States Of Coercive Diplomacy: The Commonwealth Of The Internal Dynamics Point Of View Of Analysis

After the cold war, when a country tried to employ coercive diplomacy, instead of unilaterally coercing the adversary, they tended to exploit coalitional coercion with other countries. Significant as it is, this phenomenon has not been attached enough attention to in theoretical studies. Most of the existing researches on it are only listing experience on the basis of empirical research. Few of them have drawn theoretical conclusions that can be used to explain and predict.This paper tries to study from the perspective of dynamics of the coalition to improve the above situation. According to the differences in the dynamics of the coalition, the coalitions can be divided into four categories, namely, aggregation, hegemonic, concert and ambivalent, and three dimensions are brought out: compatibility of interests among the member states, interdependence among the member states and ratio of interests among the member states. The author argues that coalition dynamics imposes great influence on variables of coercive diplomacy, and therefore, affects its operational process and outcomes. On the other hand, coalition dynamics is also affected by the following four factors: moral factor, international organizations, military factor, and apportionment of costs and stimulating system in the coalition. This paper analyzes the whole process of coercive diplomacy influenced by coalition dynamics and other factors in five stages: establishment of the coalition, coercer's policy making, issuing demands and threats, the opponent's responses and the coercer's responses.In post-cold-war diplomacy, most coercers chose hegemonic and ambivalent coalitions. Therefore, the author uses the cases of the Gulf Crisis and the First North Korean Crisis to show how the dynamics of hegemonic and ambivalent coalitions affects coercive diplomacy.The paper concludes that the higher the Compatibility of Interests among member states in a coalition, the more positive effects it will impose on coercive diplomacy, and vice versa. The asymmetry of interdependence among member states will cause Abandonment-entrapment dilemma, counteracting coercive diplomacy. The interest ratio of member states on conflicts may help overcome the above dilemma and may also cause security dilemma in coalition. The coercer may try for successful coercive diplomacy by ?improving the dynamics of its coalition. In addition, the coercer may improve the dynamics of its coalition by making good use of the four kinds of factors mentioned above.