While traditional production pollution is yet to be fundamentally solved,domestic pollution has become an increasingly prominent problem in China,and the recycling of waste products,in particular,has become the focus of public attention.Strengthening the recovery,treatment and utilization of waste helps improve the utilization efficiency of resources and reduce environmental pollution,which is also an important requirement of ecological civilization and sustainable development.In recent years,it has been a common practice in the international community to extend producers’ responsibility through some institutional arrangements and make producers responsible for the whole life cycle of their products,especially the recycling as a way of minimizing the environmental impact of waste products.Corresponding to this practice,three core systems have been formed: funding system,target management system and deposit return system.In the fourth quarter of 2012,China officially launched the waste electrical and electronic equipment(WEEE)disposal funding system targeted at certain electrical and electronic products.After seven years of implementation,however,the funding system has encountered problems such as income less than expenditure,low rate of standard recycling,and difficulty in covering new products.Therefore,making a comprehensive analysis of the operation of China’s extended producer responsibility(EPR)system and finding out the root causes of the above problems are of great theoretical and practical significance for the further improvement of China’s EPR system.So far,domestic and foreign studies on EPR are mostly carried out at the level of policy research such as management policy system design and system operation effect analysis.No scholar has conducted comprehensive EPR research based on the principles of economics under the condition that waste products are commodities which still have prices.Based on the operational characteristics of China’s WEEP disposal funding system,this paper makes a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the characteristics of China’s waste recycling market and the operation of EPR under this market condition by comprehensively using methods of comparative analysis,model analysis and empirical analysis.Firstly,in Chapters 3 and 4,this paper makes a comparative analysis of the EPR operation conditions and characteristics in China and foreign countries,and finds out the differences between them.It points out that waste is still a “commodity” at present in the Chinese market where a complete and spontaneous waste recycling system exists.When the EPR system is implemented under such market conditions,a "waste dual-dismantle market"(WDDM)will take shape.Enterprises operating in the market include policyguided "formal dismantling enterprises" that have joined the EPR system and spontaneous "informal dismantling enterprises" who have not joined it.Then,in Chapter 5,the author builds a game theory model based on the operational characteristics of China’s WDDM,and makes a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the game behaviors of the government and producers under the WDDM,the game behaviors of dismantling enterprises and recycling enterprises under the recycling funding system,the game behaviors of production enterprises and dismantling enterprises under the recycling target management system,and the game behaviors of producers and consumers under the deposit refund system.Through analysis,it is found that under the WDDM,the implementation of EPR will be affected by recycling enterprises and informal dismantling enterprises,thus leading to unsatisfactory or even ineffective implementation of EPR.Lastly,in Chapter 6,taking China’s current WEEE disposal funding system as an example,the author makes a quantitative analysis of the game behaviors and equilibrium conditions of relevant players under the system,confirming the previous conclusions.First,implementation of the funding system has led to the formation of a WDDM,where some dismantling enterprises(mainly formal ones)have joined the funding system,while other dismantling enterprises(mainly informal ones)have not joined it.Second,under the WDDM condition,the difference between the government’s fund subsidies to formal dismantling enterprises and their additional environmental costs must be greater than that between the sales prices of dismantled products of informal dismantling enterprises and formal dismantling enterprises,or else waste electrical and electronic products will flow to informal dismantling enterprises.Third,informal dismantling enterprises will take advantage of market competitive advantages to seize the fund subsidies the government provides for formal dismantling enterprises,making the implementation of EPR ineffective.This paper is innovative in the following ways:(1)It has certain theoretical innovativeness.Prior research on EPR at home and abroad basically stays at the level of management policy research,mostly focusing on the design and operation of a specific waste management policy system.From the perspective of economics,this paper analyzes the decision-making behavior of relevant players by constructing a game theory model,obtains equilibrium conditions and optimal solutions,and raises the level of EPR research from management policy research to theoretical research.(2)It has certain innovative viewpoints.Prior studies at home and abroad mostly focus on EPR itself,lacking systematic analysis of its operation environment.Based on the fact that waste is still a "commodity" at present in China,this paper puts forward the concept of WDDM for the first time at home and abroad,and analyzes its formation mechanism and operation characteristics.(3)It has certain methodological innovativeness.Prior analysis of EPR in China seldom adopts a game theory model.In this paper,the method of game theory is applied to EPR analysis,taking a leading position to some extent at home and abroad. |