Research On Land Value-added Benefits Sharing Of Hook Of Urban Construction Land Increase And Rural Construction Land Decrease Based On Contribution And Risk Of Stakeholders

With the rapid development of urbanization and industrialization in our country,the scale of construction land is rapidly expanding and the demand for urban construction land is also growing increasingly,which will lead to the scale of construction land approaching the limit of carrying capacity of resources and environment,and restrict the effective advancement of the new urbanization process.Meanwhile,inefficient use of rural construction land is widespread.Hence the shortage of urban construction land and being unused of rural construction land coexist,and the mismatch of supply and demand of construction land between urban and rural has intensified the contradiction between supply and demand of construction land.So urban and rural construction land replacement is an important way to break the contradiction between supply and demand.In order to ensure the demand for urban development land while the total amount of existing construction land does not increase and the amount of cultivated land does not decrease.Therefore,in 2005,the Ministry of Land and Resources officially introduced the policy of Hook of Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Construction Land Decrease,and then gradually implemented it in the form of a pilot.However,the policy of Hook of Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Construction Land Decrease is implemented from the top down.So the distribution of land value-added benefits is dominated by the government,benefits distribution is unbalanced,and farmers' rights are damaged,which can lead to a series of social problems.How to realize the sharing of land value-added benefits is an urgent issue that needs to be studied in the program of Hook of Urban Construction Land Increase and Rural Construction Land Decrease(Hereinafter referred to as HOOK program).This paper is based on summary of related research results at home and abroad.Firstly,this paper analyzes the connotation of land value-added benefits sharing,combs the formation mechanism of value-added benefits,analyzes the cost-benefit changes of the stakeholders,identifies the contributions and risks of the stakeholders,and explore the value-added benefits sharing mechanism based on contribution and risk of the HOOK program.Secondly,we analyze current situation of value-added benefits distribution from the two practice processes,which are farmland acquisition and sale in construction area,and homestead exit in dismantling area.And analyze the land value-added benefits sharing level of farmers and analyze the degree of satisfaction status quo of the value-added benefits distribution of farmers combined with empirical research,and then systematically sort out the problems of the current increase and decrease linked value-added benefits distribution.Following the principles of contribution-benefits equivalence,and risk-return equivalence,we consider comprehensively the cooperative contribution and risk to establish a value-added benefits distribution model,combined with the empirical analysis to measure sharing proportion of the value-added benefits among the stakeholders quantitatively.Finally,based on the problem orientation of the evaluation results of the current situation of value-added benefits sharing and the goal orientation of sharing proportion measurement results from the perspective of contribution-risk,combing with the analysis on the constraints and typical experience of land value-added benefits sharing,following the direction of governance of to reconstruct rights to ensure the fairness of benefits sharing process and adjust benefit to improve the fairness of benefits sharing results as the governance direction,we should build up a mechanism from the choice of governance structure and improvement of governance system.Through theoretical analysis and empirical research,this paper mainly draws the following conclusions:(1)Land value-added benefits sharing refers to the realization of fair and reasonable distribution of land value-added benefits among stakeholders,including sharing objects,sharing subjects,sharing standards and so on,and institutional arrangements can increase the level of benefits sharing.The essence of the HOOK program is the transferring of the development right of rural construction land to the urban,and the land price change in the sections of consolidation of rural construction land in the demolition area and farmland expropriation and transferring in the new construction area is the main path for the formation of the value-added benefits.Value-added from location change and use change,value-added from supply and demand change,investment value-added,etc.are the main sources of value-added benefits.The government-led is the leading mode of HOOK program in China.It is widely existed in most areas of China.The government,the farmers(collectives)in dismantling area,and the farmers(collectives)in the new construction area are the core value-added benefits distribution subject of the government-led HOOK program model.The practice of HOOK program results in the land rights and cost-benefit changes of the core interest subjects such as the government,the farmers(collectives)in dismantling area,and the farmers(collectives)in the new construction area.and all stakeholders contributed to the formation of value-added benefits in the HOOK program.The contributions include land contribution,capital contribution or management contribution,such as land use right,agricultural land contracting right,land attachment and capital.At the same time,stakeholders are responsible for food security,ecological and environmental effects,rising living costs,basic livelihood security,employment security,etc.Contribution distribution theory,risk compensation theory and cooperative game theory provide theoretical basis and method support for land value-added benefits sharing.Studying the value-added benefits distribution strategy have strong scientific rationality considering the contribution and risk of Stakeholders.