Research On Pricing And Government Price Regulation Strategy Of Online Car-hailing Service Under Sharing Economy

In recent years,sharing economy has gradually penetrated into all aspects of people’s lives,such as travel,accommodation,medical treatment,clothing and so on.Sharing economy brings unique experiences to consumers,and it affects the ride service deeply.For example,Didi enables riders to enjoy the high quality services without a car.As a new ride service,the pricing strategy of online car-hailing service is not yet clear.At the same time,due to the homogeneity of the taxi service and the online car-hailing service,the entry of the online car-hailing service has brought great impact to taxi service and caused problems such as the strike of the taxi drivers.In view of this,this dissertation considers different market competition scenarios,and discusses the pricing strategy of online car-hailing service and the design of government regulatory policy under sharing economy.Based on a variety of market competition circumstances,i.e.,monopoly,duopoly platform competition and the competition between taxi service and online car-hailing service,this dissertation explores the pricing decision of online car-hailing service.It also studies the design of government price regulation strategy from the perspective of the competition between taxi service and online car-hailing service.The details and results are listed as follows:(1)Firstly,this dissertation studies the pricing problem of an online car-hailing service platform in the monopoly market,and discusses its pricing strategy and the decision of the quantity of service time under the modes of chauffeur car service and ridesharing service respectively.It also investigates how the platform works out the appropriate increase proportion of the service price in order to motivate drivers to provide the service when the demand surges.The equilibrium solution of the model shows that the optimal price of online car-hailing service is related to the commission rate,and the platform also needs to pay attention to the total amount of time that the drivers can provide.(2)Then,the platform pricing problem under the condition of the competition between the two platforms is discussed.This dissertation charaterizes the competitive circumstance with SALOP model,and considers four scenarios according to the decision-making order of the two platforms,the service diversification degree and the service type.It explores the pricing strategy of the two platforms,the service diversification strategy for the market leader and the choice of service types for market follower under the competitive market circumstance.The numerical example analyzes the impact of operation cost and competition intensity on the above three strategies.(3)Furthermore,from the perspective of competition between taxi service and online car-hailing service,this dissertation uses the waiting time to characterize the service quality of the two services.It discusses and compares the pricing strategies and coexistence conditions of the two services under two scenarios where the service quality of online car-hailing service is higher or lower than that of taxi service.Numerical examples are used to analyze the effects of waiting time,the initial value of the service quality of online car-hailing service and the total network externality on consumer surplus and the coexistence condition.At the same time,based on the perspective of the difference of the service quality,this dissertation discusses the problem of the regulation of the online car-hailing service,and proposes that taxi drivers’ profit benchmark can be satisfied by enlarging the difference of the service quality.(4)Finally,from the perspective of competition between online car-hailing service and taxi service,this dissertation explores the design of price regulation strategies for online car-hailing service to achieve different regulatory targets.The two reglation targets are participation(target 1)and fairness(target 2).Based on the perspective of the service profit,the participation target considers the "franchise fee" problem of taxi service,and achieves the non-negative net profit of taxi service.From the perspective of service demand,the fairness target is to assure that the demand of taxi service is higher than the demand baseline.According to the perceived experience,the online car-haling service is divided into high-end service and low-end service,in order to explore the impact of service types on the price regualtion strategy.At the same time,this dissertation compares the regulation intensity of the regulation strategies under the two regulatory targets.Finally,it compares and analyzes the impacts of different regulation modes,such as entry limitation and price regulation and different regualtion targets on the online car-hailing service price and taxi demand.