| Throughout the Cold War, the West German security elite maintained a security consensus based upon a rapidly ascending escalation ladder, leading to the utilization of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, as the primary means of deterring Soviet military aggression. Beginning in 1982, and culminating in 1987 with the INF Treaty, the security consensus of the Federal Republic that had prevailed for 31 years, collapsed. Shortly thereafter in 1988, traditionally supportive elements of extended deterrence within the CDU/CSU began calling for the "Third Zero" and the removal of short-range nuclear weapons from Germany.; Attaining an understanding of, and explaining this radical disjuncture in German strategic policy is the ultimate goal. As a means of achieving this goal, this paper attempts to answer the question surrounding whether or not Germany has gone through a period of strategic revisionism, and if not, what then would account for the dramatic shift in German strategic policy?... |
