the same time,due to political pressure and path dependence,the government will continue to support those cooperatives led by "big capital".It can be predicted that in the future,companies,rural brokers and big farmers will remain the leading force for a long time,and the operation mode of Chinese farmer cooperatives will not change in a short time.3.The innovation of this study may be reflected in the following three aspects:(1)Innovation in research perspective.The variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives is a macroscopic and quite complex problem,and most of the existing studies have been carried out from the macroscopic or mesoscopic level,trying to construct a "huge" theoretical framework to explain this problem,but the results are unsatisfactory.Research in this paper,from the perspective of the initiators' exclusive resources and organization costs,successfully reveals the mechanism of farmer cooperatives' variation.In comparison,the perspective of this paper is innovative.(2)Innovation in research methods.At present,there are,by and large,on the variation of Chinese farmer cooperatives,more qualitative studies but less quantitative studies;more normative analys is and less empir ical research.Based on the existing research,this study,taking advantage of the micro-level cooperative research data and member survey data to construct a logistic regression model,empir ically examines the factors influencing the var iation of farmer cooperatives organization,and further constructs an econometric model to investigate the inf luential effect exerted by the variation of farmer cooperative organization.(3)Innovation in research conclusion.Through a comparative study of multiple cases,this paper finds that,if government support can reduce the organizational cost of the initiator and make up for the shortage of small farmers' exclusive resources,at the same time,external market pressure can change the relative importance of small farmers' labor and land elements.In this case,the initiator may give up the residual control right and residual claim right of the cooperative,and the democratic decision-making mode of "one person,one vote" and the income distribution mode of "surplus return according to the transaction amount" become possible. |
PDF Full Text Request