Eisenhower's New Look, tactical nuclear weapons, and limited war with a case study of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958

President Eisenhower appeared sincere in his belief in protecting the economy and reducing government expenditure on defense. He saw vast spending on defense as harmful to the economy, and fatal to democratic values. The President's New Look defense policy sought to achieve both balanced budgets and a sufficient defense. The New Look nuclearized the armed forces at every level in order to provide firepower at the expense of manpower. However, what was the cost to military capability of these savings?; Critics have ridiculed the “pentomic” reorganization and ideas of battlefield nuclear war which obscures the seriousness with which the Army took it at the time. Nuclearization did bring about nuclear powered submarines, carriers, cruisers and frigates. The Army did introduce nuclear artillery and it developed the doctrine for helicopter assault tactics—the Air Cav—in the 1950s for the mobile atomic battlefield, not for anti-guerrilla activities in Vietnam.; Utilizing the example of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 this study suggests that the nuclearization reduced the effectiveness of conventional capabilities, resulted in a difficulty in fighting limited wars—especially with tactical nuclear weapons—and limited the military response options of the President. The military readiness of the armed forces have a place in understanding the unfolding of any Cold War crisis. Cold War studies often focus upon strategic weapons; however the various wars fought during the Cold War were limited and fought with conventional weapons. Issues of doctrine, training, tactical systems—in short, military effectiveness—are important in finding what the real military balance was at different stages of the Cold War. The New Look military program did not occur in a vacuum, or simply in the realm of economics, but had to cope with, and exist within, a world of specific political circumstances.