| The current research aims at providing a decision-aid tool related to the international climate policies and studying the conditions for a world self-enforcement agreement on climate change, satisfying both techno-economic efficiency and acceptability, as defined by the interest of players to cooperate.; First, the research discusses the coupling of damage costs due to climate change with a cost-efficiency analysis based on a technical-economic linear programming model like MARKAL. Our empirical analysis proves that a linear relationship links regional damages and cumulative global emissions, so that cooperative solution and non-cooperative equilibrium can be much more easily calculated by solving local optimization problems in a case where international trade effects of climate policies are neglected.; Second, a new version of the advanced multi-region World MARKAL model was developed and calibrated to the A1B scenario of IPCC over a 50-year time horizon. The model is also used to study cooperative CO2 abatement scenarios. The results prove, among others, that the level of non-emitting electricity generation in the base case is crucial, and that the CO2 capture and sequestration options compete directly with renewable electricity generation and contributes to a major reduction in the marginal cost of CO 2.; Third, cooperative and non-cooperative world climate strategies are modeled with an integrated version of the world MARKAL model. Assuming interregional transfers to share the global gain of cooperation, our work adopts the point of view of dynamic partial equilibrium computation coupled with cooperative game-theoretic principles. The results illustrate the climatic and economic gap between cooperation and non-cooperation, the willingness of regions to cooperate, and the amount of side-payments. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)... |
