Motivated reasoning in legal decision-making

In this dissertation I identify a puzzle that was created, then largely ignored by behavioral scholars doing empirical work on the courts. The puzzle arises from the substantial disconnect between how judges characterize their reasoning processes and the demonstrated influence of policy preferences on the decisions they make. I discuss how the concept of motivated reasoning has been invoked to resolve the tension between legal and attitudinal accounts of decision-making and evaluate that claim in light of research on the role of motivation in other decision contexts.;I question the dominant assumption in behavioral research that judges are primarily policy oriented. I offer an alternative characterization of motives based on the idea that people who are trained in the legal tradition come to internalize norms consistent with idealized models of decision-making. Consistent with psychological findings demonstrating limits on motivated decision processes, I suggest accepted norms of decision-making serve as a constraint on the ability of decision-makers to reach conclusions consistent with their policy preferences.;I test two potential avenues of motivated reasoning in legal reasoning: analogical perception and the separability of preferences in cases involving multiple issues. Using an experimental approach I find that each is a potential avenue of attitudinal influence in legal decision-making. However, there is also substantial evidence of constraint in studies testing both mechanisms. I conclude in with a summary of main findings and a discussion of implications for future research.