| In this dissertation I present a challenge to the Truth Conditional (TC) theory of meaning that has dominated 20th century analytic philosophy and linguistics. I trace a line of development of a set of ideas about language beginning with Frege, continuing through Austin and Searle, and culminating in Cognitive Linguistics, which offer both a critique of the TC theory and an alternative to it, based on the underlying cognitive nature of language.; In Chapter 1, I present the motivations, assumptions, and methodology of the TC theory, as found in the work of Donald Davidson, one of its main proponents. I then argue that its methodology, which rests on finding transformations of sentences of natural language into sentences of first order logic, is fundamentally flawed. It relies on the assumption that truth is the sole semantic value, i.e. that meaning is constituted by truth-conditions, for which Davidson provides no justification.; With Frege, one of Davidson's main sources of inspiration, we find, in Chapter 2, instead of such a justification, compelling arguments against it. Frege identifies several components of natural language, sense, force, and ideas, which are indeed part of language but cannot be captured by the notions of truth and reference.; We then turn in Chapters 2 and 3 to Austin and Searle, who develop Frege's insights into Speech Act Theory. In its most developed form, Speech Act theory highlights the cognitive phenomena underlying language and, based on that, provides an alternate pattern of linguistic explanation to the TC theory.; It is only with Cognitive Linguistics, however, presented in Chapters 4 and 5, that we get a fully developed alternative theory of language based on its underlying cognitive nature. Language is not an algorithmic, formal system whose semantics is based on objective properties of the world. It consists rather of an inventory of cognitive resources open to a variety of interpretive, cognitive processes. It is therefore less than fully compositional and predictable, open to context and general cognition, and subjective and dynamic in nature.; I conclude with an analysis of the broader methodological implications for a theory of meaning. |
