| The term "phenomenal consciousness" refers to our conscious experience of qualitative properties ("phenomena" or "qualia") such as the red colour of a rose, the taste of chocolate or the feeling of pain. It presents a philosophical problem because such experiences appear to be irreconcilable with the contemporary conviction that all mental properties can ultimately be explained in strictly material (e.g. neurological) terms. It seems that even someone with complete and perfect neurological knowledge of the human brain could never deduce what it is like to see a red rose, what chocolate tastes like, or how pain feels. Phenomenal consciousness is therefore said to be one of the last remaining mysteries. In this dissertation, it is shown that this outwardly mysterious nature of consciousness is the consequence of a well-established, seemingly intuitive, but highly problematic conception of consciousness. Discarding this way of thinking effectively dissolves, rather than solves, the associated philosophical worries. Doing away with one conception of consciousness, however, requires it to be replaced by a new way of thinking. In the course of exploring several theories, among which higher-order perception, higher-order thought, dispositionalist higher-order thought, representationalist and enactive accounts, the concept of consciousness implicitly put forward by each theory is distilled. That concept is then tested by asking whether it brings us closer to an explanatory understanding of phenomenal consciousness, or whether it is, under the cover of technical smoke and mirrors, built on a crooked way of thinking. It is suggested that a particular interpretation of Dennett's (1991) multiple drafts account offers an appropriate conception of consciousness. Using the innovative parts of other discussed theories, a general way of thinking about consciousness is sketched. It is concluded that, because consciousness is essentially subjective, it is best understood in terms of the subjective meaning subjects endow upon the constant impact the world makes on them. Being conscious is, as such, simply being-in-the-world. Phenomenal character, it is further claimed, should not be understood as something that can be known; it should be taken to refer to a particular situation or state of being of the subject. |
