Wrestling rogue states: The limits of coercive political-military strategies in asymmetric conflicts

Confronting rogue states remains a central challenge in US foreign policy. Despite its superior power, the United States has had an inconsistent record of success in using coercive political and military strategies to influence rogue states. Theories of coercion do not explain these variations in outcomes of coercive efforts by the United States. Moreover, most international relations theory is too abstract to provide policymakers with practical knowledge that can assist in devising better policies. This study uses a case study methodology to derive policy-relevant conclusions about the conditions under which coercive strategies succeed or fail. I explore the dynamics of coercion by examining eight recent historical cases---ranging from Vietnam to Syria in 2005---in which the United States employed coercive strategies against rogue states over issues ranging from territorial aggression to WMD proliferation. I break down the strategies and goals pursued by both sides in each of the cases and examine how rogue states respond to changes in US strategy during the crises. From these cases, I have found that coercion succeeds against rogue regimes when the United States achieves the following four conditions: (a) it establishes credibility in the eyes of the rogue regime; (b) it defeats the rogue state's political-military strategy, or threatens the political survival of the hostile regime; (c) it isolates the rogue state internationally; and (d) it prevents the rogue state from incrementally improving its political or military position. These conditions, which are explained in detail, form a set of general knowledge that policymakers can use to devise more effective coercive strategies or to help them identify situations in which coercive strategies are likely to fail.