Research On Supply Chain Decision Based On The Stakeholders' Preferences

Internet popularity and the improvement of environmental awareness have changed the operating model of supply chain.The online and offline sales,green products,green consumption and green technology have spawned the dual-channel supply chain and green supply chain,which has promoted the development of supply chain theory,but has also intensified the competition in the supply chain and led to the increasingly prominent contradictions among supply chain stakeholders.The irrationality of the benefit distribution mechanism will lead to negative cooperation among stakeholders,especially as the behavior supply chain research shows that the stakeholders will exhibit different behavioral preferences under different power structures which have different influences on the supply chain.Therefore,in order to better develop the supply chain and improve its competitiveness,it is of great practical significance to study the behavioral preferences of stakeholders of supply chain.Based on the study of relevant references and summarization,this paper puts forward the research problems and significance.Using behavioral economics knowledge to establish the game models under different power structures from the perspective of fairness preference,risk aversion preference and consumer balking preference,this paper discusses different decisions of supply chain under the behavioral preference of stakeholders.And the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.The main work is as follows:(1)First,under the stochastic demand,the supply chain coordination of consumer balking preference and demand-dependent effort is studied.By establishing a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer,the paper analyzes the different decisions in the centralized and decentralized models and uses revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain.The study finds that the probability of consumer balking can increase the profit of the supply chain and the threshold of inventory is opposite.It is also found that the revenue and cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain and only the revenue sharing contract can't coordinate the supply chain.In addition,numerical analysis also shows the opposite impacts of the probability of consumer balking and the threshold of inventory on the supply chain.Second,under the consideration of consumer balking preference,a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer is studied.A newsboy model based on consumer balking parameters and demand-dependent price is established,and the centralized and decentralized models of supply chain are analyzed.The optimal decisions are obtained.The supply chain coordination is analyzed using revenue-sharing contract,revenue sharing and cost-sharing contract,and revenue-sharing contracts based on selling discounts and penalties.It is found that the expected selling quantity and expected reduced selling quantity are influenced conversely by the threshold of inventory and probability of a sale under customer balking.Numerical analysis shows that the expected selling quantity and expected reduced sales quantity are both quadratic functions of the probability of consumer balking and threshold of inventory,which are affected differently.(2)The paper studies a two-stage green supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral green manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer,using game theory and Nash bargaining solutions to establish the models under the manufacturer-led,retailer-led and Nash equilibrium power structures and obtains the optimal price and product greenness under different power structures,and compares the decisions of green supply chain and the influences of fairness preference under different power structures.Through numerical analysis,it is found that fairness preference is positively correlated with product greenness under manufacturer-led and Nash equilibrium models and negatively correlated with retail price and wholesale price.Under the retailer-led model,it is positively correlated with wholesale price,but retail price and product greenness are not impacted by the fairness preference.Second,considering the impacts of power structure and fairness preference on the green supply chain,the paper studies a green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer,using the mean-variance method to establish the fairness utility function for the manufacturer and retailer,and analyzes the game model under the manufacturer-led retailer's fairness preference,the retailer-led manufacturer's fairness preference and Nash equilibrium power structure,and compares and analyzes the decisions under different power structures.The study finds that the fairness preference can reduce retail price,wholesale price and product greenness under the manufacturer-led power structure,while the fairness preference can increase wholesale price and has no effect on retail price and product greenness under the retailer-led power structure.