Contract Mechanism Based On Revenue Sharing Of Supply Chain For The Channel Flattening

The emergence of the supply chain is to enhance the enterprises'ability to meet the market demand, but the hierarchical structure of the traditional supply chain is no longer suited to the new business environment. In order to break the development bottlenecks, the enterprises germinate the flatten management thinking. This paper focuses on different channels to implement the strategy of flat supply chain, how the supply chain members set up revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the main provisions of manufacturers and retailers, retailers'"competitive and cooperative" relationship, and the realization maximum profits and achievement of supply chain coordination.The first part focuses on the impact of revenue sharing contract to such supply chain when enterprises adopt the strategy of dual-channel flattening. The introduction of Hamiltonian equation for this part is the optimal solution, and achieved optimal benefit-sharing ratio. We can find through the study that under the two-channel supply chain, it's a"win-win"policy to adopt a revenue sharing contract to producers and consumers. Manufacturers and consumers can gain more benefits than in the traditional supply chain, and the emergence of online sales channels declines the retailer's profit.The second part focuses on whether the revenue sharing contract could achieve the supply chain coordination if enterprises adopt the flat strategy of commission the professional Web site to sell products under the Internet environment. Under the asymmetric cost information condition, to obtain optimal balanced solution in Stackelberg game between manufacturers and online retailers in their decision-making, and then to compare with balanced solution which under the complete information, it can be found that suppliers under asymmetric information than Incomplete Information in a more disadvantageous position, retailers receive more revenue sharing ratio. This will be illustrated by examples.The third part focuses on the research of the non-price competition problems among retailers when enterprises implement the flat channel strategy. The dominant producers play the Stackelberg game with retailers, and through revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Through analysis it id proved that revenue sharing contract can not achieve the coordination of the supply chain which composed by individual manufacturers and individual retailers, but the only optimal benefit-sharing ratio of the supply chain which composed by a single manufacturer and multi-retailers can achieve coordination of the supply chain, and through the promotional activities of retailers to maximize their own profits, but not blindly increase promotion cost.The final part researches the supply chain disruption problems which the enterprises often face under the adoption of flat channel strategy. This Part seeks the optimal benefit-sharing ratio under the interruption in production costs, production costs and disruption at the same time demand both cases, but the optimal ratio can't achieve the arbitrary distribution of the profits between manufacturers and retailers of in the hope of the whole supply chain.