| It is the critique of Western metaphysics in the thought of the later Martin Heidegger that poses the problem for consideration in this work. Namely, if Western metaphysics as onto-theology has indeed fulfilled its prefigured configurations and found its completion in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, as Heidegger claims, then what place, if any, is left for those theologians inspired by Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics? To assist in developing a basis upon which to address this issue, I limit this work to a critical examination of Whitehead's metaphysics in light of the later Heidegger's critique of onto-theology. Therefore Heidegger's critique is normative for this project.;Specifically, it is shown that Whitehead's metaphysics does not divide entities into existence and essence; nor does it search for the explanatory principle (arche); nor is God understood as causa prima and therefore causa sui; nor is Creativity an empty concept and therefore nihilistic; nor is his metaphysics rooted in the cogito sum, nor does it anthropomorphize the world in order to secure certainty amongst multiple perspectives. Whitehead's metaphysics does not lead away from Being (Sein); rather, it may very well provide an occasion for Being (Sein). After this evaluation there are some brief remarks offered about how Whitehead's metaphysics, while not obscuring Being (Sein) in any of the ways detailed by Heidegger, also offers a philosophy of nature. This philosophy of nature leaves open the possibility of developing a natural theology that is not necessarily indicted by Heidegger's critique.;The application of Heidegger's critique to Whitehead's metaphysics results in the following conclusion: Whitehead's metaphysics does not commit the mistakes detailed in Heidegger's critique of metaphysics. It is demonstrated, further, that the general character of Whitehead's metaphysics as fallibilistic at least leaves his metaphysics open to the possibility of Being (Sein). |