(3)First,the paper analyses a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer.The manufacturer's risk utility function is established by using the mean-variance theory,and the centralized and decentralized decisions of whether the production cost is disturbed is analyzed and the comparative analysis of the different decisions and the paper verifies the analysis results by numerical anlysis.The conclusions show that the retail price,direct selling price and the order quantity have certain robustness whether centralized or decentralized supply chain.At the same time,the retail price,the direct selling price and wholesale price are negative correlation to the risk aversion within a certain interval,while the order quantity is opposite.Second,under the market fluctuation,risk aversion and power structure,a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is established,and a centralized risk-averse model,the manufacturer-led risk-averse retailer's model,the retailer-led risk-averse manufacturer's model,Nash equilibrium risk-averse manufacturer and retailer's model are studied,the optimal decisions are drawn under different power structures,and the impacts of market demand fluctuations and risk aversion on supply chain decision-making are analyzed respectively.The numerical analysis proves the impacts of market demand fluctuation and risk aversion on the supply chain.The study shows that market fluctuation and risk aversion are negatively correlated with retail price,direct selling price and wholesale price under centralized mode,retailer-led mode and Nash equilibrium mode,while direct selling price is not affected when the manufacturer is dominant;the ordering quantity under four power structures increases with risk aversion and market fluctuation.(4)Through the analysis of the whole paper,the research conclusions are summarized,and some management inspirations are given.It provides a certain reference for the supply chain managers,and also enriches the content of the supply chain theory to a certain extent.And the paper puts forward the problems in the research and further explains the future work of research.The innovation of this paper lies in the product flow as the main line,the stakeholders'preference as the research object,and the game theory,the newsboy model and the behavioral economics theory are used to establish the game model under the fairness preference,risk-averse preference and consumer balking preference in the different structures.It analyzes the impacts of manufacturer preference,retailer preference and consumer preference on supply chain decisions.Specifically there are showed in several aspects:(1)The innovation of research perspectiveThis paper takes the behavioral preferences of supply chain stakeholders as the research object,and analyzes the behavioral preferences of consumer-retailer-manufacturer on supply chain decision-making from the perspective of the order of the participants in the overall supply chain reverse product flow.With different influences,we systematically study the influences of the overall supply chain behavior on supply chain operation.(2)The innovation of research contentThe research content involves not only the traditional supply chain but also the hotspots in the green supply chain and dual-channel supply chain,and analyzes the impacts of multiple factors on the supply chain decision,at the same time,the influences of behavior preference on supply chain decision-making under unbalanced power structure are studied from the perspective that the followers have obvious behavioral preferences.First,this paper studies supply chain decision-making under the constraints of consumer balking and random demand.1)This paper establishes a newsboy model under the consumer balking,which is different from the previous literature,and at the same time establishes the function of the expected reduced selling quantity.2)This paper analyzes the impacts of consumer balking on supply chain decision-making in consideration of demand-dependent efforts,and conducts supply chain coordination through revenue sharing and cost-sharing contract.3)The decision-making model based on demand-dependent efforts is established to analyze the optimal pricing and order quantity under the consumer balking.Coordinating analysis is developed through revenue sharing contracts,revenue and cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract based on sales discounts and penalties.The numerical simulation is used to analyze the joint influences of consumer balking parameters on the supply chain.Based on this,its application which is very meaningful has been further analyzed and expanded.Second,the impacts of different fairness preferences on green supply chain decisions.1)The manufacturer's fairness utility function and retailer fairness utility function are established by using Nash bargaining as a fairness reference point.2)When the green cost is only undertaken by the manufacturer,this paper analyzes the decisions of manufacturer-led,retailer-led and Nash equilibrium's green supply chain under manufacturer fairness preference.3)After considering the factors of power structure and fairness preference,this paper establishes three supply chain models based on the manufacturer-led and retailers' fairness preference,retailer-led and manufacturers' fairness preference,and Nash equilibrium's structures.The purpose is to compare and analyze the actual model to obtain a more reasonable management inspiration.Last,this paper examines the impacts of risk aversion on the dual-channel supply chain in different scenarios.1)This paper considers the impacts of production cost on the manufacturer and analyzes the dual-channel supply chain decision-making under the risk-averse manufacturer.The manufacturer's risk aversion utility function is established by using the mean-variance method.And through the establishment of a decision model under the centralized and decentralized system,the impacts of production cost disruption and manufacturer's risk aversion on the dual-channel supply chain are analyzed.2)Based on the different influences of different power structures and the risk-averse attitude on the supply chain,this paper establishes the game models of centralized risk aversion,manufacturer-led retailer risk aversion,retailer-led manufacturer risk aversion and risk aversion avoidance under Nash equilibrium.At the same time,this paper analyzes the impacts of risk aversion and market fluctuation on the dual-channel supply chain decision under different power structures in combination with market fluctuation factors.