Research On The Incentive And Regulatory Strategies Of The Rental Housing Market In China Under The Rental And Purchase System

In order to curb the excessive rise of house prices and ease the contradiction between supply and demand in the housing market,the central economic work conference proposed for the first time that housing rental and purchase simultaneously should be the main direction of China’s housing system reform in 2015.There port of the 19 th national congress stressed the need to accelerate the establishment of a housing system with multi-agent supply,multi-channel security and rental and purchase simultaneously once again,aiming to promote the development of China’s housing rent market and improve the housing market regulation mechanism.But China’s housing rental market develops slowly for a long time because the enterprises pay attention to housing sales instead of rental,and there are still many problems in the process of development.For example,the total supply of the rental housing is insufficient,and the structure of supply and demond is unbalanced.The supply channel of the rental housing is narrow and the main power of the supply is insufficient.The regulation of the housing rental is insufficient,and the maket order is not standardized.The law and regulations on the housing rental are not perfect,and the security of rental rights and interests is insuffivient,ect.It is urgent to carry out a systematic review of the development of China’s housing rental market.In combination with the current policy environment,we should clarify the interest demand sand behavior interaction strategies of multiple market subjects,and formulate scientific and effective market incentive and regulatory strategies.On the basis of combing the relevant theoretical basis and the existing literatures,summarizing and comparing the practical experience of foreign countries,combined with the development status of the domestic housing rental market,this study analyzes the content and the structure of the policy system and its impact on the housing rental market deeply,explores the interest demands,interactive evolution and equilibrium strategies of the market subjects under the policy system,in order to standardize the order of the rental market in China,speed up the effective implementation of the policy of rental and purchase simultaneously.The main research results are as follows:(1)It combs the research basis and the international practical experience of housing rental systematically.By summarizing and comparing there form and the practice experience of housing rental system in developed countries,this paper analyzes the ultimate cause of inadequate development of housing rental market in China.Consumers pay attention to housing purchase instead of rental.The protection of the lessee’s rights and interests is insufficient.The channels of rental housing are narrow.The total supply is insufficient.There is structural mismatch and the power of enterprises to participate in the rental business is insufficient.The legal system is not perfect,and the market regulation is insufficient.Therefore,to promote the healthy development of China’s housing rental market and accelerate the establishment of a long-term mechanism of rental and purchase simultaneously,we need to first clarify the policy connotation and the impact of rental and purchase simultaneously system,and clarify the interest demand sand game relations of the subjects in the housing rental market.(2)It analyzes the influence of rent purchase system on the housing rental market in China.Based on the analysis of the implementation background of the system,this paper explores the content and the structure of the policy,and finds that in the relevant policies of the system,the environmental policy is the most used,the supply policy is the second,and the demand policy is the least.On this basis,the paper further analyzes the influence of the policy system of rent and purchase on the rental housing market.The research shows that: for the rental housing suppliers,the policies of increasing the supply of the rental housing land,the incentive of the tax preferential policies,the innovation of financial products of the rental housing,the guarantee of multi-channel supply of the rental housing will be conducive to promoting supply.For consumers,the implementation of the policy will strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the lessee gradually,accelerate the landing of the same rights of rental and purchase,and guide consumers to change their concept of housing consumption gradually.For the regulatory body(the government),the implementation of the policy will strengthen the market regulation,promote to realize the central government’s goal of ensuring people’s livelihood,reduce the local government’s financial revenue,increase the local government’s regulatory costs,and improve its reputation.On this basis,combining the theory of the market incentive and regulation,the paper puts forward the whole concept model of the incentive and regulation for the housing rental market under the rent-purchase system.(3)It studies on the evolutionary game of the rental and purchase policy implementation between the central government sand the local governments.The evolutionary game model is constructed by introducing the influencing factors of market structure,the strength of reward,the strength of punishment and other parameters.The dynamic evolutionary stability strategies of the central government and the local government in different situations are studied.On this basis,the Matlab software is used to simulate.It analyzes the strategy selection and the evolution process of central the government and the local government under various constraints,and explores the impact of the main parameter son the evolution and stability of game players’ behavior strategies,and put forward effective suggestions for the implementation and regulation of the policy.On this basis,combining the theory of market incentive and supervision,the paper puts forward the whole concept model of the incentive and supervision of the housing rental market under the rent-purchase system.(4)Study on the three party evolutionary game of the policy implementation of rental and purchase simultaneously.Based on the incentive and regulatory perspective of the implementation of the policy system,an evolutionary game model is constructed with the participation of the government,the enterprise and the consumer.The interactive process and evolutionary stable equilibrium strategy of the three players in the implementation of the policy system are analyzed,and the numerical simulation is carried out with Matlab software.The results show that the government’s incentive subsidy,punishment and the net income difference between the active participation and the passive participation in the housing leasing business are the main factors that affect the choice of the strategies,and have a positive impact on the active participation in the housing leasing business.(5)Study on the evolutionary game of the regulation of the lessor’s housing leasing behavior.Based on the characteristics of limited rationality,the evolutionary game model is established to explore the regulatory strategy of the government administrative department for the illegal rental of the house lessor,and the Matlab software is used for numerical simulation.The results show that for the lessor,when the penalty cost of violation is higher than the ratio of the net income of violation and the probability of violation discovered by cross level regulation,the optimal strategy is compliant leasing.Otherwise,the lessor will choose the housing leasing strategy.For the government,when the regulatory revenue is higher than the regulatory cost,the optimal strategy is ―regulation‖.When the profit of government regulation is less than the difference between the cost of supervision and the penalty of dereliction of duty,the optimal policy is ―no regulation‖.(6)Study on the game of safe guarding rights and deterring in the service regulation of real estate agency.Based on the service regulation of the real estate agency and the maintenance disputes,this paper constructs and solves the regulation and maintenance deterrence game model with the participation of government regulation department,the real estate intermediary agency and the house lessee,and analyzes the realization conditions of three equilibrium states of the deterrence equilibrium,the challenge equilibrium and the separation equilibrium.The research shows that as one of the main paler of housing lease regulation,the lessee’s right safe guarding behavior will play an important role in housing lease market regulation,and the establishment and the improvement of dispute handling mechanism is the key link to stimulate the legitimate right safe guarding of the lessee.In order to cultivate tough government regulation departments and tenants,reduce the perceived value of conflicts between real estate agencies and the government and the tenants,so as to realize the deterrent equilibrium state of dispute handling.So,we should respect the essence of events with the representation of safe guarding rights,focus on the attitude,the measures and the determination of the real estate agencies in dealing with infringement,and take the target deregulation measures strategies and the treatment measures,pay attention to the obtain effective information through the feedback of the lessee,and play its regulatory role in safe guarding rights effectively.(7)Research summary and prospect.This paper summarizes the research work and the conclusions of this paper,puts forward the suggestions to speed up the development of housing rental market and promote the effective implementation of rent purchase system,and points out the future research direction in view of the short comings in the research.