American foreign policy toward Afghanistan: 1919--2001

This research project has focused on analysis of American foreign policy toward Afghanistan from its independence in 1919 until the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001. The United States did not consider Afghanistan geopolitically important because the remoteness of Afghanistan and the narrow vision of American policy makers about Afghan culture and social values resulted in overlooking the strategic importance of Afghanistan. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower was determined to stop the Soviet expansion and Prime Minister Mohammad Daud wanted to develop the economy and modernize the armed forces. Premier Khrushchev on the other hand wanted to win new allies in the Cold War in South Asia and the Middle East. Despite the United States' policy of Containment and Rollback, it did not provide military and economic assistance to Afghanistan, a country located south of the Soviet Union borders. The United States' denial of economic and military assistance moved Afghanistan into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.; After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the United States aided the Afghan Mujaheddin with money and weapon to "help the Afghans to expel the Soviet Union," but in reality it wanted to protect the national interests and strategic objectives of the United States in the region. In doing so the United States helped the most extremist elements of the Afghan Jihad. The American blind support of the Mujaheddin enabled them to defeat the Soviet Union, but also led to the civil war of 1992-1996 and the 3 current conflict in Afghanistan.; To remove the Taliban and have access to the petroleum and gas resources of Central Asia, the United States used the war on terrorism and the pretense of promoting democracy to install a surrogate regime in Kabul. Even though some argue that the current situation in Afghanistan will lead to stability, security, and democracy, the escalation of violence, lack of central authority, increase in political and ethnic conflict, and warlordism indicates that the current government will continue to be fragmented and unviable. Warlords will continue to rule the country and undermine efforts that would consolidate democratic institutions. Poor security and economic disparities will continue to exist and people will experience continuous human rights violations and drug trafficking. This will allow the neighboring and other countries involved in petroleum and security politics in the region to manipulate the domestic and foreign politics of Afghanistan to their advantage. The result will be a situation that exited between 1992 and 1996.