(2)The sharing level of land value-added benefits needs to be improved.There are problems such as low peasant(collective)land benefits,low farmers' satisfaction,insufficient protection of peasant(collective)land rights,and unfair benefit sharing process.At this stage,the local government's "land finance" preference was more obvious.The average price of state-owned construction land in China has been rising steadily,but the compensation for land acquisition and the cost of demolition is relatively small,accounting for a low proportion of land transfer benefits.The net benefits from land transfer is mainly obtained by the local government.The current rural land property rights system is flawed.Farmers(collectives)have insufficient capacity to implement property rights,and their status is weak.The government's property rights implementation ability is stronger and there is a lack of checks and balances.At the same time,in the current situation of government regulation and market failure,the price of rural land market is difficult to achieve.Through the monopoly of land acquisition and monopoly of land supply,the government has obtained the land value-added benefits that should be shared by farmers.The connotation of land value-added benefits sharing includes two dimensions:fairness of benefits sharing process and fairness of results.Based on this,land value-benefits benefits sharing evaluation index system including indicators of right to know,decision-making,monetary compensation,housing resettlement,pension insurance,medical insurance,and non-agricultural employment can be constructed.And the fuzzy evaluation method can be used to measure the sharing level of land value-added benefits of farmers.The empirical study found that the total fuzzy index of land value-added benefits sharing level is Suzhou(0.4804)>Yangzhou(0.4656)>Lianyungang(0.2422).Among them,the benefits sharing process of farmers in Yangzhou project area has the highest process fair evaluation(0.5658),and the results fair value evaluation of land value-added benefits sharing results in Suzhou project area is the highest(0.5084).The both value evaluation results in Lianyungang project area were all poor(process and results fair evaluation are all less than 0.3).In the meantime,empirical study found that farmers' satisfaction with the status quo of land value-added benefits sharing was low,only 21.0%(including Suzhou(about 31%)>Yangzhou(about 25%)>Lianyungang(about 7%)of respondents were satisfied.Cost-benefit and policy recognition are the mainly influencing factors on farmers' land value-added benefits sharing satisfaction.(3)The benefit distribution scheme based on cooperative contribution-risk has certain rationality.Based on the Shapley Value Method of Cooperative Game,this paper measures the contribution of various stakeholders to the alliance by sorting out the changes in the benefits of different alliances,and calculates their main risks level by direct expenditure method,substitution method and so on.Comprehensively considering the cooperative contribution and risk,we measure reasonable proportion of the value-added benefits among the stakeholders quantitatively.Empirical calculations show that,in the formation of value-added benefits,the farmers(collectives)in the demolition area have the greatest contribution,and the farmers(collectives)in new construction area have the highest risk.Farmers(collectives)of demolition area should be distributed 35%to 50%of value-added benefits.The proportion of value-added benefits that farmers(collectives)in the new construction area can share is about 25%to 40%,and the proportion of value-added benefits that the government receives should be between 15%and 30%.The farmers(collectives)in the demolition area will produce the linked indicators at the expense of losing the right to use the rural construction land(homesteads)and the above-ground houses.The ural construction land(homesteads)have greater benefits values such as housing,livestock and poultry breeding,and rental.So they should share a larger proportion of land value-added benefits.The agricultural land itself has social values such as agricultural output benefits,living security and employment security.The farmers(collectives)in new construction area have made the linked indicators available at the cost of losing collective land ownership and agricultural land contracting management rights,so they should share a certain proportion land appreciation value.Government is the leader and manager,so the program should be based on long-term benefits such as ecological benefits,social benefits and real estate-related taxes.Compared with the status quo of land benefits distribution pattern,the new value-added benefits distribution plan can effectively improve the land benefits distribution pattern among stakeholders,improve the land property benefits of farmers(collectives),enable farmers(collectives)to share the achievements of urbanization development,and accord with the policy orientation that the land value-added benefits from HOOK program should be all returned to the countryside in time.The new benefits distribution plan can provide a reference for the rational distribution of land value-added benefits in urban and rural construction land replacement,provide a quantitative reference space for farmers' compensation standards,and effectively guide the interest negotiation between the government and farmers(collectives).(4)We should build up a mechanism from the choice of governance structure and improvement of the compensation mechanism and macro system.First of all,we should choose the public governance structure of the diversified governance body to ensure the fairness of the benefits sharing process:through government leadership,improving the supply of institutional and regulatory products in the HOOK program;increasing the marketization of land benefits distribution(compensation)standards by strengthening market mechanisms,and improve the efficiency of public affairs processing;through cultivating social organizations,expanding the right of speech,broadening channels and platforms for farmers to express their interests.Therefore we can strengthen social participation,improve farmers' income status and bargaining power,and form social supervision.Secondly,through the establishment of the market-based price mechanism of rural land,implement monetary compensation,employment placement,social security improvement and other forms of multiple compensations,ensure the compensation procedures open and fair,improve the compensation mechanism,and promote the realization of benefits-sharing based on "contribution-risk".In addition,the key to perfecting the macro system lies in:?improving the rural land property rights system by clarifying the property rights subject,strengthening the property rights of land contractual management rights and homestead use rights,and accelerating the registration and certification of collective land;?Through appropriate selection of the consolidation area,reasonable control of HOOK program,rational planning of the site selection and supporting construction of the resettlement area to intensify planning control and guidance.?Improve the land market mechanism by implementing land acquisition system reforms that focus on x narrowing the scope of land acquisition and marketization,allowing rural collective construction land to enter the land market freely,establishing urban and rural land market intermediary service systems.?Reform the governance performance appraisal system by emphasizing labor and employment,resident income,and social security.?Reform the financial distribution system by adjusting the central and local land transfer income sharing and increasing the land-related tax types of local governments.? Promote public participation and supervision mechanisms by strengthening policy propaganda,expanding the scope of information disclosure,and setting up telephone,network,and media channels.